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A Theory of Law and Information:
Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and
Insider Trading
James Boylet
In this Article, Professor Boyle undertakes an analysis of the law's
treatment of information across four apparently disparate realms: copyright, genetic information, blackmail, and insider trading. He argues that
questions of information regulation, commodification, and access are
shaped by two neglected processes of interpretive construction. First, such
issues are often decided by pigeonholing them into implicitly contradictory
stereotypes of "public" or "private" information. These conflicting stereotypes have their roots in basic assumptions about politics, the market, and
privacy in a liberal state. Second, Professor Boyle argues that tension
between these stereotypes is often apparently resolved by the use of a seductive image: the romantic author whose original, transformative genius justifies private property and fuels public debate. Thus, conventional wisdom,
courts, and even economic analysts are more likely to favor granting propt Copyright 1992, James Boyle, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The
American University. LL.B. 1980, Glasgow University; LL.M. 1981, S.J.D. 1986, Harvard
University. This Article was written while I was a Visiting Professor at Boston University Law
School and Harvard Law School. The research funds of those schools supplied valuable assistance.
As befits a piece that questions the notion of authorship and originality, this one is marked by
fundamental intellectual debts. Four articles have been particularly influential: Peter Jaszi, Toward
a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship"; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries; Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Bohfeld; and Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author." I have also been influenced by the work of
Rosemary Coombe, and by the prodigious and sophisticated oeuvre of Wendy Gordon. This Article
draws on a theory of authorship and its relevance to property, romance, and interpretation that I
first laid out in The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers. Earlier versions of this
Article were presented at the 1991 Case-Western Conference on Intellectual Property and the
Construction of Authorship, and at faculty colloquia at Harvard Law School and Boston University
Law School. I would like to thank all of the participants for helping me to refine my ideas.
Colleagues at Harvard Law School, American University, and Boston University were generous with
their time. I have benefitted particularly from comments by Frank Michelman, Fred Schauer, Terry
Fisher, Howell Jackson, Terry Martin, David Carlson, Mark Hager, Jack Beermann, Joe Singer,
Rudy Peritz, Mark Rose, Margreta de Grazia, Steven Shavell, Louis Kaplow, Bob Bone, and David
Seipp. William Alford's work on intellectual property in China was also extremely helpful. Anne
Hollander, Gerry Moohr, and the rest of the participants in the Modern Legal Theory Seminar also
helped me to refine my ideas. Jae Won Kim, Jennifer Ritter, David Dantzic, and Beth Silberman
researched expertly. Above and beyond these other debts, however, this piece only exists because of
a conversation carried on over the last eight years with my polymath colleague, Peter Jaszi. It is to
him that I would like to dedicate it.
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erty rights in information when the controller of this information can convincingly be ascribed the qualities of originality, creativity, and
individuality, the defining attributes of romantic authorship. This is possible in the copyright domain and for manipulators, if not sources, ofgenetic
information. Blackmailers and insider traders cannot so readily be fitted
into the romantic author mold, and are classified instead as transgressors
against, respectively, the "private" and "public" stereotypes of information. The Article concludes by assessing the impact of the implicit stereotypes on the politics of the "information age." Professor Boyle argues that
an emphasis upon the ideology of authorship could be as important to an
information society as the notions offreedom of contract and wage labor
were to an earlier, industrialized society. This ideology of authorship, Professor Boyle contends, with its tendency to devalue the claims of sources
and of audience, has the potential for strong detrimental effects on the
political and economic structure of the "information age. "
INTRODUCTION

It is hard, nowadays, to find a piece of futurology that doesn't say
we are entering an information age. Yet there have been few systematic
critical studies of the rhetorical, ideological, political, and, ultimately,
legal structures through which we deal with information. 1 At the same
1. Among legal scholars, only the economic analysts oflaw have seemed interested in dealing
holistically with information, rather than with the doctrinal categories into which law has
traditionally divided it. The two most striking examples of the holistic approach are Frank H.
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 309, and Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics ofRights in
Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980). In a manner reminiscent of legal realist
scholarship, these studies suggest that doctrinal divisions may obscure the need for enlightened
policymaking. Easterbrook, for example, is concerned that, "[i]fthe Court puts information cases in
securities law or evidence law pigeonholes, it may overlook the need to consider the way in which
the incentive to produce information and the demands of current use conflict." Easterbrook, supra,
at 314. While I agree with the impulse to treat information holistically, my goals are rather different.
Later in this Article, I argue that despite its holistic treatment of information, the law and economics
literature is beset by a number of conceptual "baseline" and Hohfeldian errors, and that it presents
an ideology of "authorial" incentive as ifit were not ideology, but empirical fact. See infra Part IV.
Nonlawyers have come close to my concerns here. Kim L. Scheppelle's book Legal Secrets
gives a thoughtful contractarian analysis of secrets in cases related mainly to fraud, privacy, and
professional requirements of confidentiality. In the process she offers a critique of Chicago-style law
and economics and an interesting defense of egalitarian informational ethics. KIM L. SCHEPPELLE,
LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988). Literary critics have
also contributed to the issue. In a recent book, Susan Stewart offers a fascinating analysis of the
intersection of law and a range of "crimes of writing"-forgery, literary imposture, pornography,
and graffiti-and the relevance of this intersection to notions of SUbjectivity and authenticity. SUSAN
STEWART, CRIMES OF WRmNG: PROBLEMS IN THE CONTAINMENT OF REPRESENTATION (1991).
Bernard Edelman's Le Droit Saisit par la Photographie (published in English as BERNARD
EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE (1979» goes in the other direction, giving an Althusserian
analysis of law through an examination of intellectual property law relating to photographs. In the
process he raises some of the problems of objectification, originality, and commodification that I deal
with here. Finally, in a forthcoming work, Mark Rose offers an excellent analysis of the historical
connections between "authorship" and copyright in England. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND
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time, the area of legal doctrine that acknowledges that its main concern
is information-conventionally defined intellectual property-is marked
by severe disagreements over the most fundamental propositions. For
example, within copyright there are continuing disputes over a wide
range of basic issues-the classification of something as idea or expression, the definition of "fact works," and the dilemma of how to treat
computer programs being some of the more obvious. 2 Areas outside
intellectual property, although superficially commonsensical, are also
beset by basic conceptual puzzles. Blackmail and insider trading both
represent proscribed forms of trading in information that, when defined
in abstract terms, seem to conform exactly to moral and legal norms
accepted elsewhere in society. In the former case, why should private
individuals be forbidden to make private agreements regarding the dissemination of privately held information? Insider trading is even more
puzzling. Markets are built on structured inequality. Why should we
not let people trade from a position of advantage in information, just as
we let them trade from a position of advantage in wealth? Finally, if we
look at the legal treatment of genetic information-which, with electronic information, may define the international economy of the immediate future 3-we find a morass of formalism, circular arguments, and
incoherent theories of property.
Taking these puzzles as its raw material, this Article attempts to
develop a theory of law and information. Its aim is not to produce a
formula for resolving all problems, but rather to show the themes
repeated in, and the possibilities suppressed by, our current treatment of
information issues. In particular, the Article argues that questions of
information regulation, commodification, and access are shaped by the
intersection of two neglected processes of interpretive construction.
First, such questions are often decided by an uncritical process of
pigeonholing into a number of stereotypes of "public" or "private" information. These stereotypes have their roots in relatively basic assumpOWNERS: THE INVENTION OF CoPYRIGHT (forthcoming 1993). Rose's work has both parallels to
and differences from Woodmansee's pioneering article on the same issues in Germany, see Martha
Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of
the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984), and my discussion of the valences of an
ideology of authorship for interpretation and entitlement, see James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an
Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625 (1988). For a critical comparison of
our approaches, see David Saunders & Ian Hunter, Lessonsfrom the "Literatory": How to Historicise
Authorship, 17 CRmcAL INQUIRY 479,491-500 (1991).
2. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 464 ("At present, the surface patterning American copyright law is in apparent
disarray. Judges and writers can not agree on the most basic propositions."); Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 998 (1990) ("[T]here is ample precedent deciding almost every
copyright issue in almost every conceivable direction.").
3. Those with a taste for ambiguous dystopias may care to look at Neuromancer, which offers
a fictional vision of a world organized around the trade, control, and theft of genetic and electronic
information. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984).
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tions about property, society, and privacy in a liberal state. Second, the
tensions among and between these stereotypes are often lessened by an
appeal to a particular (and particularly romantic) image of information
production-the author who produces originality ex nihilo and thus
should be rewarded with honor and property rights. The Article argues
that the contradictions, assumptions, and lacunae of these two processes
are an important part of any study of the current law of information, or
the future social arrangements of the information society.
A note on method may be in order. The first half of this Articlewith its concentration on the doctrinal and argumentative patterns generated by the apparent contradiction of "information property"-bears a
certain resemblance to the structuralist legal theories of the early 1980s.
Like the authors of those articles, I claim that understanding a particular
set of tensions allows us to see patterns in otherwise diverse doctrinal
developments, to relate legal issues to basic conflicts of political vision, to
anticipate the structure of the rhetoric on both sides of any issue, and to
see the moral and political inconsistencies in the way that we deal with
information. This may sound suspiciously like overblown claims to have
discovered the "fundamental contradiction" or even the driving wheel of
history. My goal is rather different.
Structuralist and determinist accounts of social forces generally
argue that one area of social life-the means and relations of production,
the mediation of the fundamental tension between self and others, or the
patterns of childrearing-is the real determinant of history. All else is
chimera and superstructure. The claims I make here are much more
modest. At most, I am trying to layout the normative topography, the
geography of assumptions within which issues are framed, possibilities
foreclosed, and so on. This geography matters because it excludes some
options from consideration (excludes them even from being seen, perhaps) or prompts a hasty leap to judgment, or because it is one of the
many forces shaping the terrain of political struggle. But the ideas and
ideologies I am describing are neither so deeply rooted in the culture that
they can never be criticized, nor so determinate that they dictate only one
solution: the process is neither a giant conspiracy nor a deterministic
and inevitable deep structure of thought.
The second theme of this Article is its critique of romantic authorship. I claim that a series of concepts associated with the romantic
notion of the "author" is offered as a device to mediate, defer, or apparently resolve the internal tensions of regulating information. Most of the
time, courts accept the author gambit, even if the "author" is plainly
recombining elements mined free of charge from the public sphere (or
even the private body). My examples of this pattern come from copyright doctrine and the law of property in genetic information. Occasionally, however, for reasons apparently related to the pattern of tensions
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between public and private spheres, the author gambit is declined, and
the putative "authors" are instead told they cannot profit from their use
of information. Blackmail and insider trading are the two examples
given here: both of these would seem like classic market transactions,
were it not for the fact that they concern information and thus conjure
up all the contradictions and tensions which beset the treatment of information in liberal social theory. The doctrine of blackmail defends the
image of the private sphere by protecting an individual's subjectively
defined "private" information from commodification in the marketplace.
The prohibition of insider trading protects the image of the public sphere
by imposing the ideas of formal equality on market transactions precisely
because they concern information, rather than some other form of power
or wealth. My thesis is strengthened by the fact that insider trading
seems from scholarly reaction to lie particularly close to the line. Indeed,
the acknowledged pioneer-critic of insider trading law relied heavily on
the rhetoric of authorial, entrepreneurial genius to support decriminalization.4 Perhaps insider traders can be authors after all.
This aspect of the Article, and partiCUlarly its discussion of the
social construction of authorship, is reminiscent of poststructuralist criticism. My conclusion-with its reliance on both economic analysis and
literary criticism, and with its attempt to imagine the effects of a transposition of the traditions of nineteenth century liberalism to the social relations of an information society-could fashionably be styled as
postmodernist. Thus, for those who are interested, this Article presents a
kind of layer cake of the intellectual methods of the last fifteen years.
There was a reason behind this methodological eclecticism. My hope is
that this piece will be seen as an example of constructive engagement
between the main schools of legal scholarship, prompting economic analysts to consider the interpretive construction that grounds their theories,
devotees of law and literature to look beyond the text to the structure of
incentives through which the text was created, and critical legal scholars
to take seriously their professed commitment to decoding the social construction of reality in a way that produces practical suggestions for
change. Nevertheless, I have tried as far as possible to make sure that
familiarity with these academic movements is not necessary to understand the central arguments presented here.
The structure of the Article replicates that of this introduction. In
Part I, I set up the four subjects mentioned in the title of the Article. My
aim is to treat them as academic conundrums worthy of solution in their
own right and as case studies that help us to lay the groundwork for a
theory of law and information.
In Parts II and III, I argue that the doctrinal disputes and confu4. See infra text accompanying notes 224-40.

1420

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1413

sions in all of these areas can be usefully understood as reflections of a set
of basic tensions-in particular the tensions between public and private,
speech and property, formal equality and restitutio in integrum. These
tensions are especially painful because speech, debate, and the exchange
of information are so important to the liberal vision of politics and economics and to the construction of the public and private realms.
In Part IV, I turn to the area of information economics. The uncertainties and tensions in conventional legal and political discourse about
information, combined with the obvious analytical importance of concepts such as incentives to production and barriers to exchange, make
information issues seem particularly susceptible to economic analysis.
Legal scholars now routinely turn to microeconomic concepts, whether
of "the public goods problems of intellectual property" or the attributes
of an "efficient capital market," to resolve problems in the production,
generation, commodification, or use of information. Is this reliance on
economic analysis warranted? Drawing on the recent theoretical literature and on the structure of tensions described in this Article, I argue
that information economics is paradoxical or at least aporetic. S Consequently, it provides no real surcease from the difficulties of liberal state
theory or from the indeterminate topography of "public" and "private."
Sometimes economists treat information as just another product,
something that must be commodified if producers are to be given an
incentive to produce it. At other times, they treat it as part of the structure of the market: infinite, perfect, and circulating without let or hindrance. I argue that contemporary microeconomics offers only the most
intuitive basis for evaluating which "aspect" of information is fundamental to the analysis. Yet it also offers no convincing way of reconciling the
competing "aspects" into a uniquely correct ordering of preferences or
structure of tradeoffs. Any attempted reconciliation ends in paradox, a
fact noted by at least one prominent pair of economists. 6 In fact, information presents almost the same kind of difficulties for neoclassical eco5. Aporia-and its adjectival form, aporetic-means literally, "in a state of doubt."
Philosophers and political theorists have differed about the appropriateness of using the term
"paradox" or "contradiction" to describe some of the situations I layout in this Article. My claim is
that information can (and must) be defined both as a commodity, the production and distribution of
which can be analyzed within the model, and as a constituent part of the model itself. Aporia seemed
the most appropriate word to use because whether one chooses to see this as a basic theoretical fault
line, or a mere quibble that can be solved by changing the level and focus of the analysis, the nature
of information is "in a state of doubt," and the outcome of any particular economic analysis will be
profoundly different depending on which aspect is chosen. Because aporia might be an unfamiliar
word to those who love neither classical rhetoric nor German idealist philosophy, I use the word
"paradox" interchangeably. Unless specified otherwise, it is this double, and thus doubtful, quality
of information to which I am referring. Other well-known paradoxes have similar structure-for
example, the barber of Seville, who is both "a man" and "the barber," so if the barber shaves all the
men who do not shave themselves .•. ? For an explanation of the paradox created by the idea of an
informationally efficient market, see infra text accompanying notes 69-77.
6. See infra text accompanying note 83.
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nomics that rent did for classical economics: it is the problem case in
which the basic assumptions of the discipline come into conflict with
each other.
Although some economic analyses acknowledge the indeterminacies
involved in choosing which aspect of information to highlight, most are
silent on the issue. In fact, such analyses are frequently "grounded" on a
subtextual, and probably unconscious, appeal to a particular vision of
information production-the stereotype of the romantic author which I
referred to earlier. Consequently, I argue that although economics
frames some of the issues of information regulation well, the perception
that it is capable of routinely settling those issues is a false one, a false
one with important consequences.
In Part V I argue that, within the legal system, the concept of property traditionally bears the burden of resolving the tensions between public and private, but that it does so in ways that merely restate those
tensions. Thus, when we turn to a field that can best be described as
property in information, we have a set of contradictions that is literally
redoubled.
In Part VI, I test the above hypothesis by turning to the first of my
puzzles or case studies, the structure of copyright doctrine. I trace the
parallel evolution of the romantic idea of authorship--a notion that
would have been alien to Shakespeare-and the development of the concept of intellectual property. My argument is that copyright offers a
vitally important mediating strategy, a constellation of rhetorical, conceptual, and thematic ideas that seems to resolve the tensions I have
described so far. That constellation is formed by the figure of the romantic author, the theme of "original creation," and the distinction between
"idea" and "expression." It apparently provides a basis for partial and
limited property rights without raising the specter of property as merely
a utilitarian, revocable state grant, it justifies the giving of entitlements
according to a labor theory of property without spreading those entitlements too widely, and it resolves the tension between public and private
by giving the idea to the public world and the property right in expression to the writer.7 By appealing to a particular notion of progress and of
creation, the idea of "originality" downplays debts to language, culture,
and genre and thus justifies the granting of limited monopolies, even
monopolies centered around information.
The next two Parts explore the way in which the commodification of
7. This constellation ofideas appears to resolve so many of the paradoxes in the regulation of
information that one finds it in other areas of information regulation-even ones far removed from
literary creation. A particularly fascinating manifestation of this trend lies in the fact that many
economists and economic analysts of law seem just as fascinated by the romantic vision of
authorship as their econophobic precursors. One reason for this unlikely state of affairs could be
that an unconscious reliance on the idea of romantic authorship conceals the aporias of information
economics, even from the analysts themselves.
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information raises different problems depending on whether the situation
is typed as a "private" one or a "public" one. In the case of blackmail,
discussed in Part VII, the ability to control information-alone out of all
other social resources-seems to be central to our conception of personality. In the case of insider trading, discussed in Part VIII, we see information advantages, unlike other advantages in wealth or power, as
subject to the norm of equality. In both cases, I argue that if we look at
information holistically rather than within its narrower doctrinal boxes,
these two longtime subjects of scholarly dispute can be explained if not
actually resolved. In both, a refusal to commodify information is justified in part by an intuitive act of "typing" into realms of pUblicness or
privateness, each with its own ideas about justice and its own theories of
entitlement.
The mediating role of the author is also relevant to at least one of
these two subjects. Blackmail offers us no convincing author figure on
whom to pin a property right. But in insider trading, an area where
decriminalization has been seriously suggested and defended, things are
rather different. At the end of Part VIII I show that the germinal argument for the decriminalization of insider trading actually relies on an
eerily perfect invocation of the rhetoric of the romantic author or, in this
case, the romantic entrepreneur. This argument defines the entrepreneur
in terms of originality, in terms of the creative destruction of settled
arrangements. By this view, insider trading is a limited monopoly in
information that rewards the entrepreneur for his or her efforts and thus
ensures further entrepreneurial acts. Just as with copyright, society is
purportedly compensated by the advances and contributions that the
great genius throws off. In the face of such an essential contribution to
human progress, what's a little monopoly here and there?
More generally, I claim that examination of insider trading scholarship and case law gives evidence of both of the processes this Article
describes: the typing of information issues into "public" and "private"
and the attractiveness of the author concept as a device to reconcile, or at
least obscure, our conflicting notions about information.
The final puzzle, discussed in Part IX, comes from Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 8 a case that concerns ownership and control of genetic information. The Moore case presents, in miniature, each
of the conflicts referred to in this Article: the clash between a vision of
property rights as absolute or relative, between the public and private
characterization of information, between the market and "privacy," and
between natural rights and the rights of creative labor. My analysis
attempts to show the consequences, for "sources" such as Mr. Moore, of
an entitlement regime built around the notion of romantic authorship.
8.

793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
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In the Conclusion, I make three arguments. First, the Article demonstrates a particular method of "resolving" questions of information
regulation by typing the issue into one of a series of contradictory visions
of information. Second, despite Michel Foucault, postmodernism, and
the death of the novel, the romantic vision of authorship is more important today than it was to Fichte and Krause, Pope and Macaulay. The
facility with which the romantic vision appears to resolve the tensions I
describe in this Article is one of the keys to its success or failure. Sometimes the romantic vision may be "right." Yet its ahistorical claims of
universality and its overblown claims about the incentives necessary to
production, to say nothing of its overweening romanticism, make it a
dangerous template for the regulation of information. Using a string of
examples, ranging from software development to the manufacture of
pharmaceuticals, I argue that the romantic vision blinds us to the pragmatic, moral, and distributive claims of both "sources" and audience.
The final Section of the Conclusion is more speculative. Above and
beyond my attempt to reorient long-running academic debates over copyright, blackmail, insider trading, and genetic information, this Article
has a broader goal. It seems reasonable to assume that we are moving
into a world that will increasingly be structured around the collection,
manipulation, and use of information. At least at first, that world will be
discussed, debated, and regulated using ideas about information that
come from a society in which information had a rather different set of
relationships to economic power and the rhetoric of entitlement. Consequently, the final Section of the Conclusion reflects on what the "information world" could, and should, look like.
One of our greatest cultural legacies is a collection of intellectual
tools that help us to understand both the appeal and the limitations of
the rhetoric of entitlement produced by a society like ours. Thus, we
have a rich tradition of intellectual commentary on the production and
distribution of tangible objects and on the consequences of the division
between capital and labor, between ownership and control, between public and private. This commentary has produced conceptual tools such as
the labor theory of value, the Pigouvian analysis of externalities, and the
critique of the public/private split. Such tools have profound limitations
and analytical shortcomings, but they do help us to uncover that which is
suppressed or rendered invisible by the overwhelming familiarity of our
social arrangements. The final Section of the Article attempts to imagine
some of the equivalent tools for the information society.
One final note about method may be in order. My subject in this
Article is "information." Elsewhere I have explained my rejection of the
essentialist vision of language9 and the disciplinary ideas associated with
9. James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985).
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it. 10 I see this Article as a continuation of that work, rather than as a
renunciation of it. If I am not claiming that there is some preexisting,
essential component that ties together every "information" issue "properly so-called,,,lI then what holds the examples used in this study
together? My attitude towards definition in this Article has been pragmatic, in the looser sense of that term. With Felix Cohen, I believe that a
"definition ... is useful or useless . ... [It] is useful if it insures against
risks of confusion more serious than any that the definition itself
contains."l2
In this Article, I have focused on the communication and manipulation and trade of knowledge-whether found in RNA, typeface,
programmer's code, or blackmailer's photographs-and on the parties
who are seen as the rightful owners, controllers, or audiences of that
knowledge. This has led me into cognate issues presented by copyright
law, even though Pierre Menard: True Author of Don Quixote and The
Name of the Rose are not normally seen as "information."l3 Bringing
these disparate areas together does have its advantages. Each of these
areas involves situations in which tangible control of a single res is not
enough. The same compromising photograph in a blackmailer's hands,
piece of software, best-selling novel, or genetic program plugged into a
vat of gene-spliced E. coli can be used to produce an infinite number of
copies. In each, it is the message rather than the medium that is central
to the analysis. In each, one is forced to confront the division and disaggregation of the property concept, and so on.
To some, this approach may seem doubtful. Professional economists have concentrated on "innovation" rather than "information"particularly in coverage of intellectual property, but occasionally even in
their coverage of such issues as insider trading. I chose quite deliberately
to move away from this literature and to use a broad and open definition
10. James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-House of
Language, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327 (1985) [hereinafter Boyle, Ideals and Things]; James Boyle,
Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Positivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and
Essentialism, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 383 (1987) [hereinafter Boyle, Thomas Hobbes].
11. See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 167 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed.,
London, John Murray 1885).
12. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809, 835-36 (1935).
13. Patent law offers just as rich a field for analysis. I excluded it partly because of exhaustion
and lack of space, but also because of a tentative judgment that it depends on a similar conceptual
structure to that of copyright law. Both areas apply a notion of "originality" that suppresses the
importance of culture, language, and scientific community. Both exhibit the same structural pattern
of internal binary division, although the content of the divisions is not identical. (Consider the
copyright protection of expression, not idea, and the patentability of function, not form.) In each
case, it is the manifestation of the appropriate kind of genius that receives protection, while the
remainder is given to the public realm. My own background leads me to use the idea of romantic
authorship as the organizing concept. I leave open the question of whether a similar analysis could
be performed using the idea of the "inventor."
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of information as my organizing concept. In part, this choice stems from
the belief that there are interesting things to be said about both levels of
generality, and that information was the conceptual box into which my
particular theoretical interests fit most neatly. My choice also stems
from the fact that the studies that concentrate on "innovation" are destined to repeat the paradigm of the original transformative genius, rather
than subjecting it to critical assessment in each of the new contexts in
which it is deployed. I4 By themselves, of course, these explanatory
remarks could not justify my choices. In the end, it will be the work
created from the materials thus assembled that either justifies or discredits the criteria of inclusion. For epistemological reasons, if for no others,
the proof of this pudding is in the eating.

14. Some writers seem to assume that production, whether industrial or literary, is marked by
two distinct forms-one representing imitative, organic, normal science, the other transformative,
original innovation. This is as true of Schumpeter as it is of Wordsworth. See JOSEPH A.
SCHUM PETER, THE THEORY OF EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Oxford
University Press 1961) (1934). I am heartened to find that one of the most empirically detailed and
historically sensitive economic studies of technology and innovation echoes my dissatisfaction with
this conclusion. Paul David explains that he has found it much more useful to conceive of
innovation in terms of modification of particular existing processes rather than in terms of sweeping
industry-wide transformation.
[T]he economist's now conventional conceptualization of technological innovation as a
change of a neoclassical production function-an alteration of relationships between inputs
and output across the entire array of known techniques-has turned out to be less helpful
than one might wish. On more than one occasion, regrettably, it has led historical
discussions of invention and diffusion into paradox and confusion.
PAUL A. DAVID, TECHNICAL CHOICE, INNOVATION AND EcONOMIC GROWTH: EssAYS ON
AMERICAN AND BRmSH EXPERIENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 2 (1975). David's
conclusion is that
a deeper understanding of the conditions affecting the speed and ultimate extent of an
innovation's diffusion is to be obtained only by explicitly analyzing the specific choice of
technique problem [sic] which its advent would have presented to objectively dissimilar
members of the relevant (historical) population of potential adopters.
. . . Doing so, however, calls sharply into question the penchant historians of
technology have displayed for separating their task into two distinct undertakings: writing
the 'history of common practices' and the 'history of inventions,' and supposing that it will
prove useful to continue to pursue each enterprise rather independently of the other.
Id. at 5. In this Article, I stress that the fixation on authors, inventors, and entrepreneurs tends to
obscure the importance of continuity, indebtedness, and evolution and to overemphasize that of
transformation, originality, and revolution. Having claimed that this vision of creation undervalues
genre, tradition, and source, I point out that it also ignores the contradictory roles that information
is expected to play-even within the world of microeconomics. Consequently, I argue that one
cannot draw the kind of general conclusions that most economists and historians have drawn about
the relationship of any particular kind of information, or innovation, to some abstract legal form.
For obvious reasons, my use of the larger conceptual category of information facilitates this
argument considerably. David's account, with its stress on dissimilar circumstances, particular
empirical evidence, and the intimate relationship between the "innovation" and the practices it
modifies, seems to me to support at least part of this effort.
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I
FOUR PUZZLES

A.

Copyright

Nothing is more familiar to the student of intellectual property than
the claim that it is an area of unusual conceptual difficulties. We even
have judicial authority for the proposition that copyright approaches
"nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to
what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions
are, or at least may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost
evanescent." 15 At first sight the current state of copyright doctrine
would appear to justify that conclusion. The newcomer to the field is
quickly dazzled by the apparently basic questions that surface even in
relatively mundane cases. What is the distinction between idea and
expression?16 Are the page numbers in the West Law Reports or the
alphabetical compilations of names in a telephone directory actually
copyrightable?17 What are the criteria for deciding such cases: The origi~
naIity of the work? The amount of labor that has gone into it?18 The
potential loss to the original compiler, or potential profit to the copying
15. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
16. "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.); see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc.
v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.) ("Obviously, no principle can
be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its
'expression.' "). The more fundamental question, however, is not how to draw the distinction
between idea and expression, but why to draw it.
Why is it that copyright does not protect ideas? Some writers have echoed the justification
for failing to protect facts by suggesting that ideas have their origin in the public domain.
Others have implied that "mere ideas" may not be worthy of the status of private property.
Some authors have suggested that ideas are not protected because of the strictures imposed
on copyright by the first amendment. The task of distinguishing ideas from expression in
order to explain why private ownership is inappropriate for one but desirable for the other,
however, remains elusive.
Litman, supra note 2, at 999 (footnotes omitted). At a later point, I wiII argue that the contradictory
ideological structure described in these pages is the most plausible explanation for the copyright's
reliance on the idea-expression dichotomy. See infra Part VI.
17. See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations. 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 720-28 (1989)
(recounting a district court's wiIIingness to grant, and a circuit court's willingness to affirm, a
preliminary injunction against the use of West page numbers by Mead Data Central's LEXIS
service). But see Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., III S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (1991) (holding
that telephone white pages are not entitled to copyright protection and that use of them does not
constitute infringement).
18. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property. 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988)
(investigating the two "grand" theories for intellectual property-labor and personality); Alfred C.
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession. 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990)
(advocating the restoration of copyright law's natural law heritage, in part through an investigation
of the rights an author should be granted for her labor).
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party, or to society?19 Can anyone own "facts"?20 Does a computer program such as "Windows" infringe the copyright of the Apple operating
system if it has a similar "look" or "feel," regardless of whether that look
or feel is produced by lines of computer code that in no way resemble the
original work?21 What is the extent of the "fair use" exception to copyright?22 How far does the "public domain" extend and how are we to
conceive of it?23 The list of questions could be extended almost infinitely.
Indeed, in a comment on the state of "fact works" doctrine that could
well be applied to the whole field of copyright, one scholar put the point
succinctly: "[T]here is ample precedent deciding almost every copyright
issue in almost every conceivable direction.,,24 Is there something particular about intellectual property that explains this apparent doctrinal
chaos?
19. Wendy J. Gordon, Towards a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the
Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1009, 1037-49 (1990) (book review).
20. "The most notable features of present-day copyright doctrine relating to 'fact works' are its
incoherence and instability." Peter Jaszi, Fact Works and All That-A (Slightly) Structuralist
Overview, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRACTICE BEFORE AGENCIES,
COURTS AND IN CORPORATIONS 348, 348 (1987).
21. A federal district judge granted a preliminary ruling in favor of Apple. Apple Suit
Advances, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at D2.
22. For example, the Supreme Court refused to allow The Nation to copy excerpts of President
Ford's autobiography despite the fact that news reporting is mentioned as one of the statutory
exemplars of the fair use exception. "The promise of copyright would be an empty one if it could be
avoided by merely dubbing the infringement a fair use 'news report' of the book." Harper and Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985). If the reporting of excerpts of an expresident's memoirs by a news magazine is seen merely as an assertion of "news reporting," then
what counts as actual news reporting, sufficient to meet the fair use test? For a magisterial study of
fair use law, which actually discusses both the utilitarian and the utopian goals that copyright law
ought to promote, see William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1659, 1661-95 (1988). Fisher is more sanguine about the Nation case.
Later in this Article, I argue that even the defenders of an expansive fair use doctrine have paid
insufficient attention to the role of this doctrine in constructing the public domain-that is, in
providing or disseminating the raw material out of which future intellectual creations may be built.
See, e.g., Litman, supra note 2. Landes and Posner are, by contrast, very careful to mention this
aspect of copyright doctrine and seem to agree that its importance is underrated-a phenomenon for
which they offer no particular explanation. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357-61 (1989).
23. See Litman, supra note 2, at 968, 999 (arguing that "justifications for the public domain
become least satisfactory at the most fundamental level" and proposing that public domain should
be understood "not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that
permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors
to use"). Occasionally, judges seem willing to recognize this side of the public domain although they
generally "balance" their commentary by a tip of the hat to the idea of original genius.
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which,
in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature,
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and users] much which was well
known and used before.... No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and
uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a
combination of what other men have thought and expressed, although they may be
modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
24. Litman, supra note 2, at 998.
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B. Blackmail
Why is blackmail illegal? The crime is defined as an "[u]nlawful
demand of money or property under threat to do bodily harm, to injure
property, to accuse of crime, or to expose disgraceful defects."2s It is
easy to understand that the demand of money is unlawful when the
accompanying threats are of bodily harm or property damage. After all,
these threats themselves are illegal on other grounds. It is also possible
to explain why you cannot demand money as the price of refraining from
accusing someone of a crime. But what about the case where a private
individual asks another private individual for money as the price of not
revealing legally obtained information about activities perfectly legal in
themselves: "If you do not pay me $100, I will reveal to your boyfriend
the fact that I saw you coming out of another man's house at two o'clock
in the morning." After all, in this case it would be perfectly legal to
carry through with the threat. Clearly the person being blackmailed does
not wish to pay, but then many of us do not wish to pay when others ask
money from us, telling us that if we do not comply with their demands
they will carry out some legal and unpleasant course of action. How is
blackmail different from a baseball team "demanding" concessions from
a city and local residents (in the form of tax reductions and parking
spaces, for example) under threat of moving the team to another city? It
begs the question to say that the baseball team has a right to do so,
whereas the blackmailer does not. That, after all, is exactly the point we
are supposed to be explaining.
Scholars have been drawn to blackmail like wasps to a picnic.
Landes and Posner, Goodhart, Nozick, Coase, and Epstein have all suggested explanations26-none terribly convincing. The commodification
of this kind of information is generally reviled and legally prohibited, yet
no one has explained why.27 Is there a reason?

25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (6th ed. 1990).
26. See ARTHUR L. GOODHART, EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 175·89
(1931); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-86 (1974); Ronald H. Coase, The
1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655 (1988) (examining blackmail from an
economic perspective and focusing in particular on the British response to blackmail); Richard A.
Epstein, Blackmail, Inc.. 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553 (1983) (arguing that blackmail should be illegal
not so much because it is inherently coercive but rather because it necessarily leads to, and is
inseparable in reality from. fraud, peculations, and other forms of illegality); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement ofLaw. 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42·44 (1975) (articulating
and defending an economic model in which law is enforced by private entities and applying this
model to blackmail).
27. James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671
(1984). Lindgren's own explanation concerns third party rights, and I will discuss it later. See infra
text accompanying notes 164-67.
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Insider Trading

Securities law sometimes prohibits certain individuals from trading
in securities on the basis of material nonpublic information. All scholars
seem to agree that, despite widespread popu1ar support for sanctions
against insider trading, the reasons for such sanctions are hard to identify. In fact, a recent article supporting the prohibition of insider trading
started with the following startling admission: "American jurisprudence
abhors insider trading with a fervor reserved for those who scoff at motherhood, apple pie, and baseball. The commonly stated reasons for this
reaction to insider trading are many and unpersuasive. The case law
barely suggests why insider trading is harmful. ,,28 Needless to say, those
arguing against the criminalization of insider trading are even less charitable towards the reasons offered. In the ubiquitously cited work on the
subject, Henry Manne argued that prior to 1910 no one had ever publicly
questioned the morality of insider trading. 29 Further, he claimed that
since that time no one has explained why insider trading is morally or
economically wrong. 30
At first blush, it seems that Professor Manne has a point. Our society distributes wealth through a market system built on inequality of economic power and normally exalts an individual who is able to convert
some temporary advantage in knowledge or economic power into a position of market advantage. Why not here? And why is it that, just as
with blackmail, so many people share the sense that insider trading is
wrong but find it hard to explain the reason?

D.

Spleens

So far, I have given three brief and general descriptions of areas of
doctrine. My last example is longer and comes from a single case,31 the
rhetoric and reasoning of which is so extraordinarily revealing that it
28. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago
School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 628 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For assessments even more
critical, see Harold Demsetz, Perfect Competition, RegulatiM, and the Stock Market, in EcONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECuRmES 1,11-16 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969);
J.A.C. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 720; Michael
Moran, Insider Trading in the Stock Market: An Empirical Test of Damages to Outsiders (Center
for the Study of American Business, Washington University Working Paper No. 89, July 1984).
29. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 1 (1966) ("Prior to the
year 1910 no one had ever publicly questioned the morality of corporate officers, directors, and
employees trading in the shares of corporations.").
30. Most of the commonly cited scholarly critiques of insider trading, Manne claimed, were
"largely statements of conclusions." Id. at 5. The congressional hearings of 1933 and 1934 were no
better: "['1']0 say that the practice was vicious or unscrupulous was . . . not a reasoned answer.
Worse than that, the emotional tone of the arguments probably intimidated anyone who tried to
defend the practice or even make cogent inquiries." Id. at 10.
31. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1388 (1991).
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deserves extended consideration. 32 In 1976 John Moore started treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the UCLA Medical Center. His doctors
quickly became aware that some of his blood products and components
were potentially of great commercial value. They performed many tests
without ever telling him of their commercial interest, and took samples
of every conceivable bodily fluid, including sperm, blood, and bone marrow aspirate. Eventually, they also removed Mr. Moore's spleen, a procedure for which there was an independent medical reason, but only after
having first made arrangements to have sections of the spleen taken to a
research unit. In 1981 a cell line established from Mr. Moore's T-Iymphocytes was patented by the University of California, with Mr. Moore's
doctors listed as the inventors. At no time during this process was Mr.
Moore told anything about the commercial exploitation of his genetic
material. The likely commercial value of the cell line is impossible to
predict exactly, but there were "reports in biotechnology industry periodicals predicting a potential market of approximately $3.01 Billion Dollars
by the year 1990 for a whole range of [such lymphokines] ... .'>33 There
were no estimates in the case for the markets after 1990.
This case hinges on issues of information-on at least two levels.
On the most obvious level, Mr. Moore was not told about his doctors'
financial interest in exploiting his genetic material, an interest that might
well have conflicted with the demands of responsible medical care. Dealing with this issue, the Supreme Court of California had no difficulty in
ruling that Mr. Moore had stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty or lack of informed consent. After all, he had been denied information in which he had a legitimate interest and which the doctors had a
corresponding duty to provide.
On a slightly more abstract level, this case concerned the ownership
and control of another kind of information, genetic information. T-lymphocytes are white blood cells that have, coded into their genetic material, "blueprints" or "programs" for the production of lymphokines,
proteins that regulate the immune system. If these genetic "programs"
32. And I am not the only one to think so. See. e.g.• Bernard Edelman, L'Homme Aux
Cellules D'Or, 34 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY 225 (1989); Bernard Edelman, Le Recherche
Biomedicale Dans L'Economie De Marche, 30 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY 203 (1991); John J. Howard,
Biotechnology, Patients'Rights. and the Moore Case. 44 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 331 (1989);
Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of Human Cells:
Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
211 (1989); Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Bioteclmical
Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits. 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628 (1989);
Stephen A. Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University of California
and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499 (1990). For the most brilliantly
macabre title in the related literature, see Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes'~'
Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process
Clauses, 90 CoWM. L. REV. 528 (1990).
33. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
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from the T-Iymphocytes can be isolated, they can then be used to manufacture large amounts of the valuable lymphokine through a variety of
recombinant DNA processes. For example, whole vats full of bacteria
can be "told" to manufacture the particular lymphokine just as a computer word processing file can issue the same commands to any compatible printer. The key issue in the case was whether Mr. Moore owned the
genetic information coded into his cells, or indeed, whether he owned the
cells from which that information had been extracted. The court held
that he had no property rights in either.
A fascinating array of reasons is offered for this decision. First, the
court appears to believe that Mr. Moore had "abandoned" his cells when
he consented to their removal. This argument is hard to square with the
rest of the decision, however, where--while ruling on the issue of
whether he had stated a cause of action in tort-the court did everything
but hold as a matter of law that Mr. Moore had not been given sufficient
information to consent to the removal. 34 Second, the court argued that
the cells were not property anyway because California's genetic material
statute "[b]y restricting how excised cells may be used and requiring
their eventual destruction ... eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily
attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left
amounts to 'property' or 'ownership' for purposes of conversion law.,,35
By implication, one cannot assume that property rights exist ill exotic
and highly regulated substances, such as plutonium, which are subject to
exactly the same types of regulation. In fact, since almost every kind of
property is regulated, what can the court mean?
The court also said that Mr. Moore could not sue under conversion
for violation of rights to his cells based on the rights of pUblicity or privacy. These, the court suggests, are not really matters of property law,
so Mr. Moore has no remedy in conversion. Thus, though Johnny Carson has an enforceable interest in the phrase "Here's Johnny,,36 (a phrase
uttered by someone else), Mr. Moore does not have one in his own DNA.
34. It also ignores the possibility that one can give up one stick from the bundle of property
rights, but still retain the rest. This is an idea fundamental to all modem concepts of property, but
particularly to intellectual property.
3S. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492.
36. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983). A
disagreeable picture of Mr. Carson emerges from the suit, and one is left wishing that the defendant,
who described himself as "The World's Foremost Commodian," id. at 833, could have taken his
place on television. Judge Kennedy, in dissent, attacked the decision because (among other reasons)
the phrase "Here's Johnny" "can hardly be said to be a symbol or synthesis, i.e., a tangible
'expression' of the 'idea,' of Johnny Carson the comedian and talk show host." ld. at 844 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). This formulation--one that might have made even Hegel blanch-shows the power
of the idea/expression distinction, even outside its normal ambit. Kennedy also mused that Ed
McMahon might have a better claim to the phrase, as he was the one who actually used it. ld. at
839 n.S. Nevertheless, Judge Kennedy was willing to admit that a distinctive racing car could be an
"expression" of the "idea" of the driver normally associated with it. ld. at 844 (citing
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)).
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In any event, the court argues that since everyone's genetic material contains information for the manufacture of lymphokines, the particular
genetic material is "no more unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula of hemoglobin.'>37
Finally, in perhaps its most interesting twist, the opinion concluded
that Mr. Moore could not be given a property right in his genetic material because to do so might hinder research. To back up this argument
the court painted a vivid picture of a vigorous, thriving public realm.
Communally organized, altruistically motivated, and unhampered by
nasty property claims, the world of research is moving dynamically
towards new discoveries: "At present, human cell lines are routinely
copied and distributed to other researchers for experimental purposes,
usually free of charge. This exchange of scientific materials, which still is
relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit."38 This argument
is a convincing one: property rights in the world of research would only
slow down discovery. Convincing, that is, until one reads in the very
next column that "the theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse
threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research."39 Property rights given to those whose bodies can be
mined for valuable genetic information will hamstring research because
property is inimical to the free exchange of information. On the other
hand, property rights must be given to those who do the mining, because
property is an essential incentive to research. Do these assertions contradict one another? Do they tell us anything about the doctrinal chaos of
copyright or the anomalies of blackmail and insider trading? Is there a
reason that the court is willing to give Mr. Ml)ore an entitlement to
"decisional," but not to genetic, information? Finally, does the decision
give us any logical or ideological hints about the future legal regime covering biotechnology? I would say that the answer to each question is yes.
I have presented four puzzles. My claim is that each one is best
understood as a conflict over the use of information and that the conflict
is structured by a recurring pattern of contradictions. It is to that pattern I now turn.

37. Moore. 793 P.2d at 490. The court claims that "[b]y definition. a gene responsible for
producing a protein found in more than one individual will be the same in each." Id. at 490 n.30.
One's first reaction is to wonder whether the reasoning here is disingenuous or merely accidentally
fallacious. Later in this Article, the court's concern with "originality" and "uniqueness" will be
compared to the concerns stressed by the romantic notion of authorship. My claim is that such a
comparison helps us to understand the court's almost obsessional desire to prove that Mr. Moore's
spleen was not unique, whereas the doctor's research products were. See infra Section IX.C.
38. Moore, 793 P.2d at 495 (footnotes omitted).
39. Id.

1992]

LAW AND INFORMATION

1433

II
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THE LIBERAL STATE

[T]he state as a state abolishes private property (i.e. man decrees
by political means the abolition of private property) when it abolishes the property qualification for electors and representatives, as
has been done in many of the North American States.... The
property qualification is the last political form in which private
property is recognized.
But the political suppression of private property not only
does not abolish private property; it actually presupposes its existence. The state abolishes, after its fashion, the distinctions established by birth, social rank. education, occupation, when it decrees
that birth, social rank, education, occupation are non-political distinctions; when it proclaims, without regard to these distinctions,
that every member of society is an equal partner in popular sovereignty . . . . But the state, none the less, allows private property,
education, occupation ... to manifest their particular nature. Far
from abolishing these effective differences, it only exists so far as
they are presupposed; it is conscious of being a political state and
it manifests its universality only in opposition to these elements.40
There are many reasons to doubt Karl Marx's prescience as a theorist of the modem liberal state. But any American lawyer would have to
acknowledge that he was right about one thing: the centrality of the
public-private distinction to any understanding of the legal system. The
liberal state depends on the idea of equality. That, after all, is one of the
key differences between the liberal and the feudal idea of politics. Liberalism mandates an end to status distinctions in politics. There can be no
restriction of the franchise to a particular social class, no weighting of the
votes of the nobility. Thus we have equality, but only inside the public
sphere. Citizens are equal, but only in their capacities as citizens, not as
private individuals. Each is guaranteed an equal vote, but not equal
influence. We draw a line around certain activities-voting, appearing in
court, and so on-and guarantee equality within this realm. Outside that
line is the private sphere, the world of civil society. It is the private
sphere that contains all the real differences between people-differences
of wealth, power, education, birth, and social rank. This line-drawing
allows us to use the language of egalitarianism to defend a society
marked precisely by a highly stratified distribution of wealth or power.41
The real dilemma of liberal theory is that it must exalt the virtues of
40. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question. in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 24, 31 (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 1972).
41. One of Marx's more intriguing suggestions is that the public sphere of the liberal state is
attractive because it is a diminished and distorted form of a truly just, egalitarian society. While the
Eastern European state socialist societies never provided anything except a dystopian model of
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egalitarianism, of each person's voice counting equally and, at the same
time, confine that egalitarianism to the public sphere. Our vision of society must be a vision of two separate spheres, with two different governing
principles, two different theories of justice, and even two different personae to go with them.
Where the political state has attained to its full development, man
leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life,
a double existence-celestial and terrestrial. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being,
and in civil society where he acts simply as a private individual,
treats other men as means ... and becomes the plaything of alien
powers.42
The law is implicated in every stage of this process.43 First of aU,
the law draws, and in a more complex way depends on, the line between
public and private. The central fear of the liberal political vision is that
unrestrained state power will invade the private sphere. And yet the only
force available to police the state is the state. The rule of law appears to
be the answer to this dilemma. By policing the lines between public and
private and between citizens and other citizens, the law offers us the hope
of a world that is neither the totalitarian state nor the state of nature. In
this sense, both the role of law and the rule of law depend on the publici
private division.
On a more mundane level, both lawyers and citizens perceive issues
through the lens of the public/private distinction. Controversial political
and moral issues often resolve themselves as being questions ofplacement
in either the public or private realms. 44 Access to medical professionals,
drearily brutal oppression, the concern with the limits of egalitarian justice is an issue that bids fair
to obsess liberal societies for the foreseeable future.
42. Marx, supra note 40, at 32.
43. This discussion can offer no more than a summary of the basic ideas. It would take an
entire article to discuss the full ramifications of the law's role in the public/private distinction. In
fact, particularly good ones have already been written on the influence of legal thought on classical
economic thought, see Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 939 (1985), on the decline in credibility of the public/
private dichotomy, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinctiol/,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982), on the history and reasons for the continued survival of the
distinction, see Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423 (1982), and on the paradoxes produced by the fact that the market can seem public from the
perspective of the family, but private from the perspective of the state, see Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). For
a discussion of the prominence of the public/private distinction in tort law, see James Boyle, The
Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1023-34 (1985).
44. Marx also thought that law played a vital role in this process, at least with respect to
religion.
Man emancipates himself politically from religion by expelling it from the sphere of
public law to that of private law. Religion is no longer the spirit of the state, in which man
behaves, albeit in a specific and limited way and in a particular sphere, as a species-being,
in community with other men.... It is no longer the essence of community, but the essence
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for example, is in the private sphere. My access depends on my
resources; there is no constitutional guarantee to equal health care, or
even to minimal health care. Access to legal professionals, however, is at
least partly in the public sphere. When I am tried for a crime that may
carry a substantial jail term, I have the right to an attorney whether or
not my private resources will let me pay for one. 4S
This example suggests one last important point about the pUblici
private distinction in law: our conception of justice differs depending on
whether we are dealing with public law or private law. A driver negligently knocks over a pedestrian. If the victim is poor, homeless, and out
of work, the law is likely to put him back in exactly that position. Tort
damages, after all, are compensatory. If the victim is a $200,000 a year
investment banker, the injurer is likely to find himself paying out a lot
more in lost wages, among other things. Yet when we turn from private
law to public law, the picture changes completely. Should the law punish
an assault against an investment banker more seriously than an offense
against a homeless person? Our sensibilities are outraged at the thought
(even if we suspect this frequently may be the reality). In the private
sphere our ideal of justice is, broadly speaking, restitutio in integrum. In
public law we aim for equality.46
One of the claims of this Article is that every dispute about property
rights in information resolves itself into a dispute about whether the issue
"is" in the public or the private realm. This rhetoric of geographic placement suggests that we are engaged in a factual inquiry about the location
of a preexisting entity within a well-charted and settled terrain. Nothing
could be further from the truth. In fact, the process is one of contentious
moral and political decisionmaking about the distribution of wealth,
of differentiation. ... It is now only the abstract avowal of an individual folly, a private
whim or caprice.
Marx, supra note 40, at 33. In this sense, the defining feature of the liberal theory of politics is that it
moves religion, wealth, and social class from the realm of public law to that of private law. We can
no longer condition public office on a particular religion or social class, nor can we allow citizens to
buy shorter jail time or purchase exemptions from military service. We can, however, allow private
associations to exclude on the basis of religion or private individuals to purchase better health care or
education.
45. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (establishing, under the Sixth
Amendment, a right to counsel for all defendants accused of serious crimes). See generally
ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964) (describing details of Gideon).
46. The question is even more complicated than this, because the tension is reproduced at each
level of the inquiry. Gideon is a perfect example of the playing out of this issue in constitutional law.
See 372 U.S. 335. First, we have to decide whether the norm of equality applies. Our notion of
equal justice fairly obviously does include access to legal services and does not include access to
medical services. But even if we say that the norm of equality should apply, we have to decide what
equality means, with the choice normally being between formal equality and substantive equality. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, equality means substantive equality-the accused has a right to an actual
lawyer, not merely to a hypothetical lawyer if he can pay for one. In First Amendment issues,
however, we all have merely a formally equal right to speak-the state is not understood to be
constitutionally bound to pay the cost of getting my advertisement into the newspaper.
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power, and information. The supposedly settled landscape is in fact an
ever-changing scene that folds back onto itself like a Mobius strip. The
market, for example, is on the public side of the map when we are talking
about commercial exploitation of private information about families. As
citizens we feel the need to keep the impersonal, public world of commerce out of our private realm of home and hearth. Yet the market is
simultaneously on the private side of the line as against the state. When
the FDA requires a drug company to reveal details of its internal testing
practices, the company lobbyists will probably stress the importance of
defending private enterprise against public meddling. If a geography
metaphor is appropriate at all, the most likely cartographers would be
Dali, Magritte, and Escher.
My own views on information issues are strongly influenced by two
goals. The first is egalitarian-having to do with the relative powerlessness of the group seeking access to or protection of information. The
second is the familiar radical republican goal of creating and reinforcing
a vigorous public sphere of democracy and debate. 47 Yet, for all of the
usual postmodern, pragmatist reasons, I would not suggest that we erect
these two criteria into a new grand theory. All of the problems of valuechoice, contradiction, and indeterminacy of meaning would reappear in
the new theory. Thus, I have no criteria that would "replace" the language of public and private, at least no criteria that would algorithmically resolve the questions I put forward here. Why, then, do I spend so
much time taking apart that language? My point is that because there is
in fact no intelligible geography of public and private, the attempt to
resolve issues through a process of line-drawing gives us only an empty
exchange of stereotypes, "illusions about which one has forgotten that
this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as
metal, no longer as coinS."48 Those illusions, however, have considerable
motive power and this Article aims to show where they take us. Even
without a grand theory, it may be somewhere we do not want to gO.49
47. For an excellent discussion of the tensions between these ideas, see Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).

48. FRIEDRICH W. NIETZSCHE, THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 47 (Walter Kaufman ed. &
trans., 1982).
49. For the methodological and epistemological argument behind this position, see Boyle,
supra note 9. For an elegant critique of (inter alia) my approach, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem 0/
the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991). To me it seems that Professor Schlag dt.velops an
epistemological and ontological argument that epistemological and ontological reasoning can
provide no basis for normative arguments, and then uses that same kind of reasoning to conclude, in
a strikingly normative manner, that we should not argue normatively. See generally James Boyle, Is
Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modem Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991).
This seems like a fourfold contradiction. Understandably enough, Professor Schlag disagrees with
this assessment. Pierre Schlag, Foreword: Postmodemism and Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 439, 44951 (1991) (pointing out the apparent contradiction in placing postmodernism in the service of a
traditional ethical program and claiming that a romanticized ethical subject reappears in the wake of
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Now, having introduced the public/private split, let us tum to the
second part of this conceptual background, the particular role of
information.

III
INFORMATION IN THE LIBERAL STATE

Information plays a central, if not defining, role in both the public
and the private worlds of the liberal political vision. When we talk about
the private world of the family and the home, we define these institutions
partly by the idea of an entitlement to withhold information-privacy. 50
The right to withhold information is also one of the main forms of protection given to private citizens facing an accusing state. Fourth and
Fifth Amendment protections are the classic cases, but the attorney-client privilege is also a good example.
In the private world of the market, information is again a defining
feature. The analytical structure of microeconomics includes "perfect
information"-meaning free, complete, instantaneous, and universally
available-as one of the defining features of the perfect market. At the
same time, the actual market structure of contemporary society depends
on information itself being a commodity-costly, partial, and deliberately restricted in its availability. When I discuss information economiCS,51 this paradox will be of central importance.
Finally, in the public world of politics-which is defined in the liberal vision by the information-centered ideas of debate, exchange, and
decision-the free flow of information is a prerequisite for atomistic citizens to form and then communicate their preferences in the great marketplace of ideas. At the same time, a citizen's access to information is
thought to be as important a check on governmental activity as that provided by the rule oflaw. This point was made most famously by James
Madison: "A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives.,,52
the deconstructive project); Pierre Schlag, Nonnative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167
(1990).
50. Admittedly, conventional privacy doctrine covers a great deal more than the right to
withhold information. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that other areas of privacy doctrine are
explained partly in informational terms, cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding
federal regulations banning use of Title X funds by medical clinics that advise clients about the
availability of and means of obtaining abortions), and that control over private information is a vital
part of the contemporary conception-whether legal or lay-of privacy.
51. See infra Part IV.
52. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON
337, 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
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So far I have argued that information, loosely defined, is central to
our conception of the family, the market, and the democracy. I claimed
that there are tensions "between spheres" in the roles we expect information to play. For example, the public interest in a sphere of vigorous
debate and discussion often clashes with the demands of personal privacy. In contrast, claims to own certain information in the market mix
uneasily with the values of the First Amendment. 53 I also have claimed
that, within spheres, information is often conceived of in apparently
conflicting ways. Looking at the market through the lens of microeconomics, we find that information is both an analytical prerequisite for
the model and a commodity to be traded under the model. In First
Amendment theory, analysts sometimes talk as if information exchange
had its own inevitable tilt towards democratic values and the good life
("the cure for bad speech is more speech"). At other times they present
the First Amendment as the jewel in the crown of liberalism, drawing its
nobility precisely from the fact that it is value neutral as to content ("I
loathe what you say but would die for your right to say it,,).54
Some might ask for explanations: Why do we think such different
things about information? This is a vital question, and I am not sure that
I can answer it satisfactorily. Part of the answer seems to be that the
matrix of conflicts between the theories of justice that we apply to the
family, the market, and democracy is overlaid by another set of conflicts
caused by the fact that information is conceived of as both finite and
infinite, as both product and process. As an infinite good, information
seems to be that magical thing-a gift that can be given without making
the giver any poorer. I explain Pythagoras' theorem to you, or teach you
how to work out the area of a circle. Afterwards, I seem no poorer in the
sense that we both have the knowledge. This is the positive side of the
public goods dilemma. The same unit of the good apparently satisfies the
needs of an infinite number of consumers. Perhaps this is one of the
reasons that in moments of high moral or ideological conflict, we often
53. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that
the Copyright Act bars unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure'S manuscript); see also
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and
Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective
on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY
L.J. 393 (1989).
54. Some might believe that these contradictions result from the broad definition of
information that I have adopted in this piece: nothing forces us to adopt the broad definition, and it
is only with the broad definition that commodification seems to conflict with the perfect market,
copyright with the First Amendment. With the use of sensible subdivisions-into copyright issues,
First Amendment issues, privacy issues, insider trading issues, commodification issues, efficient
capital market issues, and so on-these problems would disappear, or at least lose their salience. I
am unconvinced by this argument, and I find support for my disbelief in the recurring problems that
I pointed out within the law and rhetoric of copyright, blackmail, and insider trading. Given my
vision of language and definition, however, I can imagine no "proof" of my method, save its
usefulness to the reader.
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reach for a solution that involves giving the parties more information. If
we are thinking of information as a resource that is infinite in this sense,
then the distribution of wealth does not seem to have been changed. Yet
there are occasions when courts and scholars switch perspectives. Far
from being an infinite resource, a good that may be given infinitely without impoverishing the giver, information is reconceived as a finite good,
whose production and distribution are subject to the same economic laws
as any other. Suddenly it becomes necessary to give producers an incentive to produce more information. Mandatory information transfer is
suddenly viewed as an inefficient, forced exchange that undermines the
incentives necessary to produce more information. 55
So far, I have described information's various roles separately and in
a rather static and synchronic way. But the historical importance of the
connection between information, the market, and liberal democracy
should not be underestimated. Perhaps the most familiar version of the
relationship comes originally from the philosophers of the Scottish
Enlightenment: commerce was desirable largely because it would force
people from widely separated areas to talk to each other, to obtain information about the beliefs and practices of others, and inexorably to question the basis for their own. Thus, the invisible hand would subject social
practices and traditions to the test of reason. Doux commerce would be
the crucible in which superstition and myth were burnt away and the
rationalism of the Enlightenment brought to the provinces. This
message was extraordinarily influential on the political theorists of the
early American republic. 56 In later years, both in Scotland and in the
United States, the message changed. Increasingly, both the Scots and the
American repUblicans began to worry that commerce would produce
enormous disparities in wealth and power (including power over information) and that these disparities would be subversive of the republican
form of government. 57 Sadly, this change of emphasis never received the
same attention as the original optimistic message. 58
55. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, In/ormation, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. I, 9-32 (1978) (arguing that forced disclosure of deliberately acquired information is
undesirable because it impedes production of information at socially desirable levels); Saul Levmore,
Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law ofContracts. 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982) (arguing
against a disclose-or-abstain rule in insider trading on grounds of both fairness and efficiency).
56. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1978).
57. See Robert w. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of
New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA 51 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
58. Two hundred years later, Horkheimer and Adoruo amazed American college students by
suggesting-in considerably less graceful language-that, even in capitalism, there was still
mythology and iconography. More surprising still, they argued that these new "mythologies" might
be all the more secure precisely because of the effect of disparities of power on the type of abundant
but nonrandom "information" provided to the public. MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W.
ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENGLIGHTENMENT 28 (John Cumming trans., 1990).
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If the concept of information has potentially conflicting roles to play
in family, market, and state, and if information itself is sometimes conceived of as infinite and sometimes as finite, how are social problems
involving information decided? Much of the time the answer is, "by
drawing lines." We "type" certain situations or conflicts as "public" or
"private" and then act as if we have solved the problem. Unfortunately,
we have merely restated it. As I pointed out earlier, the notion of "private" is defined in one common understanding largely by the idea of the
justified ability to withhold information. Yet the same word, with its
connotations of "that-with-which-we-cannot-interfere," conjures up the
freedom of the market from state intervention. The fact that we think of
the private sphere as encompassing both the market (vis-a-vis the state)
and the family (vis-a'-vis the market and the state) produces a Laocoon of
ideological and rhetorical contradictions. 59
For example, many consumers do not wish biographical details, provided to a retailer for another purpose, to be traded in the flourishing
direct marketing industry. They might argue that this information is
"private" and that the state should step in to prevent the companies
involved from passing it on, compiling it into larger databases, or
whatever. Others might want the state to protect the private sphere of
home and family from information coming in from the outside. The
telemarketing phone call interrupting the family dinner is the most frequently used example. In both cases, the classification as "private" is
supposed to trigger, or at least justify, state protection. Yet the owners of
the databases would protest the unfairness of the public world of the
state interfering in a private disposition of private property-in this case
involving mailing lists or databases of consumer information. The
telemarketers might say the same thing, but they would probably also
claim that-since information, rather than some other form of property
is involved-the issue is one which should be settled by appeal to the
constitutional norms that govern the public realm. 60 In other words,
they might argue both that the government should not interfere because
this is a private activity in the market and that the government should
59. See Olsen, supra note 43.
60. When I first wrote this passage, I had intended these as purely hypothetical examples.
Since that time, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, originally introduced by
Senator Hollings, which outlaws most autodialers. Pub. L. No. 101-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227). Much debate preceded the law's passage. "Calling autodialers an
'outrageous invasion' of people's homes, Sen. Hollings said privacy rights outweigh concerns about
the free speech of marketing companies." Edmund L. Andrews, Curtailing the Telephone Robots,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at Dl, D24. The Portland, Oregon, ACLU disagreed. One of their
lawyers, Mr. Charles Hinkle, is "representing a small business against an Oregon law banning the
commercial use of autodialers." ld. at D24. His arguments? The ban would interfere with free
speech and would violate the constitutional commitment to equality in public life-in this case the
Equal Protection Clause-since it distinguishes between commercial and non·commercial speech.
ld.

1992]

LAW AND INFORMATION

1441

not interfere because this is a public issue of free speech-and equal protection, for that matter. 61
If there really were an intelligible geography of public and private,
and a unitary concept of information, then we might hold up the hope
that one set of claims could be proved to be "true" and the other "false."
But since the era of the legal realists, that hope has seemed chimerical.
The story cannot end here, however. One of the themes of this
Article is that the implicit frameworks within which the regulation of
information is discussed are contradictory--or at least aporetic-and
indeterminate in application. As far as the rhetoric of public and private
goes, that seems an unexceptionable conclusion. 62 Since that rhetoric
dominates popular discussion of information, I explored at some length
the multiple ways in which liberalism portrays information as central to
both public and private realms. It is hard to read public debates on any
issue involving information without coming to the conclusion that a
great deal of it is an exercise in line-drawing or typing, increasingly isolated from the moral and political ideals the lines are supposed to represent. Perhaps this is the best we can do. But then again, perhaps not.
So much for public debate. Is scholarship any different? Increasingly, scholarly discussions of information are turning away from liberal
constitutionalism and rights theory and towards the language of
61. The same, familiar tensions play themselves out in the public sphere of debate. Do private
citizens have a right of access to privately held communications media in order to participate in
public debate? The citizens would portray the television station as a means of public communication
tinged with a public interest, cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upholding a state statute that
regulated grain storage charges on public interest grounds), and would demand state intervention to
prevent public debate from being ceded to a satrapy of private interests. The television station would
portray such intervention as an illegitimate public interference with private property. Similarly, does
a person who participates in the public world of politics lose her property right in reputation, a
property right normally protected by the imposition of a universal tort duty to refrain from
defamation? The list of similar questions goes on. On top of these issues lie the conflicts between the
vision of information as both finite and infinite. Is someone really "taking" anything from you when
they learn of your address or your consumption patterns and sell those facts to a thousand
databases? You still have all the "goods" that you had before-except, of course, that peculiar good
that exists in the negation or restriction of information.
62. Although the academic literature is relatively silent regarding the conflicting requirements
that liberal state theory puts on information, most academics would admit, I think, that the language
of public-ness and private-ness is relatively useless for resolving any important issue. I do not mean
to say that it is meaningless to talk of "public" and "private" issues. On the contrary, those terms
are central to public discourse. They are also the accepted way in which competing political beliefs
are expressed. Hence the old saw that conservatives think the market is private and the bedroom is
public and liberals think the exact opposite. Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy:
Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1429, 1430-31 (1982)
(discussing the malleability of terms like public and private but noting their prominence in the
discourse of political disagreement). But although they are vital terms with which to express
normative conclusions, they are poor guides to analysis or decisionmaking. When lawyers or state
theorists attempt to use them as operative terms, the "a1I-things-to-all-people" quality that makes
them so useful in political debate simply produces an endless array of mirror-image arguments of the
kind described above.
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microeconomics. 63 Whether the issue is copyright,64 patent,65 insider
trading,66 blackmail,67 or simply "valuable information,,,68 some of the
most ambitious recent scholarship employs some kind of economic
approach. Yet, microeconomics provides no surcease from the paradoxes of information. As I will try to show in the next Part, those paradoxes are just as central to the discipline of economics as they are to
liberal political theory.

63. SCHEPPELLE, supra note 1, provides an excellent contractarian critique of this tendency.
See also EcONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE EcONOMIC ApPROACH ApPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF
EcONOMICS (Gerard Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz eds., 1987).
64. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 325 (applying economic models to determine
the extent to which "copyright law can be explained as a means for promoting efficient allocation of
resources"); John S. Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1991)
(arguing that although copyright and patent law serve essentially the same goals-justice for
creators and efficiency for consumers-patent law is logically coherent while copyright law is not);
see also Fisher, supra note 22 (proposing reformation of the fair use doctrine in particular and using
economic analysis to support his proposal).
65. See, e.g., George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent
Agreement, 31 J.L. & EcON. 227 (1988) (discussing difficulties of allowing property rights in ideas
and using the Aircraft Patent Agreement as an illustration); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 108, 118 (1990) (arguing that patent law
should treat physical and intellectual property identically, because "[rlights to exclude are not
monopolies just because the property involved is an intangible rather than something you can walk
across or hold in your hand"); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REv. 1813 (1984) (discussing conflicts between patent and antitrust law and the resUlting
paradoxes); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265
(1977) (arguing that the patent system is desirable because it increases output of resources used for
technological innovation).
66. In insider trading scholarship, it would be briefer to cite those articles that do not rely on
economic analysis. However, the following list may give some indication of the breadth of
approaches subsumed under the heading. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 29 (examining generally the
parameters of the insider trading problem, traditional legal solutions, and arguments for and against
prohibiting the activity); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading,
35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983) (arguing that insider trading might be allowed in some cases as an
efficient way to compensate corporate managers); William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in
Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 863 (1987) (arguing the opposition to insider trading may be
unfounded because such activity causes very little harm); Cox, supra note 28 (arguing for continued
regulation of insider trading and criticizing arguments that such trading is justified because it
increases allocative efficiency); Christopher P. Saari, Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,
Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977)
(arguing that empirical findings underlying efficient capital market theory cast doubt on the SEC's
assumption that stricter prohibitions on insider trading are the best means of protecting investors).
67. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 26; Epstein, supra note 26; Landes & Posner, supra note 26, at
42-43.
68. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 1 (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of discrete
doctrinal areas of information law and attempting to unify them within a broader theory of property
rights in information); Kitch, supra note 1 (using price and finance theory to analyze welfare
consequences of law on ownership of information by firms and employees).
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IV
THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION

As usual, information has not one role, but many. The analytical
structure of microeconomics includes the concept of "perfect" information-meaning free, complete, instantaneous, and universally availableas one of the defining features of the perfect market. 69 At the same time,
the actual market structure of contemporary society depends on information being a commodity-costly, partial, and deliberately restricted in
its availability. To put it briefly, perfect information is a defining conceptual element of the analytical structure used to analyze markets driven by
the absence of information, in which impelfect information is actually a
commodity.70 If an analogy is needed, imagine a theology that postulates
ubiquitous God-given manna-food from heaven-in its vision of the
heavenly city, but otherwise assumes that virtue and hard work are both
maximized under conditions of scarcity. Now use that theology as the
basis for a practical discussion of the ethics of food shortages. 71
This basic theoretical aporia 72 explains the weakness of much economic analysis of information regimes. My point is not that the reality is
more complicated than the abstraction. That would be a critique of all
abstractions, and abstractions are necessary to life. My claim is that
information is a problem case for that specific set of abstractions we call
economic theory, that it can and must be represented within the theory
in two conflicting ways, and that certain concrete problems follow as a
result. Some economists believe that these problems can be solved by
69. For reasons related to the aporia described here, economists have tried to refine the
concept of perfect information so as to limit the breadth of the concept. The accepted formulation
seems to be that "[i]ndividuals are unsure only about the size of their own commodity endowments
and/or about the returns attainable from their own productive investments. They are subject to
technological uncertainty rather than market uncertainty." Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social
Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcON. REv. 561, 561 (1971)
(assessing private and social value in a perfect market of technological information and discussing
implications of these values for the patent system); see also Peter A. Diamond, The Role of a Stock
Market in a General Equilibrium Model with Technological Uncertainty, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 759
(1967) (explaining how the stock market deals with technological uncertainty). But see Sanford J.
Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM.
EcON. REV. 393 (1980) (arguing that informationally efficient markets are impossible because either
prices would perfectly reflect the available information about the market, denying compensation to
those who spend resources to obtain such information, and thus undermining the incentive to
produce, or would introduce an extra cost into the price so that it no longer reflected perfectly the
available information).
70. Having always wanted to imitate my ancestor and attach my name to a Law, I would like
to call this Boyle's Paradox. Somehow, I doubt that the name will catch on.
71. Actually, the analogy underestimates the point, as the discussion will show in a moment.
In any event, like microeconomics, religions are replete with mediating devices between the ideal and
the actual. Consider, for example, how the conflict between an ideal vision of a perfectly merciful
God and the actual reality of starving children, is mediated through a variety of conceptual devices
including "original sin" and "God moves in mysterious ways." The economic ideas discussed in this
section have more esoteric names, but the basic function is similar.
72. See supra note 5.
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changing the level of analysis-from perfect to imperfect markets, from
imperfect information as commodity to imperfect information as transaction cost to perfect information as component of the analytical structure-just as Russell and Whitehead believed that they could banish
paradoxes from mathematics by segregating the component parts of the
paradox on different levels of analysis. Godel's Theorem convinced
mathematicians of the impossibility of getting rid of this pattern of circularity, recursive definition, and self-swallowing analysis. Sadly, with
some notable exceptions that I shall discuss in a moment, economists
seem to have avoided any comparable moment of professional modesty.73
The first manifestation of this paradox in information economics is
the fact that the requirements of "motivation" and those of "efficiency"
seem contradictory.74 For example, if markets are to be efficient, the
73. For some qualified exceptions to this statement, see JACQUES H. DREzE, A Paradox in
Information Theory, in EssAYS ON EcONOMIC DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 105 (1987)
(arguing that the value of information can be negative as well as positive); Torben M. Andersen,
Some Implications of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 6 J. POST KEYNESIAN EcON. 281
(1983-1984) (arguing that the concept of information does not have any well-defined meaning in
efficient capital market); Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 69. The classic article calling for a more
rigorous treatment of information was George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL.
EcON. 213 (1961). According to Stigler, "One should hardly have to tell academicians that
information is a valuable resource: knowledge is power. And yet it occupies a slum dwelling in the
town of economics. Mostly it is ignored ...." Id. at 213. Reading the economic literature on
information, one is tempted to believe that there was a reason for the marginalization of infcrmation
noted by Stigler: information plays the same role for neoclassical economics that rent did for
classical economics. It is the problem case in which the internal tensions of the discipline come to
the surface.
74. Many economists do not see a paradox here because microeconomics is, after all, the study
of trade-offs. As I will show in a moment, economic analysts of law tend to start by thinking of
information as a commodity and then to introduce the free circulation of information as a
countervailing factor that needs to be "balanced" against the need to commodify. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 22, at 326 ("Copyright protection .•• trades off the costs of limiting access to a
work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place.").
Actually, except for the fact that it ignores the distributional side of things, this is not a bad
formulation in that it tends to recast every issue as an ad hoc balancing act, depending on highly
contextual and specific local factors. Yet by downplaying the extent to which this "balancing act"
diminishes the scientific pretensions of the pure version of the theory, economic analysis attempts to
keep its credibility while maintaining the illusion of rigor. Professional economists employ this tone
of certainty less often than practitioners of "law and economics." Compare id. at 333 ("In principle,
there is a level of copyright protection that balances these two competing interests optimally ••..
We shall see ... that various doctrines of copyright law, such as the distinction between idea and
expression and the fair use doctrine, can be understood as attempts to promote economic efficiency
. . . .") (emphasis added) with Hirshleifer, supra note 69, at 572 (because of the possibility of
speculation on prior knowledge of invention and the uncertainties of "irrelevant" risks, patent
protection mayor may not be necessary in order to produce an appropriate incentive to invention).
It also makes one a little skeptical to note that, when done by economic analysts ofIaw, this ad
hoc balancing of empirically unspecified and unquantified factors tends to track the distinctions
made by the existing case law with surprising fidelity-surprising, that is, unless one had already
assumed that the common law was working its way towards the economically efficient solution. See
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
65 (1977). In recent years, however, it seems that economists have begun to acknowledge that the
problems in reconciling efficiency and incentives in information issues go deeper than this. See
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prices must perfectly reflect available information. Yet information is
costly to obtain. If prices perfectly reflect available information, with no
part of the price going to the producer of the information, then there is
no incentive to produce more information. To postulate efficiency in the
production of information we must assume away the incentive necessary
to produce. To postulate the incentive is to make efficiency impossible.
It looks like a classic paradox. This is not an observation confined to
those skeptical of information economics, some of the most sophisticated
economists writing in the area have acknowledged this problem: "There
is a fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets
spread information and the incentives to acquire information.,,75 Are
property rights in information a transaction cost that impedes the full
and efficient circulation of information? It might seem obvious that they
are. After all, perfect information is one of the elements of the perfect
market. If information can be commodified, then a host of transaction
costs are introduced into information flow and a limited monopoly is
granted in the midst of a system supposedly based on competition. 76
Yet the picture changes when information is viewed not as an element within the theoretical structure of the economic system, but rather
Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 405. Lawyers, too, have had their moments of skepticism, the
most famous being Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1970). The most sophisticated recent
analyses have been those of Wendy Gordon. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
1600 (1982); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter
Gordon, Merits of Copyright]; Gordon, supra note 19.
75. Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 405.
76. This clash is a general one, not limited to information questions. Judge Easterbrook has
recently argued that both judges and economists overstate the extent to which intellectual property
rights (and in particular, patent rights) confer a monopoly. Intellectual property rights, he argues,
are no different from rights to tangible property.
Problem: Patents are not monopolies, and the tradeoff is not protection for disclosure.
Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with real property.... A
patent may create a monopoly-just as an auto manufacturer may own all of the auto
production facilities-but property and monopoly usually differ.
Easterbrook, supra note 65, at 109. If Easterbrook is merely pointing out that the economic
consequences of granting different patents will be different given the varying possibilities of
substitute goods and so forth, the point is a good one. Indeed, it is precisely such empirical
difficulties that undermine economists' more sweeping statements about the efficiency of the patent
system as a whole. See Hirshleifer, supra note 69. As to his other point, Easterbrook may be right
that judges overestimate the monopolistic qualities of intellectual property.
Nevertheless, his article, like many pieces of economic analysis, seems to commit the opposite
error-to underestimate the extent to which all property rights can have monopolistic or
quasimonopolistic effects. Property rights are frequently trumps against market forces; this point
causes considerable problems for economic analysis. Thus, an economist would ask: "If J value
your house more than you do (measured by our relative ability and willingness to pay), why should I
not be able to compel you to sell it to me whether you like it or not?" Indeed, the general tendency
in Chicago-school economic analysis is to use offering price rather than asking price as a measure.
See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv.
387 (1981); cf. C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB.
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as a commodity produced and distributed according to the rules of that
system. In fact, most economic analysis of information takes this "commodity perspective.'>77 From that perspective, the goal of the analysis is
to discover the level of property rights that will produce the optimal level
of production. Take the classic case of International News Service v.
Associated Press. 78 Associated Press CAP) operated a news-gathering service. An international network of correspondents and wire services provided news which was printed in the AP papers. Unfortunately for AP,
International News Service (INS), which operated a far less expansive
news-gathering apparatus, made a practice of free riding on AP's efforts.
INS employees would gather news from AP's noticeboards and from
early editions of its East Coast newspapers and would then reprint the
news, often taking advantage of the time differential between the east and
west coasts.
The INS case raises a difficult question for economic analysis. One
line of rhetoric and analysis indicates that we should secure to producers
the fruits of their labors, and thus induce them to produce more. Without some legally protected interest in the news it gathers, AP will presumably be under a competitive disadvantage. News will become a
"public goods problem." Unable to exclude its competitors from the
fruits of its efforts, AP will be driven to cut back its news-gathering activities-as will all the other newspapers. Thus, though consumers might
be willing to pay for a higher level of news gathering, it will be impractical for any individual newspaper to provide such a service. Put this way,
the majority's creation of a legally protected interest in freedom from
AFF. 3 (1975). Under that measure, a forced sale would be moving resources to their highest use
value.
But because we make a pretheoretical classification of the issue as being about "settled property
rights," we use asking price rather than offering price as the measure of value. You get to keep the
house unless your asking price is equal to or lower than my offering price-in other words, unless
you are wiIling to sell it to me. Yet, if there is a "public interest" involved, or an existing clash of
land uses, we shift doctrinal boxes into eminent domain or nuisance and change our measure of
valuation back to offering price. We need a general principle or algorithm that would identify those
issues that should be analyzed in terms of the free-flowing calculus of utility (and offering price) and
those issues that should be analyzed in terms of settled property rights (and asking price). Absent
such a principle, economic analysts seem to be guilty of exactly that kind of mushy ad hoc balancing
for which they reproach other legal scholars. See Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are
Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980).
It is, of course, true that there may be no problem as to any given property right. You may
loathe my house, and the patent may be for a device that no one wants to use. This hardly resolves
the more general theoretical problem, however, and it also tends to reduce all property (and
intellectual property) questions into endlessly particular, empirical inquiries-negating the
possibility of exactly the kind of grand statements about the efficiency or inefficiency of entire
doctrinal areas for which economic analysis is renowned.
77. Obviously, there are a number of reasons for this-many of them good ones. Later in this
Article, I will suggest that one of the not-so-good reasons is an unacknowledged and largely
unconscious reliance on a particular model of authorship as the norm against which to measure all
information issues. See infra Section X.B.
78. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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unfair competition in news gathering is the perfect solution to the public
goods problem. By allowing commodification, it ensures continued production and avoids the prisoner's dilemmas set up by the alternative
regime.
Yet one cannot solve the problems of economic analysis merely by
adopting the commodity perspective-leaving perfect competition and
information efficiency concerns aside. The problem of the free flow of
information reappears within the new model. For example, should we
approach the question of "fair use" in copyright through the lens of the
commodity perspective? If we do so, will we only tolerate limitations on
intellectual property rights when those limitations are necessary to minimize transaction costs or accomplish well-defined public goals? The
most sophisticated scholarly analysis takes this approach.79 Consequently, it tries to preserve incentives for creators, even establishing a
typology of "fair uses"-assigning or denying property rights in part
according to whether those uses would tend to reduce the reward available to the author. 80 Yet the analysis largely ignores the opposite perspective, that of the efficient flow of information. If we switch the
perspective, we see that one important purpose of "fair use" law is to
make sure that future creators have available to them an adequate supply
of raw materials. From this perspective, too many "incentives" could
convert the public domain into a fallow landscape of private plots.
To their credit, some economic analysts have attempted to reconcile
the two perspectives. Thus, for example, Landes and Posner describe
copyright as constructed by the tension between the need to grant legally
protected interests to authors in order to motivate them and the need to
limit the rights of authors so as to allow future creators legal access to
the raw materials they need. 81 This seems reasonable enough, but it also
leaves them dangerously close to the mushy "balancing" analysis from
which economics was supposed to provide surcease. At the same time,
the aporia reappears in the question of classification within the theory.
For instance, how are we to classify a telephone directory of agents and
79. See Fisher, supra note 22.
80. ld. at 1766-79.
81. Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 326. In another context, one might expect that Landes
and Posner would engage in one of those charming "assume a can opener" flights of fancy, in which
we merely assume that authors will contract for the right to use exactly the inspirational sources
needed, no less and no more. After all, Judge Posner can imagine that contingency fee lawyers will
come flocking to prisons in order to pursue meritorious claims for damages: "Encouraging the use
of retained counsel thus provides a market test of the merits of the prisoner's claim. If it is a
meritorious claim there will be money in it for a lawyer; if it is not it ought not to be forced on some
hapless unpaid lawyer." McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1325 (7th Cir. 1982) (posner, J.,
dissenting). Why should he not imagine T.S. Eliot paying small royalties to everyone from Dante to
the inventors of the tarot pack? Interestingly, Landes and Posner seem to assume from the
beginning that such a solution is completely impractical. Instead, the best way to encourage
production is to limit the creator's legally protected interests ab initio. Perhaps authors are allowed
to exist in a world less stringently constricted by the devices of economic fantasy.
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publishing houses or an index price measure in a futures market in
books? Is the former-the information necessary to make the market
run-something that should be freely available? Is the latter a commodity in which the creators must be able to claim a legitimate intellectual
property right if we are to encourage continued production of information? Or is it exactly the other way around?82
My argument is not merely that analysts are concentrating too
much on motivating creators and not enough on the free flow of information. I am claiming that a change in the focus of the analysis does not
dispose of these difficulties; it merely reverses their "polarity." There are
issues that economists tend to analyze by thinking of information as
information rather than as a commodity-for example, the discussion of
the efficient capital market hypothesis. Yet, as some economists have
pointed out, unless the questions of commodification and incentive are
worked into the analysis, the theory ends in paradox as soon as the
slightest costs or imperfections are introduced into it. The best example
comes from Grossman and Stiglitz's description of the self-destructing
futures market.
[W]henever there are differences in beliefs that are not completely
arbitraged, there is an incentive to create a market. (Grossman,
1977, analyzed a model of a storablcr commodity whose spot price
did not reveal all information because of the presence of noise.
Thus traders were left with differences in beliefs about the future
price of the commodity. This led to the opening of a futures market. But then uninformed traders had two prices revealing information to them, implying the elimination of noise.) But, because
differences in beliefs are themselves endogenous, arising out of
expenditure on information and the informativeness of the price
system, the creation of markets eliminates the differences of beliefs
which gave rise to them, and thus causes those markets to
disappear . ...
Thus we could argue as soon as the assumptions of the conventional perfect capital markets model are modified to allow
even a slight amount of information imperfection and a slight cost
of information, the traditional theory becomes untenable. . ..
. . . [B]ecause information is costly, prices cannot perfectly
reflect the information which is available, since if it did, those
who spent resources to obtain it would receive no compensation. 83
82. Recourse to the traditional categories of copyright law-expression may be owned but not
ideas or facts-merely begs the question. We could choose to analyze expression in our
"commodity" mode and facts and ideas in our "free circulation of information" mode. Having thus
assumed away the very aporia we need to resolve, we could study the production of texts under the
current regime-to find our methodology triumphantly confirmed as we rediscovered the very
pattern of choices that we ourselves had made moments before.
83. Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 404-05 (emphasis added). The time lags, or other
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Switching perspectives again, we might think that commodification
is the answer. A futures market produces information-in the form of
the price of futures contracts. We do not normally think of price as a
public good, but it seems to fit all of the criteria. In this case, it is a
valuable commodity that takes considerable effort to create and is available thereafter at a marginal cost near zero. 84 If we wish to eliminate the
imperfections in the transmission of information through price, that are necessary for those who
create information to trade on it, are crucial to the discussion of insider trading. See infra Part VIII.
In an article that studies the informational mechanisms of market efficiency, Ronald Gilson and
Reinier Kraakman have argued that the "efficiency paradox" occurs only when the market is fully
efficient: "While we do argue that an evolutionary bias pushes the market toward efficiency, the
Efficiency Paradox arises only whenfull efficiency is achieved. Our very emphasis on information
costs recognizes that prices need not be perfectly efficient with respect to any particular
information." Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 623 (1984). Nevertheless, they acknowledge that this notion of limits does not
explain the apparent inconsistency between Grossman and Stiglitz's conclusions and their own
analysis of two particular market mechanisms-universally informed and professionally informed
trading-an analysis which does "explicitly point[] to reaching just such an efficient equilibrium."
Id. To their eyes, however, "the conflict between these perspectives is more apparent than real." Id.
Their solution is an interesting variation of an analysis that should be familiar by now. Briefly put,
their idea is that the first trader who gains access to or develops some useful information will be able
to profit from it-thus receiving an adequate incentive-and that the equilibrium can thereafter be
maintained at a very low cost.
The empirical literature does not demonstrate that the originators of [a useful] insight
failed to earn a return on their efforts. Rather, it is reasonable to suppose that they did
earn an acceptable return on the information, but that the secret was subsequently
dissipated through discovery by competitors (or even academics). So understood, the
question posed by the Efficiency Paradox is not whether incentives exist to induce the
original innovation. Rather, the puzzle is to explain how an efficient eqUilibrium is
maintained once the innovation becomes so widely known that profit is no longer possible
for those who exploit it.
. . . Because of joint cost characteristics, maintenance of the equilibrium is effectively
costless, and the Efficiency Paradox disappears.
Id. at 625 (footnote omitted). The first part of the argument, which locates the incentive in the
originator's temporally limited monopoly in trading on the value of the information, is very similar
to Hirshleifer's musings about the patent system, see Hirshleifer, supra note 69, as well as to
Manne's description of insider trading as the necessary compensation for entrepreneurial acts, see
infra text accompanying notes 224-40. Given a privilege to trade, the originator does not need a
legally protected interest (on the model of copyright or patent, say) in order to encourage future
information creation. The second part of the analysis employs a traditional philosophical method
for getting around state/process paradoxes-paradoxes such as Zeno's tale of the arrow that can
never reach its target since it must pass though an infinite series of smaller and smaller distances.
With the initial process simply postulated, we have no trouble thinking about the arrow quivering in
the target, the equilibrium being maintained. Yet, as I think Kraakman and Gilson would agree, if
we move from the abstract modeling of possible market mechanisms to the actual analysis of a
particular market, we have moved too quickly, because to postulate this is to assert that which must
be proved. In the abstract there is no way of knowing whether the temporal advantage of being first
in possession of information and having a privilege to trade is an inadequate compensation, requiring
greater intellectual property rights, or an overcompensation that will encourage too many traders to
invest too much in the acquisition of information so as to gain an advantage over other traders. See
Eugene F. Fama & Arthur B. Laffer, Information and Capital Markets, 44 J. Bus. 289 (1971).
84. Cf. Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & EcON. 293 (1970).
As Demsetz points out, the key feature of the public good is that "it is possible at no cost for
additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public good." Id. at 295. Why, then, is price not a
public good?
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public goods problem, the answer might be to commodify the price measure-to assert an intellectual property right in the price output of the
market-in order to prevent others from gaining free access to the information. Yet if there is one thing that microeconomics cannot justify
treating as a public good, surely it is price.
If all of this seems like an Alice-in-Wonderland conclusion, it is
worth considering the case of Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 85 in
which the court recognized that Dow Jones had a "proprietary interest in
its indexes and averages which vests it with the exclusive right to license
their use for trading in stock index futures contracts."86 The court
pointed out, however, that "[t]he extent of defendant's monopoly would
be limited, for as defendant points out, there are an infinite number of
stock market indexes which could be devised.,,87 The Dow case does not
go as far as the "secret stock market" I proposed half-jokingly, but it
does exemplify the ineradicable tension between the notion of perfect
information and frictionless markets and the notion of commodification
and property rights.
This internal tension in the analysis always leaves open the question
whether a particular issue is to be classed as a public goods problem for
which the remedy is commodification,88 or a monopoly of information
problem for which the remedy is unfettered competition. 89 The problem
85. 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983). For the connection between this case and the INS case, see
Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy a/International News Service
v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411 (1983).
86. Dow Jones, 456 N.E.2d at 90.
87. Id.
88. Alternatively, the solution could be some form of state tax and transfer scheme to
accomplish the same ends. This "commodification" solution may seem to run against the
conventional wisdom that public or collective goods are those from which others cannot be
excluded. If the good can be commodified, one might ask, surely that means that it was never a
public good in the first place? From my perspective, this difficulty hinges on a certain confusion over
baseline assumptions about legally protected interests, a confusion that is relatively common in the
writing of nonlegally trained economists. Economists tend to think that an undifferentiated property
concept has resolved many of the questions of internalization/externality, tend to lay no clear
distinction between the physical and the legal exclusion of users of public goods, tend to
underestimate the extent to which property rights can be fragmented, and tend to insist on a
somewhat naive separation between public and private law. The real problem with public goods is
that a failure by their users to internalize their full costs will lead to underproduction. (Although
some economists believe that in some cases, it may actually lead to overproduction. Hirshleifer,
supra note 69, at 569.) Demsetz makes a similar point.
Frequently there is confusion between the public good concept, as I understand it, which
states that it is possible at no cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public
good, and a different concept, that might be identified as a collective good, which imposes
the stronger condition that it is impossible to exclude nonpurchasers from consuming the
good.
Demsetz, supra note 84, at 295. A central idea behind much of the law and economics literature
since Coase is that many ofthe problems traditionally solved by recourse to the state taxation system
can be just as well served by a system of limited property rights such as those found in copyright or
patent.
89. For example, consider the following:
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of classification is not merely an empirical one. Even the existence of
precise empirical evidence (of a kind currently unavailable for any area of
information regulation except, arguably, stock market prices) would not,
alone, reveal the right answer unless we had also decided on what level of
generality the analysis was to be undertaken. In Feist Publications v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.,9° for example, the Supreme Court denied
copyright protection to the compilers of a white pages phone directory.
The logic of the analysis I just applied to the INS case might seem to
indicate that it was necessary to give the compilers of the directory some
protection. After all, directories raise classic public goods problems.
The cost of creation is high, yet it is possible at minimal extra cost for
additional users to enjoy the same unit of the good thus created. In other
words, it is expensive to make and cheap to copy. The Court was not
disposed to agree. Partly by means of doctrinal line-drawing (copyright
rather than unfair competition) and partly by means of definitional fiat
(telephone directories are not original, so in that sense nothing truly new
is being created), the Court moved away from the "sweat of the brow"
theory and denied the compilers copyright protection.
At first, it appears that the Feist opinion has nothing to tell us about
economic analysis. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that the
Court was not so much rejecting the commodity perspective as it was
changing the level of generality of the analysis. From Justice O'Connor's
perspective, it was the structure of copyright law as a whole that strikes
the right balance between the need to reward producers and the need to
maintain competition and the free flow of information. Since copyright
law as a whole allows the commodification of expression but not the
ideas or facts which that expression contains, and since the Court finds
this particular arrangement of facts to be "unoriginal," no legally protected interest can be recognized. It is only once this prior decision about
It is true that under a patent system there will, in general, be some shortfall in the return to
the inventor, due to costs and risks in acquiring and enforcing his rights, their limited
duration in time, and the infeasibility of a perfectly discriminatory fee policy. On the other
side are the recognized disadvantages of patents: the social costs of the administrativejudicial process, the possible anti-competitive impact, and restriction of output due to the
marginal burden of patent fees. As a second best kind of judgment, some degree of patent
protection has seemed a reasonable compromise among the objectives sought.
But recognition of the unique position of the innovator for forecasting and
consequently capturing portions of the pecuniary effects-the wealth transfers due to price
revaluations-may put matters in a different light. The "ideal" case of the perfectly
discriminating patent holder earning the entire technological benefit is no longer so ideal.
For, the same inventor is in a position to reap speculative profits, too; counting these as
well, he would clearly be over-compensated.
. . . Do we have reason to believe that the potential specUlative profits to the inventor,
from the pecuniary effects that will follow release of the information at his unique disposal,
will be so great that society need take no care to reserve for him any portion of the
technological benefit of his information? The answer here is indeterminate.
Hirshleifer, supra note 69, at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
90. 111 s. Ct. 1282 (1991).
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the level of generality has been made that the questions of efficiency and
incentive can intelligibly be posed.
For all of these reasons, economic analysis of information regimes is
extraordinarily indeterminate. A person reading the confident statements of legal scholars about the superior efficiency of the patent regime
over the copyright regime,91 or the economic inefficiency of insider trading regulation92 and of the law offraud,93 would be surprised to find that
economists cannot agree over the basic question of whether, in the
absence of commodification, there will be under- or over-investment in
the production of information. Kenneth Arrow takes a position that
seems to support the Court's result in INS. He argues that without property rights, too little information will be produced, because producers of
information will not be able to capture its true value. 94 Fama and Laffer,
on the other hand, argue that too much information will be generated,
because some information will be produced only in order to gain a temporary advantage in trading, thus redistributing wealth but not achieving
greater allocative efficiency.95 In other words, in the absence of information property rights, there may be inefficient investment of social
resources in activities that merely slice the pie up differently, rather than
making it bigger. Hirshleifer gives a similar analysis of patent law, ending with the conclusion that patent law may be either a necessary incentive for the production of inventions or an unnecessary legal monopoly in
information that overcompensates an inventor who has already had the
opportunity to trade on the information implied by his or her discovery.96 It is hard to think of a more fundamental uncertainty.97
91. See Wiley, supra note 64.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 224-40.
93. See Easterbrook, supra note 1; Kronman, supra note 55; Levmore, supra note 55.
94. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: EcONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617
(National Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962). The Arrow article itself offers some lovely
examples of the tensions between efficiency and anticompetitive provision of incentives. It is
interesting to note that Arrow, writing for The RAND Corporation, believes that even with
intellectual property rights it is unlikely that sufficient knowledge will be produced. He therefore
suggests that "for optimal allocation to invention it would be necessary for the government or some
other agency not governed by profit-and-Ioss criteria to finance research and invention." Id. at 623.
Arrow uses this idea to offer a partial defense of the "cost-pIus" method of developing weaponry for
the military. "This arrangement seems to fly in the face of principles for encouraging efficiency, and
doubtless it does lead to abuses, but closer examination shows both mitigating factors and some
explanation of its inevitability." Id. at 624. Michael Perelman, most emphatically not writing for
The RAND Corporation, uses a similar logic to reach a conclusion sufficiently indicated by his title.
See Michael Perelman, High Technology. Intellectual Property. and Public Goods: The Rationality 0/
Socialism. 20 REv. RADICAL POL. EcON. 277 (1988).
95. Fama & Laffer, supra note 83, at 298.
96. Hirshleifer, supra note 69, at 572-73.
97. The problem is further compounded by the fact that many professional economists seem to
have a naive, prerealist understanding of law. In particular, I found the following recurrent
mistakes. Professional economists often talk as though there was a natural suite of property rights
that automatically accompanied a free market. They make strong and unexplained assumptions that
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It is my argument in this Article that much contemporary economic
analysis conceals these tensions, aporias, and empirically unverifiable
assumptions by relying unconsciously on the notion of the romantic
author. I have tried to show that most issues in information economics
could be portrayed (in the absence of more detailed empirical information) as either public goods problems for which the state has wisely chosen the remedy of commodification in order to avoid underproduction or
as potential monopolies in which intolerable transaction costs are introduced into the free flow of information. In later Parts, I will argue that
this choice is often concealed by an implicit reliance on the author
notion, a reliance that tends to push the analysis towards the incentives/
commodity vision of information. This could have serious negative consequences since it will lead analysts (and governments) to support a
greater commodification of information than is actually warranted. Such
a discourse could also be used cynically to protect existing information
monopolies. Economists would be mainly concerned by the possible efficiency losses implicit in such a result. In the Conclusion, I argue that
there are also profound distributional issues which should concern usparticularly if we believe that information is becoming one of the primary
resources in the international economy.
So much for the theory. What about the facts? The empirical evidence, of which there is surprisingly little, seems to justify these conclusions, or at least to cast doubt on current assumptions about the level of
international intellectual property protection necessary to promote
research and innovation. A historical, statistical study of the effect of
patent protection on the development of drugs in both developed and
developing countries from 1950 to 1989 found:
[T]he existence of a patenting system is not a prerequisite for
inventions.

The relationship between patent systems and their influence
on the inventive capacity of developed countries was also tested.
Two different tests using Yule's coefficient showed conclusively
certain types of activities (for example, trading on superior infonnation) will "naturally" be allowed,
but that certain others (for example, trading on superior physical strength) will not be. This kind of
error also creeps into the work of some lawyer-economists such as Easterbrook and Levmore. See
generally infra Part VIII (discussing insider trading). To the extent that they do use the concept of
property, economists tend to assume that "absolute" property rights are the default position. The
debates between Laffer and Arrow show the results of these shortcomings. For example, both
Arrow and Laffer seem to assume that the "natural" unregulated position is that one would have
"privileges" but not "rights" to trade in infonnation. But if there is no such thing as a natural,
unregulated market, we would have to compare the efficiency of all of the possible legal positionsparticularly since the legal system actually uses the full suite of Hohfeld's jural correlates in its
regulation of different kinds of infonnation. For an excellent description of the many different legal
relationships around valuable infonnation, see Easterbrook, supra note I, at 313-14.
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that, for those countries in which nearly all inventions are made,
the relationship is not significant.
. . . The hypothesis that the number of inventions would
increase along with the world-wide increase in patent systems was
also considered, but it was concluded that there is no significant
relationship between these two variables, either in the United
States or in the world at large. 98
The certainty of these conclusions warrants some skepticism. A
small correlation (Yule's association coefficient = 0.15) between patent
protection and invention was observed in developed countries. 99 As the
authors observe, there is a much more significant correlation between
economic development and invention (Yule'S association coefficient =
0.94).100 Yet when the question is what level of intellectual property
rights to maintain domestically, the latter correlation is of dubious relevance-at least for developed countries. On the other hand, the absence
of a strong correlation between patent and invention is significant, and
the study certainly tends to undermine the claims made by the developed
world that a stronger international regime of intellectual property is necessary to encourage innovation.
Finally, while all such studies warrant methodological skepticism,
the studies that support intellectual property protection seem even more
problematic. One study estimated that without patent protection sixtyfive percent of new drugs produced by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
would not have reached the market. 101 The analysis was based, however,
on data supplied by the pharmaceutical industry in response to a questionnaire on the impact of patent protection on research and development. The problems with such a method are fairly obvious.
In another context, the paradoxes and empirical uncertainties of
economic analysis might be of mainly theoretical interest. In discussions
of information, they are of immediate practical relevance to almost every
issue. In part this is because economists-to their great credit-have
been in the forefront of attempts to treat information holistically.102
Another reason may lie in the perception that information issues are
somehow more "intangible." Escaping more easily from the absolutist,
formalist, and physicalist notions of tangible property, information has
historically seemed more amenable to a utilitarian calculus. 103 Conse98. Pablo Challu et al., The Consequences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting, 15 WORLD
65, 115 (1991).
99. Id. at 68.
100. Id. at 70.
101. Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174·75
(1986).
102. See supra note 1.
103. To my knowledge, copyrights and patents are the only types of property that have an
explicitly utilitarian constitutional basis. Congress is empowered "[t]o promote the Progress of
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quently, these issues are often debated in economic terms-both inside
and outside the academy. When the U.S. Trade Representative argued
that the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) should be
used to pressure other countries to increase their levels of intellectual
property protection, she turned to the language of necessary economic
incentives, rather than to the labor theory of property or the language of
natural rightS. 104 Once again, the simplistic claim arises that more protection of intellectual property means more innovation and invention.
There is another reason that economics shapes the debate of information issues. Neoclassical price theory is not only the most sophisticated utilitarian language available, but also the one whose disciplinary
assumptions--consumer sovereignty, exogenous preferences, and so onbest reflect a liberal vision of the production, distribution, and exchange
of information. lOS The "marketplace of ideas" is more than just a ranScience and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. The Clause
demonstrates two important characteristics of intellectual property. First, intellectual property
seems more chosen-more of a social artifact-than other types of property, though in fact it is not.
Second, partly because of this, intellectual property is almost always discussed in terms of the social
benefits it will bring. The person who is asked why he should have the right to pile his flax by the
tracks regardless of the inconvenience to the railroad company is likely to say "because it's my
land." The author who is asked why he should have some legally protected interest in a work after it
has been conveyed through the marketplace cannot appeal so easily to any naturalistic or physicalist
notion of property. This phenomenon is evidenced also in respect for different types of property
rights; "nice" people, who would not steal a record from a record store even if they were sure they
were unobserved, nonetheless tape albums they did not buy. For all of these reasons, intellectual
property intuitively seems a fit subject for a utilitarian calculus of social interests. What better
language than economics in which to discuss "the way in which the incentive to produce information
and the demands of current use conflict"? Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 314. As a result,
intellectual property in particular was subject to ecOnomic analysis long before other doctrinal areas.
See, e.g., Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 EcONOMICA 167 (1934).
Interestingly, this 1934 article argues for diminished copyright protection. ld. at 194-95.
104. My preferences, as I earlier said, would be for complete protection of intellectual
property. And so the higher the protection, the more I think it benefits the developing
countries, who thereby then attract the transfer technology, investment, and creative
endeavor. And of course, the more you protect intellectual property, those established
firms are willing to pour more into research and development to try to address mankind's
problems, whether they be disease or constructive building of agricultural crops or what
have you, all for the benefit of peoples wherever they may be located.
News Briefing by U.S. Trade Representative, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 17, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File (Carla Hills, Remarks on the Signing of a Bilateral
Memorandum of Understanding with the People's Republic of China).
105. There may also be a more indirect relationship between the exaltation of individuality,
creative innovation, and utilitarianism. Schumpeter thought there was:
[T]he typical entrepreneur is more self-centered than other types, because he relies less
than they do on tradition and connection and because his characteristic task-theoretically
as well as historically-consists precisely in breaking up old, and creating new, tradition.
Although this applies primarily to his economic action, it also extends to the moral,
cultural, and social consequences of it. It is, of course, no mere coincidence that the period
of the rise of the entrepreneur type also gave birth to Utilitarianism.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 14, at 91-92. The reader may notice the similarity between Schumpeter's
vision of the entrepreneur and the idea of authorship described here. This connection will be
explored in the discussion on insider trading. See infra Part VIII.
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dom metaphor: it is an accurate summation of many of the assumptions
that our society brings to the discussion of information issues. In a
moment, I will argue that this metaphor brings still more problems in its
wake.
If microeconomics has become one of the most attractive languages
in which to discuss questions of information, then it is almost inevitable
that the specific blindnesses 106 of economic analysis will be replicated in
information policy. Thus, to the particular difficulties of the economic
analysis of information are added the more general difficulties of the economic analysis of law-baseline problems, wealth effects, and so on.
These have been analyzed elsewhere, so I will not dwell on them here.
To sum up, there are at least two types of theoretical problems in
micro economic analysis of information. The first stems from the contradictory roles that information plays in the market and in micro economic
theory-information as both perfect and imperfect, property rights in
information as both necessary incentives and dubious transaction costs,
and so on. The second type of problem stems from the conflict between
the assumptions of micro economic analysis and actual social behavior.
For example, when poor schoolchildren are convinced by relentless
advertising and peer pressure that they "need" hugely expensive basketball shoes, even a staunch advocate of liberal economics may begin to
doubt both the descriptive accuracy and prescriptive fairness of an
unswerving application of the norms of "consumer sovereignty" and
"exogenous preferences."107
What conclusions do we draw from the combination of these two
theoretical problems? The pessimistic conclusion would be that one of
the most influential ways we have to discuss issues of information is a
theory so indeterminate that it frequently functions as a Rorschach blot
for dominant social beliefs and the prejudices of the analyst. At the same
time, this theory tends structurally to undervalue issues of power and
inequality.
Call that the pessimistic conclusion. Is there an optimistic one? My
answer would be a guarded "maybe." It is a good idea to focus on incentives to production, on transaction costs, and on the problems created by
the presence or absence of legally protected interests. It is certainly a
good idea to try to discover actual effects of a particular regime of infor106. I do not necessarily mean this as an insult. All theoretical schemes function like blinders,
focusing attention on certain phenomena while ignoring others. In its current incarnation, the
economic analysis of law tends to ignore wealth effects, structural ("irrational") oppression, the
possibility of manufacturing needs as well as products, and so on. To the extent that a more or less
sophisticated version of economic analysis becomes the discourse of power in the regulation of
information, such issues would tend to be ignored or at least marginalized. From my perspective,
these seem to be exactly the issues that deserve our attention.
107. Bob Gordon offers the following definition of "economist": "An economist is a person
who believes that advertising is a means of conveying information."
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mation regulation. By and large, economists have not actually done this,
but at least they have talked about it. The tendency of economic analysis
to go at least one layer below reified doctrinal concepts is also to be welcomed. One could imagine a type of information economics that was
sensitive to baseline errors, offer-asking problems, and wealth effects, that
questioned the reality of exogenous preferences, and that openly
acknowledged the tension between perfect information and "information
as commodity." If this economics also paid more attention than is currently fashionable to the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, I, for
one, would be pleased.
If all of these things were done, what epistemological status and
practical effect would information economics have? It would be a little
less imperial, a lot more modest, and much more empirical. Its conclusions would be more carefully hedged than they are now, and it would
openly declare its partiality-the inherent prejudices of any utilitarian,
efficiency, or welfare-maximizing calculus and the political consequences
of the distinction between allocation and distribution.
To some, this judgment may seem strange in light of my claims that
information economics is beset by a basic paradox or aporia. If the discipline is truly paradoxical, surely it is useless?-no matter how chastened
its conclusions. The answer, I think, is that economics is only useless if
one makes a particular positivist and scientistic set of assumptions about
the kind of knowledge a theory has to provide in order to qualify as a
theory. Admittedly, both professional economists and economic analysts
of law-and not merely those from the Chicago school-sound in their
more expansive moments as if they subscribe to those assumptions. But
that is no reason for the rest of us to do so. Neoclassical price theory is a
valuable tool which enriches our understanding of the world. Like all
theoretical systems it has blind spots and moments of formal
"undecidability." Used with an awareness of its paradoxes and its blind
spots, an awareness of the unconscious process of interpretive construction that conceals its indeterminacy, it would nevertheless be a valuable
theoretical tool. Seen this way, economics would be a spur to concentrate on incentives and information flow, to worry about perverse motivations and unintended consequences. It would, in short, be more a
rough-and-ready set of analytical techniques and reminders than a
Newtonian science.
Whether or not this is the economics we should have, it is not the
economics we have at the moment. With a few significant exceptions, we
have an economics more like my pessimistic picture-an aporetic discipline which, as I hope to show in the rest of this Article, often conceals
its indeterminacy through romance. To understand the origins of that
romance, we must first look at the liberal conception of property.
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V
PROPERTY IN THE LIBERAL STATE

Like infonnation, property has a vital role in liberal state theory.
That role imposes certain conflicting requirements on the concept of
property itself.108 Legal realism, Lockean political theory, critical legal
thought, and law and economics have all stressed-each in its own
vocabulary-the idea that property is perhaps the most important way in
which we attempt to reconcile our desire for freedom and our desire for
security.109 How can we be free and yet secure from the freedom of
others, secure and yet free to do that which we want to do?110 The most
obvious way to deal with this apparent contradiction is to conceive rights
of security
in a manner that both makes them appear to be absolute and
negates the proposition that they restrict the legitimate freedom of
action of others. Thus if we define liberty as free actions that do
not affect others at all, and rights as absolute protection from
hann, the contradiction vanishes. 111
The traditional Blackstonian definition of property does just that. But
there are irresoluble conceptual tensions in any such fonnulation, a point
which has considerable relevance to intellectual property law, as we will
see later. Vandevelde states the problem in the following way:
[A]t the beginning of the nineteenth century, property was ideally
defined as absolute dominion over things. Exceptions to this definition suffused property law: instances in which the law declared
property to exist even though no "thing" was involved or the
owner's dominion over the thing was not absolute. Each of these
108. See generally Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law. 86 U. PA. L.
REv. 691 (1938); Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 975; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modem Concept of Property. 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325
(1980).
109. To put it in the simplest terms possible, property is a strong barrier against potentially
dangerous other people but, at least since the decline of classical legal thought, a weaker barrier
against the state. See. e.g.• Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the
condemnation of property for the purpose of limiting the concentration of property ownership
constitutes a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (allowing a municipality to condemn and
transfer private property to a development corporation for the public purpose of expanding its
economic base). Constitutional rights, on the other hand, are generally a strong barrier against the
state, but a weak barrier against "private" parties. Or, as one of my colleagues puts it, the full
panoply of constitutional restraints applies to the actions of the dogcatcher in Gary, Indiana. but not
to Exxon or General Motors. The best explanation of property as a mediator between freedom and
security comes from Singer, supra note 108, and I am indebted to his analysis.
110. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 139-43 (Bobbs-Merrill 1958) (1651); JOHN S. MILL,
ON LIBERTY 70-86 (David Spitz ed., Norton 1975) (1859); Boyle, Thomas Hobbes. supra note 10;
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure 0/ Blackstone's Commentaries. 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 209-21
(1979).
111. Singer, supra note 108, at 980.
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exceptions, however, was explained away. Where no "thing"
existed, one was fictionalized. Where dominion was not absolute,
limitations could be camouflaged by resQrting to fictions, or rationalized as inherent in the nature of the thing or the owner....
As the nineteenth century progressed, increased exceptions
to both the physicalist and the absolutist elements of Blackstone's
conception of property were incorporated into the law.... This
dephysicalization was a development that threatened to place the
entire corpus of American law in the category of property. Such
conceptual imperialism created severe problems for the courts.
First, if every valuable interest constituted property, then practically any act would result in either a trespass on, or a taking of,
someone's property, especially if property still was regarded as
absolute. Second, once property had swallowed the rest of American law, its meaningfulness as a separate category would disappear. On the other hand, if certain valuable interests were not to
be considered property, finding and justifying the criteria for separating property from nonproperty would be difficult. 112
To the extent that there was a replacement for this Blackstonian
conception it was the familiar "bundle of rights" notion of modern property law, a vulgarization of Hohfeld's analytic scheme of jural correlates
and opposites, loosely justified by a rough-and-ready utilitarianism and
applied in widely varying ways to legal interests of every kind. The
euphonious case of LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway 113 is used in many a first-year class to illustrate the conceptual
shift. Could a flax maker be found guilty of contributory negligence for
piling its stacks of flax too close to the tracks? The majority bridled at
the very thought. The flax maker was piling its flax on its own property,
after all. "[T]he rights of one man in the use of his property cannot be
limited by the wrongs of another.... The legal conception of property is
of rights. When you attempt to limit them by wrongs, you venture a
solecism."114 Though the majority's circular reasoning 115 carried the
day, it is Holmes' partial concurrence that pointed to the future. Rather
than imagining an absolute sphere of rights surrounding the property
lines like a glass bubble, Holmes would be happy to remove the flaxpiling entitlement from the bundle of property rights for whatever swathe
of the property "was so near to the track as to be in danger from even a
112. Vandevelde, supra note 108, at 328-29.
113. 232 U.S. 340 (1914).
114. [d. at 350.
115. If the railroad had a duty not to cause the destruction only of that property kept at a
reasonably safe distance from the track, where was the wrong? To put it another way, why isn't the
majority venturing a solecism by allowing the "wrong" of the flax-stacker (in stacking the flax by the
tracks) to limit the "rights" of the railroad company to operate their property?
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prudently managed engine."1l6 He also directed a few sanguine, if
vaguely crocodilian, comments towards the majority on the subject of
their concern about the apparent relativism of his concept of property.
I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought
that my view depends on differences of degree. The whole law
does so as soon as it is civilized. Negligence is all degree-that of
the defendant here degree of the nicest sort; and between the variations according to distance that I suppose to exist and the simple
universality of the rules in the Twelve Tables or the Leges
Barbarorum, there lies the culture of two thousand years. 117
Presumably, the majority consoled itself with the fact that its concern with absolutism and universality was 2000 years out of date. In any
event, the writing was on the wall. Property was no longer conceived of
as absolute, as a guaranteed trump against the interests of the majority or
the state, or as related to any physical thing. Indeed, so thoroughly had
the conception been relativized that courts were willing to admit that
there could be property rights restricted to particular interests, to be
asserted against one person rather than another, and only in some situations and moments. But if this is the case, where is our shield against
other people or the state? If the flax-piling entitlement can be stripped
from seventy yards of the LeRoy Fibre Company's land merely because
there would be utilitarian benefits to letting the railroad run unmolested,
then why not from 100 yards, or from the whole parcel? Instead of an
absolute, unchanging, and universal shield against the world, property is
now merely a bundle of assorted entitlements that changes from moment
to moment as the balance of utilities changes. It seems that the modern
concept of property has given us a system that works on the day-to-day
level, but only at the price of giving up the very role that property was
supposed to play in the liberal vision.
Thus, when we turn to intellectual property, an area which throughout its history has been less able to rely on the physicalist and absolutist
fictions which girded the traditional conception of property, we will see
not only an attempt to clothe a newly invented romantic author in robes
of juridical protection, but also to struggle with, mediate, or repress one
of the central contradictions in the liberal world view. This, then, is the
redoubled contradiction of which I spoke earlier. If it is to protect the
legitimacy and intellectual suasion of the liberal world view, intellectual
property law (and indeed, all law that deals with information) must
accomplish a number of tasks simultaneously. It must provide a conceptual apparatus that appears to mediate the various tensions associated
with the role of information in liberal society. Thus, for example, it must
116. LeRoy Fibre, 232 U.S. at 353 (Holmes, J., concurring in part).
117. [d. at 354 (citation omitted).
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explain why a person who recombines information from the public
sphere is not merely engaging in the private appropriation of public
wealth. It must explain how we can motivate individuals, who are sometimes postulated to be essentially self-serving and sometimes to be noble,
idealistic souls, to produce information. If the answer is "by giving them
property rights," it must also explain why this will not diminish the common pool or public domain so greatly that a net decrease in the production of information will result. (Think of overfishing.) It must carve out
a sphere of privacy and at the same time ensure a vigorous sphere of
public debate and ample information about a potentially oppressive state.
It must do all of this within a vision of justice that expects formal equality within the public sphere, but respects existing disparities in wealth,
status, and power in the private. And all of these things must be accomplished while using a conception of property that avoids the theoretical
impossibilities of the physicalist, absolutist conception, but that at the
same time is not too obviously relativistic, partial, and utilitarian.

VI
COPYRIGHT

So far, I have argued that because of the contradictions and tensions
I have been describing, there are certain structural pressures on the way
that a liberal society deals with information. When we tum to the area of
law conventionally recognized as dealing with information-intellectual
property, and in this case copyright-we will find a pattern, a strategy
that attempts to resolve these tensions in the liberal view of information.
On one level, understanding this pattern helps to make sense (if not
coherence) of the otherwise apparently chaotic world of copyright. On
another level, understanding the conceptual strategy developed in copyright illuminates most of the other areas that concern information-even
if those areas are not conventionally understood as relating to copyright.
Although intellectual property has long been said to present insuperable conceptual difficulties, it actually presents exactly the same
problems as the liberal conception of property generally. It merely does
so in a more obvious way and in a way which is given particular spin by
our fascination with information. All systems of property are both
rights-oriented and utilitarian, rely on antinomial conceptions of public
and private, and present insuperable conceptual difficulties when reduced
to mere physicalist relations. But when they are conceived of in a more
abstract and technically sophisticated way, systems of property immediately begin to dissolve back into the conflicting policies to which they
give a temporary and unstable form. In personal or real property, however, one can at least point to a pair of sneakers or a house, say "I own
that," and have some sense of confidence that the statement means something. As LeRoy Fibre shows, of course, it is not at all clear that such
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confidence is justified, but at least physical property presents itself as an
apparently coherent feature of social reality. This is a fact of considerable ideological and political significance. In intellectual property, the
response might be "What do you mean?"
As Martha Woodmansee discovered, this point was made with startling clarity in the debates over copyright in Germany in the eighteenth
century. Encouraged by an enormous reading public, by several apocryphal tales of writers who were household names yet still lived in poverty,
and by a new, more romantic vision of authorship, writers began to
demand greater economic returns from their labors. One obvious strategy was to lobby for some kind of legal right in the text-the right that
we would call copyright. To many participants in the debate the idea
was ludicrous. Christian Sigmund Krause, writing in 1783, expressed
the point pungently.
"But the ideas, the content! that which actually constitutes a
book! which only the author can sell or communicate!"-Once
expressed, it is impossible for it to remain the author's property.... It is precisely for the purpose of using the ideas that most
people buy books-pepper dealers, fishwives, and the like, and literary pirates excepted.... Over and over again it comes back to
the same question: I can read the contents of a book, learn,
abridge, expand, teach, and translate it, write about it, laugh over
it, find fault with it, deride it, use it poorly or well-in short, do
with it whatever I will. But the one thing I should be prohibited
from doing is copying or reprinting it? ... A published book is a
secret divulged. With what justification would a preacher forbid
the printing of his homilies, since he cannot prevent any of his
listeners from transcribing his sermons? Would it not be just as
ludicrous for a professor to demand that his students refrain from
using some new proposition he had taught them as for him to
demand the same of book dealers with regard to a new book? No,
no, it is too obvious that the concept of intellectual property is useless. My property must be exclusively mine,' I must be able to dispose of it and retrieve it unconditionally. Let someone explain to
me how that is possible in the present case. Just let someone try
taking back the ideas he has originated once they have been communicated so that they are, as before, nowhere to be found. All
the money in the world could not make that possible. 118
Along with this problem go two more fundamental ones. The first is
the recurrent question of how we can give property rights in intellectual
products and yet still preserve the inventiveness and free flow of informa118. Christian S. Krause, lJber den Biichemachdruck, 1 DEUTSCHES MUSEUM 415-17 (1783)
(emphasis added), quoted in Woodmansee, supra note 1, at 443-44.
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tion that liberal social theory demands. I shall return to this question in
a moment. The second problem is the more fundamental one. On what
grounds can we justify giving the author this kmd of unprecedented
property right at all, even if the conceptual problems could be overcome?
We do not think it is necessary to give car workers residual property
rights in the cars that they produce-wage labor is thought to work perfectly well. Surely an author is merely taking public goods-language,
ideas, culture, humour, genre-and converting them to his or her own
use. Where is the moral or utilitarian justification for the existence of
this property right in the first place?
The most obvious answer is that authors are special, but why? And
since when? Even the most cursory historical study reveals that our
notion of "authorship" is .an invented concept of relatively recent provenance. Medieval church writers actively disapproved of the elements of
originality and creativity that we now think of as essential components of
authorship.
They valued extant old books more highly than any recent
elucubrations and they put the work of the scribe and the copyist
above that of the authors. The real task of the scholars in their
view was not the vain excogitation of novelties but a discovery of
great old books, their multiplication and the placing of copies
where they would be accessible to future generations of readers. 119
Woodmansee quotes a wonderful definition of "book" from a mideighteenth-century dictionary that merely lists the writer as one mouth
among many-"[t]he scholar and the writer, the papermaker, the type
founder, the typesetter and the printer, the proofreader, the publisher,
the book binder, sometimes even the gilder and brass-worker, etc."-all
of whom are "fed by this branch of manufacture." 120 Other studies show
that authors were seen as merely another type of craftsman-an appellation which Shakespeare might not have rejected-or at their most
exalted, as the crossroads where learned tradition met external, divine
inspiration. 121 But since the tradition was mere craft, and the glory of
the divine inspiration was to be offered to God rather than to the vessel
he had chosen,122 where was the justification for preferential treatment in
119. ERNSf P. GOLDSCHMIDT, MEDIEVAL TEXTS AND THEIR FIRST ApPEARANCE IN PRINT
112 (1943) (emphasis added), quoted in JOHN W. SAUNDERS, THE PROFESSION OF ENGLISH
LETTERS 20 (1964).
120. GEORG H. ZINCK, ALLGEMEINES OECONOMISCHES LEXICON col. 442 (3d ed. n.p. 1753),
quoted in Woodmansee, supra note 1, at 425.
121. See Boyle, supra note 1, at 628-33.
122. This view persisted for some time:
Nevertheless, I had to be told about authors. My grandfather told me, tactfully,
calmly. He taught me the names of those illustrious men. I would recite the list to myself,
from Hesiod to Hugo, without a mistake. They were the Saints and Prophets. Charles
Schweitzer said he worshipped them. Yet they bothered him. Their obtrusive presence
prevented him from attributing the works of Man directly to the Holy Ghost. He therefore
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the creation of property rights? As authors ceased to think of themselves
as either craftsmen, gentlemen,I23 or stenographers for the Divine Spirit,
a recognizably different, more romantic vision of authorship began to
emerge. At first,' it was found mainly in self-serving tracts. But little by
little it spread through the culture so that, by the middle of the eighteenth century, it had come to be seen as a universal truth about art. 124
felt a secret preference for the anonymous, for the builders who had had the modesty to
keep in the background of their cathedrals, for the countless authors of popular songs. He
did not mind Shakespeare, whose identity was not established. Nor Homer, for the same
reason. Nor a few others, about whom there was no certainty that they had existed. As for
those who had not wished or who had been unable to efface the traces of their life, he found
excuses, provided they were dead.
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, THE WORDS 61-62 (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1964).
123. I use the male form deliberately. It is true that despite the obstacles placed in their way, a
number of women authors established themselves on the literary scene. To say, however, that they
participated in the "invention" of romantic authorship, or to claim that such a notion accurately
reflected the parts of their own creative practices that they thought most valuable, seems to me to be
going too far. In this historical analysis, gender-neutral language might actually obscure
understanding. See SANDRA M. GILBERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE ATTIC:
THE WOMAN WRITER & THE NINETEENTH CENTURY LITERARY IMAGINATION (1988); see also
ANN RUGGLES GERE, CoMMON PROPERTIES OF PLEASURE: TEXTS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
WOMEN'S CLUBS 647 (1992); MARLON B. Ross, THE CONTOURS OF MASCULINE DESIRE:
ROMANTICISM AND THE RISE OF WOMEN'S POETRY (1989); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author
Effect: Recovering Collectivity. 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279 (1992).
A significant exception to this line of thought is provided by Professor Linda Lacey who, in a
fascinating and thOUght-provoking article, provides a feminist-influenced view of authorship that I
would argue is just as romanticized as the vision I discuss here. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses
and Copyrights. 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532. Professor Lacey argues that authors have been stigmatized as
female and therefore, unlike all other rights-holders. have had their property rights limited. I would
disagree with the tendency to romanticize the individual creator for the reasons given in this Article.
Moreover, I simply cannot agree that other forms of property are not limited for reasons of social
policy, commonweal, convenience of administration, or what-have-you. For a criticism of this kind
of "absolutist" picture of property rights, see supra note 108, infra text accompanying notes 243-49.
124. For comprehensive development of these ideas, see Boyle, supra note 1; Jaszi, supra note 2.
This line of thought can be traced back to Foucault. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in
TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141 (Josuee V. Harari
ed., 1979). Woodmansee provided the paradigm for actual research, and her article gives a
marvellous account of the "rise" of intellectual property in Germany. Woodmansee, supra note 1.
For the linkage between romantic authorship and intellectual property in England, see Mark Rose,
The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship. 23
REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988). See also N.N. FELTES, MODES OF PRODUCTION OF VICTORIAN
NOVELS (1986). But see John Feather, Publishers and Politicians: The Remaking of the Law of
Copyright in Britain 1775-1842 Part II: The Rights ofAuthors. 25 PUBLISHING HIST. 45 (1989). For
the same linkage in France, see Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of
Authorship in Revolutionary France. 1777-1793. 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (1990). And for the
United States, see CATHY N. DAVIDSON, THE REVOLUTION AND THE WORD: THE RISE OF THE
NOVEL IN AMERICA (1986). My ideas on this issue were strongly influenced by participation in the
1991 Conference on Intellectual Property and the Construction of Authorship at Case Western
University. Some of the papers from that Conference have been collected in the Cardozo Arts and
Entertainment Law Journal. Symposium, Intellectual Property and the Construction ofAuthorslzip.
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.l. 277 (1992). I should note here that I am concentrating on the
romantic vision of the author, because that is the image with which I am most familiar, and the
rhetoric of which seems most persuasive. I do not mean to imply that a similar project could not be
undertaken using some different version of the romantic creator-the great inventor, say. In either
case, originality provides the hook with which one can both justify and limit monopoly.
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Woodmansee explains how the decline of the craft/inspiration
model of writing and the elevation of the romantic author both presented
and seemed to solve the question of property rights in intellectual
products.
Eighteenth-century theorists departed from this compound
model of writing in two significant ways. They minimized the element of craftsmanship (in some instances they simply discarded
it) in favor of the element of inspiration, and they internalized the
source of that inspiration. That is, inspiration came to be
regarded as emanating not from outside or above, but from within
the writer himself. "Inspiration" came to be explicated in terms
of original genius, with the consequence that the inspired work
was made peculiarly and distinctively the product-and the property-of the writer. 125
In this vision, the author was not the journeyman who learned a
craft and then hoped to be well paid for it. The romantic author was
defined not by mastery of a prior set of rules, but instead by the transformation of genre, the revision of form. Originality became the watchword
of artistry.126 To see how complete a revision this is, one need only
examine Shakespeare's wholesale lifting of plot, scene, and language from
other writers, both ancient and contemporary. To an Elizabethan playwright, the phrase "imitation is the sincerest form of flattery" might have
125. Woodmansee, supra note 1, at 427.
126. The notion of originality brought its own burdens, particularly during the mid-19thcentury zenith of the cult of the romantic author. The pitiable account of the obsessive author in
George Borrow's Lavengro is a fine example.
[The misfortune which befell me] was neither more nor less than a doubt of the legality of
my claim to the thoughts, expressions, and situations contained in the book; that is, to all
that constituted the book. How did I get them? How did they come into my mind? Did I
invent them? Did they originate with myself? Are they my own, or are they some other
body's? .•. I at length flung my book, I mean the copy ofit which I possessed, into the fire,
and began another.
But it was all in vain; I laboured at this other, finished it, and gave it to the world; and
no sooner had I done so than the same thought was busy in my brain, poisoning all the
pleasure which I should otherwise have derived from my work. How did I get all the
matter which composed it? Out of my own mind, unquestionably; but how did it come
there-was it the indigenous growth of the mind? And then I would sit down and ponder
over the various scenes and adventures in my book, endeavouring to ascertain how I came
originally to devise them, and by dint of reflecting I remembered that to a single word in a
conversation, or some simple accident in a street, or on a road, I was indebted for some of
the happiest portions of my work; they were but tiny seeds, it is true, which in the soil of
my imagination had subsequently become stately trees, but I reflected that without them
no stately trees would have been produced, and that, consequently, only a part in the merit
of these compositions which charmed the world-for they did charm the world-was due
to myself. Thus, a dead fly was in my phial, poisoning all the pleasures which I could
otherwise have derived from the result of my brain sweat.
GEORGE BORROW, LAVENGRO 332-33 (Ernest Rhys ed., Everyman's Library 1909) (1851). (In
keeping with the theme of this footnote, I should say that I am indebted to Peter Jaszi for pointing
out this passage to me.) To understand the contemporary attitude towards sources, it is worth
comparing this notion of originality, and its profound "anxiety of influence," with the classical one
described infra note 128.
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seemed entirely without irony. "Not only were Englishmen from 1500 to
1625 without any feeling analogous to the modem attitude toward
plagiarism; they even lacked the word until the very end of that
period."127 To the theorists and polemicists of romantic authorship, the
reproduction of orthodoxy would have been proof that they were not the
unique and transcendent spirits they hoped themselves to be. 128
It is the originality of the author, the novel creation the author fashions out of the raw materials provided by culture and the common pool,
that "justifies" the property right. At the same time, the postulate of
originality offers a strategy for resolving the basic conceptual problem
pointed out by Krause: what concept of property would allow the author
to retain some property rights in the work but not others? In the
German debates, the best answer was provided by the great idealist,
Fichte. In a manner that is now familiar to lawyers trained in legal realism and Hohfeldian analysis, but which must have seemed remarkable at
the time, Fichte dis aggregated the concept of property in books. The
buyer gets the physical thing and the ideas contained in it. Precisely
because the originality of his spirit was converted into an originality of
form the author retains the right to the form in which those ideas were
expressed.
[E]ach writer must give his thoughts a certain form, and he can
give them no other form than his own because he has no other.
But neither can he be willing to hand over this form in making his
thoughts public, for no one can appropriate his thoughts without
thereby altering their form. This latter thus remains forever his
127. HAROLD o. WHITE, PLAGIARISM AND IMITATION DURING THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE
202 (1935). During the mid-16th century "imitative composition enjoyed general and unquestioned
acceptance." Id. at 42. It was not until the very end of the century that any writer made use of
Martial's figurative expression "plagiarius" (man-stealer) with the connotation literary thief. Id. at
120.
128. Contrast the views of the mid-16th century: "As for the theoretical treatises which
discussed literature, they were unanimous in asserting the necessity of imitation, varying only in the
emphasis they placed upon the classical safeguards for originality." Id. at 59. Even in the 15805, as
writers began to object to imitation,
[oJf all the objections to imitation which were raised, only those of Churchyard and of one
anonymous author were directed against imitation as such. All the rest opposed only what
classical critics had pointed out as incorrect: piracy, secrecy, perversity, servility,
superficiality. And of all those who demanded originality of invention, not one used the
term in its modern sense of individual fabrication. All sought originality just as classical
critics declared that it should be sought: through individual adaptation, reinterpretation,
and, if possible, improvement of the best which each writer could find in the literature of
his own and earlier days.
Id. at 118-19. The difference between the classical sense of originality (which defined itself around
the adaptive reproduction of past knowledge) and the romantic conception of originality (which
demanded radical innovation) could hardly be more marked. The former vision celebrates, while the
latter vision minimizes and even denigrates, the influence of "sources"-genre, tradition, past
learning, and shared language. This tendency to underemphasize and devalue sources is of profound
importance to the law of information in general and intellectual property in particular.
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exclusive property. 129
American copyright law strikes exactly the same theme. In the
famous case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 130 which concerned the copyrightability of a circus poster, Oliver Wendell Holmes
was still determined to claim that the work could become the subject of
an intellectual property right because it was the original creation of a
unique individual spirit. Holmes' opinion shows us both the advantages
and the disadvantages of a rhetoric that bases property rights on "originality."13! As a hook on which to hang a property right, "originality"
seems to have at least a promise of formal realizability. It connects
nicely to the romantic vision of authorship. It also seems to limit a
potentially expansive principle, the principle that those who create may
be entitled to retain some legally protected interest in the objects they
make--even after those objects have been conveyed through the marketplace. But while the idea that an original spirit conveys its uniqueness to
worked matter seems intuitively plausible when applied to Shakespeare!32 or Dante, it has less obvious relevance to a more humdrum act
of creation by a less credibly romantic creator-a commercial artist in a
shopping mall, say. The tension between the rhetoric of Wordsworth
and the reality of suburban corporate capitalism is one we will explore
further later in the Article. In Bleistein, this particular original spirit
had only managed to rough out a picture of energetic-looking individuals
performing unlikely acts on bicycles, but to Holmes, the principle was
the same. "The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon
nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it
something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he
may copyright .... "133 This quality of "uniqueness," recognized first in
great spirits, then in creative spirits, and finally in advertising executives,
expresses itself in originality of form, of expression.
In the language of romantic authorship, uniqueness is by no means
the only characteristic of the author. Originality may imply iconoclasm.
The romantic author is going beyond the last accepted style, breaking out
129. Johann G. Fichte, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable (n.p.
1793), quoted in Woodmansee, supra note 1, at 445 (emphasis added by Woodmansee).
130.

188 U.S. 239 (1902).

131. See id. at 248-52.
132. In fact, of course, Shakespeare engaged regularly in activity that we would call plagiarism

but which Elizabethan playwrights saw as perfectly harmless, perhaps even complimentary. This
not only shows the historical contingency of the romantic idea of authorship, it may even help to
explain some of the "heretical" claims that Shakespeare did not write Shakespeare. Most of the
heretics use the fact of this supposed plagiarism and their knowledge of the timeless truth of the
romantic vision of authorship to prove that someone else, preferably the author of the borrowed
lines, must have written the plays. After all, the Immortal Bard would never stoop to copy the
works of another. Once again, originality becomes the key. See Boyle, supra note 1.
133. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
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of the old forms. This introduces an almost Faustian element into the
discussion. The author is the maker and destroyer of worlds, the irrepressible spirit of inventiveness whose restless creativity throws off invention after invention. Intellectual property is merely the token awarded to
the author by a grateful society.
A passage from Professor Litman bears repeating at this point:
Why is it that copyright does not protect ideas? Some writers
have echoed the justification for failing to protect facts by suggesting that ideas have their origin in the public domain. Others
have implied that "mere ideas" may not be worthy of the status of
private property. Some authors have suggested that ideas are not
protected because of the strictures imposed on copyright by the
first amendment. The task of distinguishing ideas from expression in order to explain why private ownership is inappropriate
for one but desirable for the other, however, remains elusive. 134
I would say that we find the answer to Professor Litman's question in the
romantic vision of authorship, of the genius whose style forever expresses
a single unique persona. The rise of this powerful (and historically contingent) stereotype provided the necessary raw material to fashion some
convincing mediation of the tension between the imagery of public and
private in information production.
To sum up, then, the idea/expression division which has so fascinated and puzzled copyright scholars apparently manages, in one stroke:
1. To provide a conceptual basis for partial, limited property rights,
without completely collapsing the notion of property into the idea of a
temporary, limited, utilitarian grant by the state, revocable at will. The
property right still seems to be based on something real-on a distinction
that sounds formally realizable, even if, on closer analysis, it turns out to
be impossible to maintain.
2. To provide a moral and philosophical justification for giving the
author such a property right. Mter all, through his originality of spirit,
the author has created something entirely new out of the raw material of
the public domain. The argument is almost like Locke's labor theory:
one gains property by mixing one's labor with an object. But where
Locke's theory, if applied to a modern economy, might have a disturbingly socialist ring to it, Fichte's theory bases the property right on the
originality of every spirit as expressed through words. Every author gets
the right-the writer of the roman ci clef as well as Goethe-but because
of the concentration on originality of expression, the residual property
right is only for the workers of the word, not the workers of the world.
Even after it is analogized to SCUlptures and paintings, software and
music, it will still have an attractively circumscribed ambit.
134.

Litman, supra note 2, at 999 (footnotes omitted).
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3. To resolve (or at least conceal) the tension between public and private. In the double life that Marx described, information is both the lifeblood of the noble, disinterested citizens of the public world and, at the
same time, a commodity in the private sphere to which we must attach
property rights if we wish our self-interested producers to continue to
produce. 135 By disaggregating the book into "idea" and "expression,"
we can give the idea (and the facts on which it is based) to the public
world and the expression to the writer, thus apparently mediating the
contradiction between public good and private greed.
Thus, the combination of the romantic vision of authorship and the
distinction between idea and expression appears to provide a conceptual
basis and a moral justification for intellectual property, does not threaten
to spread dangerous notions of entitlement to other kinds of workers, and
mediates the tension between the schizophrenic halves of the liberal
world view. Small wonder that it has been a success. Small wonder that,
as I hope to show in this Article, the language of romantic, original
authorship tends to reappear in discussion of subjects far removed from
the ones Fichte had in mind. Like insider trading. Or spleens.
A final question remains before I can proceed. Has the structure I
have just described been rendered superfluous by economic analysis and
public goods theory? An economist might say that the difference
between the author and the laborer is that the author is producing a public good and the laborer is (generally) producing a good that can be satisfactorily commodified and alienated using only the traditional lexicon of
property. The distinctions drawn from the idea of romantic authorship
might appear to be surplus-unnecessary remnants of a conceptualist
age.
It is certainly true that some articles decry the language of "idea"
and "expression" and offer the prediction that those terms will be used as
mere summations of the underlying economic analysis l36_in the same
way that "proximate cause" is used as a way of expressing a conclusion
about the desirable reach ofliability. But this kind of response mistakes
both the popular and the esoteric power of the language of romantic
authorship. As the rest of this Article will show, the romantic vision of
authorship continues to influence public debate on issues of information-far beyond the traditional ambit of intellectual property. I tried to
show earlier137 that the language of economic analysis provides no neat
solutions to the problems of information regulation-precisely because
economic analysis is marked by the same aporias as the rest of public
discourse. In this situation of indeterminacy and contradiction, it is the
romantic vision of authorship that frequently structures technical or
135. See supra text accompanying note 40.
136. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 64, at 123-24.
137. See supra Part IV.
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scholarly economic analysis-providing the vital initial choices that give
the analysis its subsequent appearance of determinacy and "common
sense" plausibility. Scholars may criticize the distinctions that flow from
the romantic vision, but they should not imagine themselves to be free
from its influence. This point will be particularly obvious when we get to
the unlikely-and distinctly unromantic-subject of insider trading.
In the next Part I tum to the question of blackmail. One of my aims
in this Article is to pick examples that illustrate different aspects of the
structure of information regulation I describe here. Copyright offers the
idea of romantic authorship as a way of reconciling the demands of private property and the public realm. By contrast, blackmail is a situation
in which the state forbids the commodification of information, precisely
because it concerns the private sphere of home, hearth, and personal selfdefinition.
VII
BLACKMAIL

Blackmail is of academic interest primarily as a proving ground.
Each new generation of scholars comes to it, as to some muddy and
treacherous test track, to try out their new theories. 138 The test is an
apparently simple one: to find out whether their approach will answer
the question, "Why is blackmail illegal?"
Before we plunge headlong into that morass, however, it is worth
focusing on the qualities that make blackmail problematic in the first
place. When scholars talk about the difficulties of explaining blackmail,
they are generally referring to a restricted subsection of the doctrine. It
is easy to explain attempts to extort money by threats that would be illegal to carry out and to explain why a blackmailer cannot ask money as
the price of keeping silent about some violation of the law. The hard case
to explain is the situation in which one person asks another person for
money as the price of not revealing legally obtained information about
activities perfectly legal in themselves. The example I gave earlier was,
"If you do not pay me $100, I will reveal to your boyfriend the fact that I
saw you coming out of another man's house at two o'clock in the morning."139 The information was legal to acquire and would be legal to
reveal, the conduct was legal to engage in, yet it is illegal to demand
money for keeping quiet. 14O In Hohfeldian terms, the sale of a privilege
138. By far the best survey comes from Professor James Lindgren. See Lindgren, supra note 27.
Though I disagree with Lindgren's own explanation of blackmail, his article is an excellent
introduction to the field, and one to which I am indebted.
139. See supra text accompanying note 25.
140. Lindgren formulates the problem in this way: "I have a legal right to expose or threaten to
expose [a] crime or affair, and I have a legal right to seek a job or money, but if I combine these
rights it is blackmail." Lindgren, supra note 27, at 670-71 (footnotes omitted). While this is clearly
an advance on other formulations, it tends to gloss over the variety of the legally protected interests
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has been criminalized but the privilege itself has been retained. How is
this different from any other situation in which one economic actor
makes a bargain with another to forego a legal course of action that the
second party wishes to avoid? To put it another way, what is the qualitative difference between a blackmailer's demands for money and a baseball
team's demands for tax breaks, rezoning, and direct grants as the price of
not moving to another a city?141
The attempts to explain the criminalization of blackmail point in
very different directions, and I could not begin to cover the full range of
explanations here. Instead, I will use this Part to illustrate three kinds of
attempted explanations: economic theories, libertarian theories, and
third party theories. I will argue that all three fail to explain blackmail,
and that we need a theory that focuses on the various roles that information is expected to play within our society. Admittedly, such a theory
gives an answer of a different type than the ones sought by the theorists I
cite here. To me, however, that answer seems both more credible and
more useful.

A.

Economic Theories

Landes and Posner believe that the prohibition of blackmail springs
from the state's attempt to prevent (inefficient) private enforcement of
the law. In other words, the prohibition of blackmail is supposed to help
the state keep its monopoly in law enforcement.
Were blackmail, a form of private enforcement, lawful, the public
monopoly of enforcement would be undermined. Overenforcement of the law would result if the blackmailer were able to
extract the full fine from the offenders .... Alternatively, the
blackmailer might sell his incriminating information to the
offender for a price lower than the statutory cost of punishment to
the criminal, which would reduce the effective cost of punishment
involved. The legal relationships involved are not all actually "rights," but a mixture of privileges,
powers, and immunities. This tendency to reduce all legal relationships to a single "right" concept
appears to playa role in undermining Lindgren's own theory. Later in this Article, I will argue that
there are other cases in which the legal system makes it illegal to commodify various privileges and
powers-for example, parents may arrange private adoptions, but they may not sell babies to
adoptive parents. It is in this context that blackmail should be understood.
141. There is something else in the blackmail question that makes it an irresistible puzzle for
legal scholars, but a matter of little concern for courts, practicing lawyers, or citizens. Blackmail
just seems undeniably bad. It is the combination of the rule's intuitive moral sense and the lack of an
obvious theoretical justification that leads scholars to believe that there is an answer out there if only
they think hard enough about it. In that sense, blackmail is like other jurisprudential puzzles, such
as the definition of law, which intrigue the novice and tantalize the professional by their apparent
simplicity, only to confound and confuse anyone who proposes a theory.
This idea of the tasks of jurisprudence is rendered problematic by the essentialist vision of
language on which it rests. See Boyle, Ideals and Things, supra note 10; Boyle, Thomas Hobbes,
supra note 10. I will argue here that a related problem besets the analysis of blackmail.
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to the criminal below the level set by the legislature. 142
The first problem with this argument is its assumption that legislators will identify the optimal level of activity and set fines accordingly.
What mechanism would operate to make self-interested legislators, concerned mainly with reelection, choose the correct level of an activity?143
This argument appears to presume too easily the existence of a perfect
market for legislation.
The second problem with the argument is that it does not explain
the hard case I mentioned earlier-the case when both revelation and
silence on the part of the blackmailer and the act on the part of the victim would be entirely legal. Thus, for instance, if George Bernard Shaw
is secretly eating rack of lamb despite his publicly announced vegetarianism, his butcher may not make him pay for the privilege of silence. 144 At
the beginning of their section on blackmail, Landes and Posner note that
blackmail appears at first sight to be an efficient way of enforcing the law,
"the moral as well as the positive law.,,145 Yet (rightly or wrongly) Shaw
is not assumed by most people in this society to be violating a moral
law-thus the threat of over- or underenforcement does not seem to
arise.
Perhaps realizing these difficulties, Landes and Posner then offer a
slightly different explanation for the criminalizing of the sale of humiliating as well as incriminating information.
The social decision not to regulate a particular activity is a judgment that the expenditure of resources on trying to discover it and
punish it would be socially wasted. That judgment is undermined
if blackmailers are encouraged to expend substantial resources on
attempting to apprehend and punish people engaged in the
activity. 146
This is an ingenious suggestion, but there are a number of problems
with it. First of all, the implications Landes and Posner draw from "the
decision not to regulate" seem problematic in the extreme. Allover the
United States there are parents trying to find out if their childrenwhether infant or adult-are eating their greens, doing their homework,
smoking cigarettes or dating the "wrong people." The idea that the legal
system ought to step in to prevent them from investing time in checking
up on any legal activity does not survive prolonged scrutiny, no matter
142. Landes & Posner, supra note 26, at 42.
143. Cf DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979) (surveying legislator and voter behavior
from an economic point of view); Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior:
Macey's Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 183 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interst
Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall. 33 EMORY L.J. 1
(1984).
144. Nor for the silence of the lambs.
145. Landes & Posner, supra note 26, at 42.
146. Id. at 43.
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how attractive it might be to the children involved. To put it another
way, it is already stretching a point to claim that criminal statutes are
accurate judgments of the efficient level of an activity. It is going altogether too far to claim also that the absence of criminal statutes represents a measured judgment by the legislature that "research" on such
behavior would be inefficient.
The second problem with the argument is its leap to the deduction
from negative evidence. It is strange to imagine that by failing to
criminalize behavior we are making a reasoned judgment that information about that behavior should never be gathered. One can imagine all
sorts of reasons we might have for failing to criminalize behavior that
would not prevent us from wanting to have news gathered and spread. A
politician makes repeated sexist or racist jokes, an air force officer in
charge of nuclear weapons is a moody alcoholic, a candidate for a teaching position has awful teaching evaluations at a prior school-in each
case, we can acknowledge some social value to the information despite
the fact that the behavior concerned is perfectly legal. Posner and
Landes would need to show both that: (1) noncriminalization was a
conclusive judgment that the information was not worth the investment
of social resources and (2) forbidding citizens to trade in it would have a
meaningful effect on its acquisition. Yet (2) seems empirically doubtful
in the extreme, while (1) seems just plain wrong.
One response to these problems might be that Landes and Posner
object only to monetary incentives to engage in this kind of research.
Where affection and sentiment or public or private interest supply the
motive, we might hope that all is for the best-my examples notwithstanding. Of course, if there are enough nonmonetary incentives to
investigate legal behavior, then the prohibition of monetary incentives
would be irrational, a use of the state's cumbersome and expensive
machinery in the service of a goal that is already unreachable. But even
if the empirical question were dealt with adequately (and Posner and
Landes do not deal with it at all), such a response brings a new school of
problems in its wake. If we concentrate only on occasions involving
monetary incentives to gather information, the theory as stated seems
unable to distinguish rationally between paid concealment and paid revelation. If adultery is legal in this partiCUlar state, does that represent a
judgment that we do not want resources devoted to the discovery of adultery? Thinking of the blackmailer, Landes and Posner would presumably say, "Yes." Does this logically require that we prohibit newspaper
reporters from following Gary Hart, or one spouse from hiring private
detectives to check on the other?
Just at this point in their article, Landes and Posner reverse tack,
apparently without realizing it: "We therefore predict that in areas
where there is a public monopoly of enforcement, bribery, like blackmail,
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will be prohibited, while in areas where there is no public monopoly it
will be permitted. And so we observe.,,147 This may seem to deal with
the spouse example. But it completely undercuts their idea that the decision not to regulate implies a judgment that resources should not be
spent trying to acquire the information. There is no public monopoly of
enforcement of George Bernard Shaw's vegetarianism, yet "private
enforcement"-through blackmail-is illegal. In many states there is no
public monopoly of enforcement of prohibitions against adultery, certain
types of plagiarism, or violation of the individual's professed creed-yet
blackmail is not permitted.
Perhaps Landes and Posner are saying that we should minimize the
gathering of information about activities that are not illegal and which
private parties have no right to restrain. If that is the idea, then they
seem again to be ignoring the possibility that blackmail may well be one
of the least important motives for gathering information. Prurience,
moral disapproval, or simple curiosity can lead citizens to pry, as can the
desire to help another human being, to gain status as a gossip, or to
achieve political power. Surely if we wished to avoid this kind of wastefu1 "research," the solution would be to criminalize it, or at least to allow
the injured party to bring suit under an enormously expanded tort of
intrusion on seclusion. Under their plan, the only person deterred will be
the person who wants to sell directly to the individual concerned. Sales
to other parties-the tabloids, for example-are untouched, as are all the
other nonmarket incentives for engaging in investigation. If this is an
attempt to prevent the socially wasteful investment of resources, then it is
a signally ineffective one. 148 Though thought-provoking, Landes and
Posner's theory focuses on probably the least important market and on
only one motive for gathering information. It also neglects empirical
considerations that might rob it of any significance, deploys the concept
of monopoly enforcement in apparently contradictory ways, and ignores
the case in which the information-gathering is paid for ex ante rather
than ex post.

147. Id.
148. Lindgren also makes some of these points in his critique of Posner. At the same time,
however, he makes what I consider to be an error, at least tactically, in his criticisms of Posner and
other economic theorists such as Ginsburg. In both cases, he criticizes theories that focus on the
inefficiency of investing resources in acquiring "blackmailable" information, because they cannot
explain the prohibition of blackmail using accidentally acquired information. To this, I think Posner
would simply respond that problems offormal realizability and difficulties of proof would more than
justify drawing the rule so as to include the person who accidentally learns of some scandalous
behavior as well as the person who waits, night after night, with camera in hand. In my discussion
of Coase and Ginsburg, I reformulate this criticism in a way that does not appear to be countered by
the formal realizability argument. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
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Ginsburg 149 and Coase lSO take a more promising economic
approach. Both focus on the fact that, if blackmail is allowed, there will
be incentives for potential blackmailers to invest in discovering information that could be used to blackmail others. "Blackmail involves the
expenditure of resources in the collection of information which, on payment of blackmail, will be suppressed. It would be better if this information were not collected and the resources were used to produce
something of value."lSl This is, in fact, an ingenious explanation of
blackmail. But again there are a number of problems.
The first problem, as Lindgren points out, is that it does not explain
the prohibition of "accidental blackmail" (such as the clergyman seen in
flagrante delicto through a wind-fluttered curtain). Let us assume the
response to this critique is, as I suggested earlier, that of formal realizability. Drawing the boundaries this way will make it easier to enforce.
The second problem is that the argument appears to rest on an unacknowledged empirical assumption about the prevalence of accidental
blackmail as opposed to "deliberate blackmail" (the individual who sets
out to "get the dirt on someone"). If the information necessary for deliberate blackmail is costly relative to the likely benefits to be gained, then
rational actors would be deterred anyway. Thus, even when the practice
is legalized, most blackmailers would be of the accidental type. Yet the
accidental blackmailer's discovery of the information is unaffected by the
rule change. Thus we might be forbidding a potentially productive
exchange, leaving the accidental blackmailer who would rather have
been paid off than gossip, but would rather gossip than keep quiet, to
spill the beans. To make the argument with any confidence we would
need to figure out the proportion of accidental blackmail to deliberate
blackmail under both rule systems, and the relative utility functions of
gossip for both types of blackmailers. It could be the case that our
attempt to prevent the socially wasteful investment of resources will
block mutually beneficial transactions-those between eager victims and
accidental blackmailers who place a low value on gossip.
The third problem is the quick move to judgment that "nothing of
value" has been produced. The measure being used here is not the subjective willingness of the parties to pay. Because of its moral repulsiveness, it seems intuitively believable that blackmail produces nothing of
value. But is this really the case? What measure of social value' is being
used? On the part of a victim, the blackmail payment represents "the
avoidance of a loss," rather than a "gain," but we are surely not saying
that all situations where parties pay to avoid losses are criminal. Con149. Douglas Ginsburg, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript, on file at the Harvard University Law Library).
150. Coase, supra note 26.
151. ld. at 674.
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sider the behavior of the baseball team, negotiating with its host city for a
better deal. As Coase himself admits at the end of his article,
The problem is that all trade involves threatening not to do
something unless certain demands are met. Furthermore, negotiations about the terms of trade are likely to involve the making of
threats which it would be better if they were not made (and in this
Pigou is right). But it is only certain threats in certain situations
which cause harm on balance and in which the harm is sufficiently great as to make it desirable that those making them
should be prosecuted and punished. 152
Having implicitly accepted that all of the theories would criminalize
transactions now understood to be perfectly legal, Coase concludes by
wondering whether the British system, with its broad grant of discretion
to judge and jury, represents the best answer. This seems a perfectly
sensible response on the level of policy. Yet it also represents an abandonment of the rationalist project in this case, with no consideration of
the more general questions that such a rejection seems to raise.
These are not the only possible criticisms of economic theories of
blackmail. We could turn Landes and Posner on their heads and argue
that blackmail would function, by and large, as an effective way to police
social norms, coupled with a relatively efficient buyout provision. If the
victim was willing to pay more for the information than the public would
(whether through tabloid bounty or Gennifer Flowers celebrity), then the
blackmailer would sell silence. On its face, a resource has been moved to
its highest use-value. Only Landes and Posner's rather dubious assumption about the efficiency of both positive and negative judgments by legislatures allow them to avoid this interpretation. Viewing blackmail as a
secondary method of social control, it is not entirely clear how one can
both stay within the strange world of economic assumptions and yet
declare that the information "has no value." For all of the reasons listed,
the economic theories of blackmail seem to fail according to their own
standards. 153 This is a point that Coase seems almost to acknowledge at
152. [d. at 675-76.
153. When I presented this paper at Harvard Law School, Professor Henry Hansmann
suggested that blackmail theorists could come up with a new variant of the economic explanationsarguing that by denying the possibility of direct sale, blackmail operates as an incentive to encourage
the revelation of information in which society has an interest. Although this was a spontaneous
creation (to the best of my knowledge) it seems to be the least problematic of the economic
hypotheses. Nevertheless, it still runs into some of the same problems as the other economic theories;
in particular, it asserts-without evidence-that the gain from the total value of the information
revealed by the existence of blackmail doctrine would be greater than the loss caused by the blocking
of many potentially efficient transactions between blackmailers and victims eager to pay for silence.
If disclosure of items in the public interest is the goal, why do we not rely on the economists' default
assumption that the market will provide? There is a market for tidbits of disgraceful news about the
mighty, whether that market is The New York Times or The National Enquirer. In other situations,
economists are prone to say that-if the public interest is truly great enough-then the market will
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the end of his article.
Perhaps the central problem with all such theories from my perspective, however, is that they seem so far from the social understanding of
blackmail. Would social judgments about the normative status of blackmail turn on empirical issues about the relative frequency and costliness
of its accidental versus its deliberate varieties? Of course, explanations of
the law do not have to assume that social actors understand their own
institutions. Yet in the case of blackmail, the goad to answer the puzzle
comes partly from the juxtaposition of the almost universal sense that the
practice is wrong and the difficulty of distinguishing it from "lawful"
transactions. To discard the importance of social perceptions is also to
challenge a large part of the motive for undertaking the theoretical
inquiry in the first place. Finally, as I will point out later, there seems to
be a particular problem here for economic analysts. How do we move
from a picture of relentlessly rational actors, consumer sovereignty, and
exogenous preferences to a world in which we assert that citizens think
blackmail has nothing to do with information costs, but are deluded?
For me at least, that is a puzzle. It looks like a theory of false consciousness. But that is exactly the kind of theory most economic analysts of
law claim to be avoiding.

B.

Libertarian Theories

Blackmail is also a very troublesome topic for libertarians. If contract is the central metaphor for mutually beneficial social relationships
and government intervention in free exchanges is a paradigmatic evil,
how can blackmail be wrong? Driven by this logic, some libertarians are
willing to argue that blackmail is permissible,154 but two of the most
prominent libertarians, Robert Nozick and Richard Epstein, think it
should be criminalized, though each gives a different explanation for this
apparent exception to their principles.
Epstein, in his article Blackmail, Inc., argues that if blackmail were
legal, it might lead to further crimes as the victim sought money to pay
off his blackmailer. 155 This idea seems extremely implausible, being both
logically unrequired and subject to some obvious practical difficulties.
Why should we suddenly start assuming that this particular monetary
pressure would drive the victim to crime? Consider the entirely legal
forms of "pressure" that can be put on individuals in our society-ranging from the advertising that encourages us to define our self-worth in
price the resource appropriately. In other words. the victim would lose the bidding war. Why
assume. in this particular instance. that transaction costs are high enough that we must rely on a
paternalistic clause which forbids parties to contract?
154. See WALTER BLOCK. DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE 53-54 (1976); MURRAY N.
ROTHBARD. THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 124-27 (1982).
155. Epstein. supra note 26. at 564-65.
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terms of consumer goods that not all of us can afford to the action of a
company in laying off workers, many of whom have mortgages or medical bills that place an intolerable financial burden on them. Each of these
might conceivably lead to crime. Yet somehow it seems doubtful that
Epstein would criminalize the advertising of Air Jordans, or the practice
of plant closings. Besides, as Lindgren points out, it would be in
Blackmail, Inc.'s interests to set the payments at a level not likely to
provoke rash criminal activity.156 An incarcerated victim is an unpromising target for blackmail.
Epstein also speculates that the blackmail victim, unlike other persons needing money, would probably not be able to get a loan because of
the difficulty of specifying the reason she needed the money. Again, this
seems implausible. In my (admittedly limited) experience, providers of
consumer credit, credit cards, and home equity loans care only about
one's ability to pay. The liberal state mayor may not be indifferent as to
"ends," but lenders certainly seem to be.
There also seems to be a familiar baseline error here: imagining a
hypothetical change of rule, but failing to adjust behavior to conform to
the new rule. If blackmail were legal surely lenders would find it an
acceptable investment. Imagine a lender contemplating a further loan to
a borrower who already owes the lender money. If paying off BlackmaiI,
Inc., will allow the borrower to keep a lucrative job or social position,
then a blackmail loan would seem like a better investment than a loan
for a new car. If lenders are supposed to be irrational, presumably
Blackmail, Inc., would be smart enough to develop a good credit division. Rather than exploring either of these possibilities, Epstein imagines
that Blackmail, Inc., will stupidly encourage the victim's slide into crime.
Thus, not only will they open themselves to suit and to criminal charges
for conspiracy, but they will also forfeit the advantages Epstein has just
conferred on them by legalization. Admittedly, a firm this stupid doesn't
deserve a break, but why assume such irrationality on the part of all
concerned?
Finally, as Epstein himself notes, it would seem intuitively plausible
that a rational blackmail industry would pick rich victims-victims who
might not need credit. Blackmailers would prefer rich victims because of
the diminishing marginal utility of wealth 157 and because there would
probably be a statistically significant correlation between those who have
something to lose in terms of reputation and association and those who
156. James Lindgren, More Blackmail Ink: A Critique of Blackmail, Inc., Epstein's Theory of
Blackmail, 16 CONN. L. REv. 909, 921 (1984).
157. This is an economic concept about which Chicago-school economists (and econolibertarians such as Epstein) generally maintain an intriguing silence. Of course, one can
differentiate between wealth-maximizing and more strictly utilitarian versions of economic analysis.
But what is the advantage of doing so?
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have money. The street person is an unlikely victim of blackmail, the
minimum wage worker scarcely more likely, and, ifthere are any costs of
investigation at all, we would need some empirical evidence of the breakeven point before we could say whether those who are most likely to be
blackmailed would not also be likely to have substantial resources or
credit on demand. Epstein's conclusion that, unlike kindred transactions,
"only blackmail breeds fraud" seems, like religious encyclicals about the
depraving effects of rock music, to have little in the way of logic to recommend it.
Epstein has another string to his bow. Working from libertarian
assumptions, he sees most nonphysical crimes to be grounded in fraud or
deceit. Thus, for him, "[t]he puzzle ... is somewhat transformed, as the
question might be better asked, why is it that [the victim] escapes criminal punishment for deception, not why is [the defendant] punished for
blackmail."158 In the end, he cannot entirely solve this problem so he
pushes it to one side, confident that the blackmail problem, at least, has
been resolved: "Blackmail should be a criminal offense even under the
narrow theory of criminal activities because it is the handmaiden to corruption and deceit."159 We have already dealt with the corruption argument. What about deceit? The trouble here is that this answer seems to
avoid the question. The blackmail puzzle asks why the law allows citizens to keep secrets, and to reveal secrets, but not to make others pay for
the keeping of secrets. To say that secret-keeping in some wider sense
should be illegal, and to use this as an explanation of blackmail's illegality, is hardly likely to satisfy those who have been seeking a solution to
the problem. For someone like Lindgren, this is similar to "solving"
Epinimides' paradox (that all Cretans are liars, Epinimides himself being
from Crete) by suggesting that Epinimides was actually from los.
In another interesting libertarian analysis, Robert Nozick has
argued that blackmail should be illegal because it is "not a productive
activity."16o The proof of its "unproductivity" comes, for Nozick, from
his belief that one party to the exchange would be no worse off if it were
prohibited.
Though people value a blackmailer's silence, and pay for it, his
being silent is not a productive activity. His victims would be as
well off if the blackmailer did not exist at all, and so wasn't threatening them. And they would be no worse off if the exchange were
known to be absolutely impossible. 161
This idea is an interesting one, but it collapses as soon as it is exposed to
the world of legal powers, privileges, and immunities. There are many
158.
159.
160.
161.

Epstein, supra note 26, at 565.
Id. at 566.
NOZICK, supra note 26, at 85.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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cases in which I would be better off (in some sense) if the other party did
not exist at all. The neighboring landowner wishes to build a structure
that will deprive my courtyard of sunlight, but is willing to forego building for payment. Perhaps Nozick would respond that even if this landowner did not exist, some landowner must exist and thus-at least
potentially-I would face the same problem. But even this kind of confession and avoidance does not solve the problem.
Nozick seems to be relying on an implicit but indefensible baseline.
The alternative to blackmail is silence, and thus the victim may seem
better off if blackmail is illegal. But the alternative to blackmail may be,
not silence, but revelation. This is a point that those libertarians who
believe blackmail should not be criminalized have made loudly and
often. 162 To put it another way, Nozick is making a category error, confusing the person with the legally protected interest. The victim might be
better off if the blackmailer did not exist, but Nozick instead is arguing
for the disappearance of one of the blackmailer's legally protected interests, leaving intact exactly the ones that can do the victim harm. It is
true that all those with secrets to hide would be better off if no one ever
discovered them. But the law of blackmail cannot get rid of the person
who discovers a secret; it merely makes it impossible for him to sell that
secret. Nozick has not stripped the blackmailer of the privilege of disclosure, but merely the ability to commodify silence. He is therefore wrong
to say that victims "would be no worse off if the exchange were known to
be absolutely impossible."163 In such a situation, blackmailers who put a
low value on the celebrity of being a gossip, but who would instead have
accepted a small payment for silence, will now disclose. In such a situation, victims might justifiably conclude that they would have been better
off if Nozick had never existed!
Nozick might choose to reformulate his position by combining the
incentives point discussed by Coase with his own definition of unproductive exchanges. The idea here would be that prohibiting blackmail would
discourage rational actors from investing resources in trying to "get the
dirt on someone" and thus minimize the number of "unproductive
exchanges." Such a response, however, has two major problems. First
and most fundamentally, there is the difficulty in crafting a noncircular
definition of unproductive exchanges, and one that does not also
criminalize a host of other transactions. So far, this is something that
Nozick has been unable to do. Second, this argument appears to rest on
the same unacknowledged empirical assumption about the prevalence of
accidental blackmail as opposed to deliberate blackmail. Thus Nozick
might be forbidding a potentially productive exchange, leaving the accidental blackmailer who would rather have been paid off than gossip, but
162.
163.

supra note 154, at 243.
NOZICK, supra note 26, at 85.

ROTHBARD,
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would rather gossip than keep quiet, to spill the beans. To make the
argument with any confidence we would need to figure out the proportion of accidental blackmail to deliberate blackmail under both rule systems, and the relative utility functions of gossip for both types of
blackmailers. Of course, neither Nozick nor Epstein can do this.
C.

Third Party Theories

James Lindgren's analysis offers to resolve the paradox of blackmail
by reference to third party interests.
[M]y own view is that the key to the wrongfulness of the blackmail transaction is in its triangular structure. As Epstein notes,
the transaction implicitly involves not only the blackmailer and
his victim but always a third party as well. This third party may
be, for example, the victim's spouse or employer, the authorities,
or even the public at large. When a blackmailer tries to use his
right to release damaging information, he is threatening to tell
others. To get what he wants, the blackmailer uses leverage that
is less his than someone else's. Selling the right to go to the police
involves suppressing the state's interests. And selling the right to
inform others of embarrassing (but legal) behavior involves suppressing the interests of those other people. Why should this
threatener be able to gain personal advantages by coercing others,
using leverage that is not really hiS?l64
In one sense, Lindgren is on the right track here. Certainly his article contains an impressive survey and critique of other theories, and his
theory at least asks us to look at the reaction of other individuals in the
society. But the analysis is flawed by a series of errors based on conceptual slippage in the definition of key terms. In what sense, exactly, is the
leverage that the blackmailer uses "less his than someone else's"? First
of all, one should note the vagueness of the terms. Is a legally protected
interest being asserted here, or merely an "interest" in the same sense
that many people have an interest in seeing Madonna's new video? At
times, Lindgren seems to be moving from the latter to the former, thus
presuming the point he is obliged to prove. Second, if Lindgren is asserting that the blackmailer has "no right" to capitalize on the latter kind of
interest, he seems to be restating the very problem he has set himself to
solve. For the realist scholars of the 1920s, the slippage from "no right
to control" to "no saleable privilege to reveal" represents a prototypical
Hohfeldian error. The ability to analyze such issues clearly is exactly the
thing that distinguishes post- from pre-Hohfeldian analysis. 165
164. Lindgren, supra note 156, at 922-23. Lindgren's full explanation of his theory is given in
Lindgren, supra note 27.
165. See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS AS ApPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OrnER LEGAL EssAYS (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923); see also Hitchman
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Third, whatever kind of "interest" this is, Lindgren is mistaken if he
believes that one may not sell access to something one does not own.
Many bargains involve one party using access to a resource or market he
or she does not own as leverage to persuade another party to contract. If
I sell a popcorn concession in my baseball stadium to you, you will be
interested only because you know this will give you access to a group of
potential consumers. You would never pay me merely for refraining
from exercising my right to deny you access to the physical space that I
own. Without the crowd, my sale of this right would be worthless to
you, just as the blackmailer's promise to forebear from exercising the
privilege of revelation would be worthless without third parties who will
not otherwise be told of the secret. I own neither those consumers nor
their appetites, but I do control access to them while they are at the
game. Is this transaction somehow despicable because the economic leverage I use is access to someone else's appetite, whether for popcorn or
for gossip? I will probably lease the stand to the person who pays the
most, perhaps increasing the cost of popcorn to those who attend the
game. In some sense, therefore, I sell my right of exclusion, using the
"interests" of others as my economic leverage, and yet I am not forced to
incorporate their interests fully into my calculation. 166
When we renegotiate, I may threaten to lease to someone else unless
you pay me more. As far as one could tell, Lindgren's analysis is unable
to distinguish this case from blackmail. "Why should this threatener be
able to gain personal advantages by coercing others, using leverage that is
not really his?"167 But as this analogy should make clear, the phrase
"not really his" contains a fatal ambiguity. The leverage is not really
mine, in the sense that I do not own the baseball fans and their appetites,
or the audience for gossip, but it is "really mine" in the sense that I have
legally protected interests that allow me to grant or withhold physical or
informational access. If we ignore the judgmental possessive, "mine,"
with its associated connotation of the absolute concept of property, then
the legal relationships become much clearer. Lindgren's theory-at least
in any strong form-fails to distinguish blackmail from innumerable
legal transactions.

Coal & Coke Co. ,v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 152-56, 193-202 (forthcoming Oxford University Press) (unproofed
ed.); Walter W. Cook, Privileges 0/ Labor Unions in the Struggle/or Life. 27 YALE L.J. 779 (1918).
166. The baseball example, like many cases of blackmail, involves a situation close to a bilateral
monopoly. Obviously, there are limits-for example, substitute goods (other baseball teams, other
activities, other foods)-but the ability to sell the legally protected interest still gives considerable
power to the party possessing it.
167. Lindgren, supra note 156, at 923.
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Shared Problems

Before I finish the critical part of my coverage of blackmail, I would
like to point out three characteristics of the articles I have discussed so
far. The first is best exemplified by Nozick, Posner, and Epstein. Their
arguments show an interesting willingness to relinquish, or at least modify, a principle they normally hold dear. The principle is consumer sovereignty, or the personal definition of self-interest. Why is blackmail
such a difficult case for them? Seeing that the law prohibits a transaction, seeing that the transaction is apparently dependent only on the
coercion involved in the relinquishment of a legal privilege, and yet finding the transaction indefensible, they are placed in an agonizing position.
To suggest, as the legal realists did, that coercion is inherent in the legal
system, that the core of a consensual laissez jaire system is completely
dependent on institutionalized coercion, is not a solution that appeals to
them. 168 Besides, it is not clear that even that admission would solve the
puzzle of blackmail. (In formal terms, it would merely put other transactions on the same level as blackmail-hardly an attractive solution in
either theoretical or practical terms.) At the same time, all three wish to
put the law of blackmail within the class of "rational social institutions,"
and thus they must find some logical explanation of its wrongfulness.
The explanation must contain some principle to distinguish between this
state interference in a "consensual transaction" and all the other state
interferences in "consensual transactions." Otherwise, they might be
seen to have accepted the premise of liberals and radicals that paternalistic intervention is frequently necessary in the economic system in order
to mitigate the effects of unequal power. 169
Second, it is also noticeable that even in combination, all the theories-but particularly the economic and libertarian ones-fail to grasp
the social meaning of blackmail. Put another way, I doubt that anyone-even on the streets of Cambridge-would respond to the question,
"Why is blackmail illegal?" by appealing to notions of inefficient incentives for information production or of unproductive exchanges. Of
course, there is nothing wrong with giving an explanation for a body of
law that conflicts with the explanations of those in the society governed
by such laws. But Nozick, Epstein, Posner, and Coase are increasingly
forced towards theories that diverge so widely from popular ideas that
the only explanation for the discrepancy seems to be the false consciousness of those concerned. For theorists in other traditions this would be
unexceptionable. Yet for libertarians and economic analysts to accept
168. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603
(1943).
169. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
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the idea of false consciousness is to throw their theories-strongly dependent on a particular version of rational choice-into doubt.
The third observation could be made about all of the articles, but it
is most clearly at work in Lindgren's. We could call it "Kantian anthropology." At times, Lindgren seems to assume that because there is a rule
prohibiting blackmail and the practice seems intuitively bad, there must
be a single general principle underlying both prohibition and revulsion.
The task that he sets himself, and that he (rightly) sees as the basic goal
of the other studies of blackmail, is to find this missing principle. This is
certainly one way to understand legal institutions. Its premise is that
social institutions should have a rational basis, expressible in terms of
general principles, and those that do not should disappear from the
earth. Its descriptive, rationalist anthropology dovetails nicely with its
prescriptive, principled critique. As a method of legal studies, its premises are so widely shared that they are not often subject to question. Its
weapons also have undeniable critical bite, particularly when deployed
against someone who is working within the same genre of scholarship.
Indeed, the persuasiveness of my critique of the other blackmail theorists
depends on both author and reader presupposing these background conventions. But just as information questions make more apparent the
weaknesses in the liberal vision of property and in the conceptual structure of efficiency and incentive discourse in economics, so too they highlight the contentious quality of this vision of legal scholarship.
I would claim that we cannot understand blackmail unless we look
at it in the context of the ideology and institutions of a liberal society, a
society that often presupposes different theories of justice and methods of
treating people in the realms of the family, the market, and the state. We
get a different picture if we look at legal institutions and moral beliefs in
light of the history, social arrangements, and ideology of this actual society, rather than in an unspecified and featureless world oflegal hypotheticals and pure rationality.
Let us use a nonblackmail hypothetical for a moment. Consider the
contract rules about penalty clauses and liquidated damages. We could
come up with a rationalistic explanation of the difference, based perhaps
on allocative efficiency or the Rawlsian original position. But although
such an explanation would be useful, it would also ignore the absolute
terror that liberal social theory in general and classical legal thought in
particular have of private law assuming a redistributive function. This
concern is built on moral ideals and ideas of political theory, but it is also
built on concerns of legitimacy and of the apparent soundness of an
entire ideological view of the world.
Any study of legal ideology would note two problematic conclusions
deduced from the supposedly nonredistributive nature of contract law:
(1) the court should merely interpret the will of the parties, because to
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go further would be to move from being an instrument of the parties'
bargain to being an independent redistributive actor; and (2) punitive
damages are inappropriate in contract law, which functions only to
achieve the results the contract would have reached. The obvious conflict comes when the parties apparently specify punitive damages. If it
shares that ideological background, the court is faced with a contradiction. That contradiction helps explain the confused and confusing distinction between illegitimate "punitive damages" and legitimate and
mutually agreed upon "liquidated damages." The perspective of rational
managers of the legal system, dealing with one technical problem of doctrine at a time, underestimates the extent to which these answers fit into a
world already structured by history, ideology, and political vision. 170
How does this insight help us to understand blackmail? To answer
that question I must return to my discussion of public and private. My
thesis here is that one of the main reasons that blackmail is illegal (and
strongly perceived to be wrong) is that there is a strong social belief,
sometimes consciously articulated and sometimes unconsciously held,
that not everything should be reduced to the universalizing logic of the
money relation. In particular, the private realm of home and hearth
should be protected against the relentless instrumentalism of market
transactions. This belief is given a particular "spin" by our practice,
within that sphere, of defining the norm of justified protection largely by
reference to the right to withhold and control information. Intuitively,
blackmail seems like the intrusion of market logic into the realm that
should be most "private." To put it another way, we do not think that
we should commodify relationships in the private realm. To commodify
is itself to violate the private realm. 171 To commodify a violation of privacy, then, is doubly reprehensible.
Two features of blackmail doctrine seem to me to support this inter170. This is not to say that, since societal institutions have nonrational elements, we must give
up the tools of reason (although my claim is that those tools are less powerful than is often assumed).
But it does offer an interesting insight into the kind of theorizing that assumes the correctness of a
strongly held social belief and works to fashion a principled justification for it-rather like putting a
slipcover onto an existing chair.
Looking at issues in the way I suggest here also helps us to understand the connections between
apparently diverse questions. The will theory of contracts, the doctrine of no duty to act, and the
continued constitutional challenges to punitive damages, for example, all share certain premises
about the role of private law vis-ii-vis the distribution of wealth. Thus, an attack on one principle is
often perceived as an attack on them all.
171. In this, as in much of the discussion of commodification in this Article, I have found Peggy
Radin's work to be invaluable. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849
(1987). Professor Radin does not discuss blackmail, or information issues as such, nor does she use
the public/private split to explain social reluctance to commodify certain types of information.
Nevertheless, she does discuss many of the issues analyzed here, including the commodification of
body parts, and I found those discussions to be extremely helpful. She also touches on the
commodification of celebrity personae, id. at 1857 n.33, and on the issue of market inalienability in
tort law, id. at 1876·78.
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pretation. First, by and large we allow the victim (and the blackmailer's
assessment of the victim's sUbjective beliefs) to determine whether or not
particular information involves a "disgraceful defect." A vision of blackmail that did not focus on privacy, but instead wanted to prohibit the
commodification of information about a particular menu of behavior and
practices, would either list topics about which individuals could not be
blackmailed or appeal to an objective or community standard. In fact,
we choose to protect George Bernard Shaw's secret carnivorousness to
exactly the same extent that we protect secret marital infidelity, despite
the different tolerance for such practices in society as a whole. The comparison to the law of libel is instructive.
Second, we only prohibit the commodification of private information. This reinforces my earlier arguments about the multiple contradictory stereotypes about information. Unless I have gone so far as to
commit an additional tort such as intrusion upon seclusion, I am allowed
to reveal all of the information I discover-without penalty. The privilege is retained, but the sale of the privilege is criminalized. When freely
revealed, information-even relatively private information-fits readily
into the public, First Amendment stereotype: information is the lifeblood of the public realm, that which we must not regulate if we are to
maintain the free flow of ideas. The attempt to commodify, however,
undermines the First Amendment stereotype, allowing the privacy vision
to take over. In the Part on insider trading, I will argue that the reverse
mechanism explains the prohibition of trading on material, nonpublic
information. l72 There, the "public" view of information, the idea of presumptive equality in this resource alone, operates to give insider trading
law a powerful rationale.
Seen this way, blackmail is analogous to a different set of crimes. To
understand blackmail we would not compare it to the robber's demand
for a wallet. Instead, we would compare it to other situations where
commodification of something "private" is made illegal, despite the fact
that, at a slightly greater level of abstraction, the transaction looks like
an ordinary market exchange. Thus the analogies would be to the
voidability of contracts for sexual services or the prohibition of babyselling. I can give sexual favors, but not enforce a contract for them. I
have the power to arrange a private adoption of my child, yet I cannot
sell that power, nor the child. 173
172. See infra Part VIII.
173. There are many other examples. In the wrongful birth cases, the refusal of many courts to
include the costs of raising a child as part of the "damage" attributable to a neligently performed
sterilization operation stems partly from the desire to keep the market out of the realm of home and
hearth. Courts produce a whole set of arguments ranging from the ineffable benefit of extra children
to the difficulty of quantification, the duty to mitigate damages, and the impossibility of tracing the
chain of causation. Yet a moment's analysis of each of these reasons reveals that other tort issues
pose far greater difficulties. In the end, one is hard put not to conclude that the court is really
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Many scholars find this kind of response unsatisfying. Even if there
are "irrational" or "sentimental" or "romantic" reasons behind a legal
institution, should we not work to complete the Enlightenment projectto bring institutions to account in the court of reason? I have both a
fancy philosophical response and a mundane practical response to this
suggestion. The fancy philosophical point is that there is no pretheoretical, prec1assified reality from which we can begin to analyze our institutions. This context or that context may not be inevitable, but there will
be some context, some prior social construction of reality. Wittgenstein's
analysis of language games,174 Feyerabend's and Kuhn's (very different)
work on the scientific method,I75 Rorty's neopragmatism l76-all seem to
cast doubt on the idea of a world not already socially constructed, while
leaving open the question of consequences that flow from exploring the
limits of the particular, overlapping contexts in which we find ourselves.
My more mundane response is that it is important to understand the
limitations of a system that "decides" issues by typing them as public or
private. To say that, however, is not to hold up the possibility of a pure
analysis that would treat the issue of blackmail in a "neutral" framework. No such framework is available. On a local basis, I still believe in
arguments about the desirability of a prohibition of blackmail-arguments based on judgments about consequences, on analogies to other
kinds of behavior, even on the idea of incentives to engage in particular
kinds of information-gathering. Those arguments, however, will not discover some universalizable principle that underpins both the proscription
of blackmail and its social support. Instead, they will be both over- and
underinclusive. They will point towards the prohibition of acts that we
allow, while not explaining our prohibition of other transactions. The
goal of the blackmail theorists, to provide the single rational explanation
is not only unmet but-I would argue-unreachable.
What then is the benefit of the analysis I offer here? What does it
profit us to understand that information issues are resolved partly by the
typing of issues into "public" or "private" categories? How does it help
us to understand that blackmail prevents the commodification of subjectively defined private information partly because of a romantic notion of
privacy, home, and hearth, and an associated belief that we must keep
the market away from that realm if we hope to maintain it? First, I think
imposing a particular belief about those areas that should not be subject to market quantificationno matter how real the loss.
174. LUDWIG WITI'GENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
3d ed. 1953).
175. PAUL K. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHIST THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE (1975); PAUL K. FEYERABEND, PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICISM (1981); THOMAS
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
176. RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
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it is descriptively useful. To understand how information issues should
be resolved, we need first to understand how they are resolved.
Second, the analysis gives us an ability (albeit very limited) to prognosticate. In the Conclusion, I point out that any analysis of an "information society" has to deal with the conflicting valences of our various
visions of information as public and as private, as commodity and as
"that which must never be commodified." Blackmail doctrine points out
the lengths to which we are prepared to go to give individuals sovereignty over information pertaining to them. This surely is an important
idea in any society in which the collection, manipulation, distribution,
and use of information plays a significant role.
Third, dealing specifically with the blackmail puzzle, the analysis
sets out a reason for the problems with the existing blackmail literature.
The very notion of "reason," "theory," and "principle" adopted by the
blackmail theorists makes it almost impossible for them to find such a
reason, theory, or principle underlying blackmail. There is an old joke
about a drunk looking for his car keys under a street light, even though
he had dropped them several hundred feet away. When asked to explain
his behavior, he points out that while the keys might not be there, it was
the only place he could see anything. To a certain extent, the Kantian
anthropology of the blackmail theorists has the same problem. They
wish both to engage and to ignore the socially constructed nature of markets, coercion, and privacy. To put it another way, the society in which
the kind of principle for which they are looking could be found would be
the society in which social forms were already transparent to rational
analysis; that is to say, the society for which it was not necessary.
Finally, the persistent mistakes made by the most sophisticated analysts of blackmail-the category and baseline errors, the failure to take
into account changes in behavior if a new rule is presumed, the conflation
of different legally protected interests into an undifferentiated "right"
concept-all of these turn out to be mistakes that are instructive for the
remainder of the literature on law and information. In the next Part, the
analysis of insider trading doctrine will reveal the persistence of such
errors in a case in which the commodification of information is apparently prohibited because of the public rather than the private stereotype
of information. At the same time, examination of the germinal critique
of insider trading doctrine will show that the language of romantic
authorship can appear where least expected.
VIII
INSIDER TRADING

Our era aptly has been styled, and may well be remembered
as, the "age of information." Francis Bacon recognized nearly
400 years ago that "knowledge is power," but only in the last

1992]

LAW AND INFORMATION

1489

generation has it risen to the equivalent of the coin of the realm.
Nowhere is this commodity more valuable or volatile than in the
world of high finance, where facts worth fortunes while secret
may be rendered worthless once revealed. 177
The above quotation comes from an insider trading case. Anthony
Materia worked as a copyholder for a financial printer. One of his duties
involved reading documents aloud to a proofreader who checked their
accuracy. In this case, the documents concerned a forthcoming tender
offer. Although the names of the companies had been erased, Mr.
Materia-whom the Court of Appeals described as "an avid market
watcher"178-was able to work out the identity of the intended target.
He did this by checking the details revealed in the tender offer documents
against a variety of publicly available types of information. In another
context, one could imagine Mr. Materia's wit, hard work, and eye for an
opportunity being held up as exemplary American entrepreneurial virtues. In the context of this case however, with its persistent overtones of
fraud and deceit, the Second Circuit found little to admire in Mr.
Materia's conduct and disapproved of the enthusiasm with which he pursued his extracurricular interests. At one point Judge Kaufman noted
drily, "If copyholding was Materia's vocation, the stock market appears
to have been equally consuming."179 Having determined the identity of
the target company, Mr. Materia invested heavily. "Within hours of
each discovery, he purchased stock, and within days-after the offer had
been made public-he sold his holdings at substantial gains.,,180
In the broadest possible terms, we could say that the question
presented by Materia is, "When mayan individual profit from access to
material, nonpublic information?" In an earlier case, United States v.
Chiarella, 181 which had strikingly similar facts, the same court had held
that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disc1ose."182 The
Supreme Court did not agree. To Justice Powell, writing for the majority, the court of appeal's decision was too concerned with one particular
goal of the Securities Exchange Act.
Its decision ... rested solely upon its belief that the federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment
decisions." The use by anyone of material information not gener177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

SEC v. Materia. 745 F.2d 197. 198 (2d Cir. 1984). cert. denied. 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
ld. at 199 n.2.
ld. at 199.
ld.
588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978). rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
ld. at 1365.
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ally available is fraudulent, this theory suggests, because such
information gives certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage
over less informed buyers and sellers. 183
Justice Powell was not inclined to see the Securities Exchange Act as a
document with such relentlessly egalitarian aims or such a broad reach to
effect them. "Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically
from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship
between two parties, should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.,,184
In Materia, the Second Circuit tried again. Having seen their general duty to "disclose regularly received material nonpublic information"
rejected by the Supreme Court, they recast the issue in terms of misappropriation. 185 Seen this way, Mr. Materia's offense was that he had
"misappropriate[d] nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty
and trade[d] on that information to his own advantage.,,186 It was this
action that violated Section 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and
Rule IOb-S. This time, with the issue framed not as the existence of formally equal public access to information, but instead as the protection of
private information from something the court called "misappropriation,,,187 the Supreme Court was not inclined to disagree. 188 Given our
earlier discussion of tensions in the regulation of information, this choice
between an equal access view and a quasiproperty rights view should not
be surprising. 189
183. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (quoting Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1362).
184. ld. at 233 (citation omitted). The majority seemed to feel that some degree of inequality
inheres in the very idea of a market. Thus, "not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes
fraudulent activity under § 10(b)." ld. at 232. In the later case of Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983), the Court amplified its acceptance of the idea that certain participants in the marketplace
could be allowed to exploit their position of informational advantage as a form of compensation for
some real or imagined public function.
Congress has expressly exempted many market professionals from the general statutory
prohibition set forth in § l1(a)(I) of the Securities Exchange Act...• We observed in
Chiarella that "[t]he exception is based upon Congress' recognition that [market
professionals] contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the
informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic information]."
ld. at 657 n.16 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 n.16). Market professionals are private actors
who perform a public function and are given license to exploit the information that comes their way,
as a payoff. The private right secures the public role. Again, the parallel to copyright is striking.
185. This theory had been suggested in the Chiarella case, but since it was never submitted to
the jury, Chiarella's conviction had been overturned and the resolution of the issue left "for another
day." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
187. ld. at 202-03. The court was understandably vague in explaining the idea of
misappropriation. Was the information property, and if so, whose? If it was not property, could it
be misappropriated? Would a third party, overhearing the same information in an elevator, have
been "misappropriating" it? Or was the court merely saying that Mr. Materia's contractual
fiduciary duties authoritatively allocated opportunities for information gathering, thus conditioning
the offense on the breach of a private agreement?
188. Materia v. SEC, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985), denying cert. to 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
189. This choice also split the Supreme Court. Whereas the majority in Chiarella saw

1992]

LAW AND INFORMATION

1491

The conflicts between the court of appeals and the Supreme Court in

Materia and Chiarella are variations on a deeper thematic conflict. Why
should insider trading be illegal at all? Earlier in this Article, I pointed
out that we live in a society that distributes wealth through a market
system built on the inequality of economic power and that normally
exalts an individual who is able to convert some temporary advantage
into a position of market gain. Even those who think insider trading
should be criminalized agree that "[t]he case law barely suggests why
insider trading is harmful.,,190 Critics of the current law argue that
insider trading is consistent with norms found elsewhere in society, 191
that it injures no one,192 that insider trading would be impossible in an
efficient capital market,193 that insider trading operates as a method of
compensation for entrepreneurial excellence,194 and that corporations
would regulate it themselves if they believed it to be harmful. 195
My attitude toward these criticisms is somewhat unusual. Critics of
insider trading regulation could rightly claim that it is inconsistent with
many of the norms that we apply to market behavior. There is something strange in the discovery of a statutory island of egalitarianism at
the very heart of capitalism. But this island is not the only manifestation
of egalitarian ideals in the rules defining market transactions. The law of
fraud and mistake, the rule against perpetuities, the doctrine of
unconscionability, and (the populist understanding of) antitrust all have
disparities of information as an inevitable part of a market, the dissent believed that the mere fact of
disparate access is crucial to a 10b-5 case. Thus, in the view of Justices Blackmun and Marshall, an
earlier Supreme Court case "len[t] strong support to the principle that a structural disparity in access
to material information is a critical factor under Rule 10b-5 in establishing a duty either to disclose
the information or to abstain from trading." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972»; see also United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564-67 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane) (plurality opinion), cert denied, 112 S. Ct.
1759 (1992). On the mUltiple confusions of the case law, see 6 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D.
LoWENFELS, SEcuRmES FRAUD & CoMMODmES FRAUD § 7.5(510)-(513) (1991). For scholarly
reactions to the misappropriation theory, see Manning G. Warren III, Who's Suing Who? A
Commentary on Investment Bankers and the Misappropriation Theory, 46 MD. L. REv. 1222 (1987);
Elliot Brecher, Note, The Misappropriation Theory: Rule lOb-5 Insider Liability for Nonfiduciary
Breach, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1049 (1987); Karen A. Fischer, Comment, The Misappropriation
Theory: The Wrong Answer to the Chiarella Question, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 701 (1987). Of
course, as I tried to show earlier, the conflict goes far beyond insider trading. For an application to
intellectual property of cognate principles derived from the INS case, see supra text accompanying
notes 77-82, as revised by a countervailing desire to promote competition, see Leo J. Raskind, The
Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REv.
875 (1991).
190. Cox, supra note 28, at 628.
191. Hetherington, supra note 28.
192. "(l]nsiders' profits are not outsiders' losses but evidence of more efficient resource
allocation." Moran, supra note 28, at 1.
193. "The SEC first should recognize that in an efficient market, where prices are by definition
'fair,' it is impossible for investors to be cheated by paying more for securities than their true worth."
Saari, supra note 66, at 1069 (footnote omitted).
194. See MANNE, supra note 29, at 138-41.
195. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 66, at 862-63.
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egalitarian components. 196 These rules are not all concerned with informational egalitarianism. Nevertheless, there is something undeniably
counterintuitive about the prohibition against insider trading. One might
expect that those who are normally skeptical of egalitarian regulation of
market transactions would make much of this apparent anomaly, while
those more hospitable to egalitarian notions would be keen to explore the
dynamics of this egalitarian theme in the treatment of information. The
former group might be expected to defend inequality in this particular
context in straightforward normative terms-much as Rand or Hayek
dO,197 for example. The latter group might be expected to investigate this
apparent "information exception" to our tolerance for market inequality.
Does the structure of public and private which I described earlier mean
that it is easier to argue for egalitarian results with issues that are
presented in terms of inequalities of information, rather than straightforward inequalities of wealth or power? The popular support for insider
trading regulation offers some support for that hypothesis, as does the
marked absence of articulate explanations of what is wrong with insider
trading in the first place. Consequently, one might expect to find the
informational-equality hypothesis explored at some length.
In fact, the actual scholarship on insider trading is often very different. In particular, the area is dominated by economic analysis that, with
some significant exceptions, exemplifies in a rather unreflective way the
aporia in information economics that I described earlier. 198 The analyses
196. Kim Scheppele's work is particularly good at showing how economic analysis fails to
explain the concern of the courts hearing fraud cases with issues of power and inequality-exactly
the types of issues that a more egalitarian (or in her case, Rawls-influenced contractarian) vision of
the law of "legal secrecy" would concentrate on. See SCHEPPELE, supra note I; see also Kronman,
supra note 55.
197. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 81-102 (1960); FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1979); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (1944); AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS (1964).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 69-98. With the exception of Gilson and Kraakman,
very few scholars have attempted to integrate the literature dealing with the efficient capital markets
hypothesis with the actual mechanisms of market efficiency and the associated problems of incentive
and transaction cost. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 83. Gilson and Kraakman argue that (in
at least two market mechanisms) the limited temporal monopoly on information will allow the first
party to develop it to reap a reward, while subsequent imitation or learning by other traders will
move the market towards an efficient equilibrium, thus harmonizing the "incentive" and the
"efficiency" sides of the information debate. I am skeptical about this idea-or at least about its
more general implications-for the reasons given in the discussion of information economics. See
supra text accompanying notes 82-93. Gilson and Kraakman propose the legalization of (certain
kinds of) insider trading together with a requirement that insiders identify themselves and the size of
their trade at the time of the trade. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 83, at 629-34. I believe that
such a proposal must be based on a firm empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of allowing
insider trading (including the incentives that result from existing disparities in information, see
Hirshleifer, supra note 69) versus the costs and benefits of prohibiting insider trading (including
lessened incentives to produce the information that would otherwise be traded, see Fama & Laffer,
supra note 83, at 297-98). Kraakman and Gilson explicitly acknowledge this problem, but do not
consider it to be a fatal flaw.
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of insider trading regulation tend to be divided into two broad camps:
those scholars who see insider trading as primarily an issue of the incentives necessary to produce information, and those scholars who focus on
the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Both analyses face a fundamental problem. Just as physicists must think of light as both a particle and
a wave, so economists must see information as both a prerequisite for
market efficiency and a good whose producers must be motivated. If
incentives are to be offered for the gathering of information, then the
market cannot be informationally efficient. On the other hand, if no
incentives are offered, the theory cannot explain how the information is
To be sure, any increase in infonnational efficiency from insider trading may alter the
incentives to create the infonnation because it reduces the opportunity to exploit
infonnational disparities through trading. Because the derivatively infonned trading
mechanism does not disclose the infonnation itself, however, it wiII not reduce the returns
to infonnation creators who exploit their infonnation through production rather than
trading, and concern over an impact on allocation is thereby minimized.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 83, at 632 n.2l8.
This claim would depend, presumably, on two things: first, that there is the opportunity to
exploit the infonnation through production rather than trading, and second, that the trading
mechanism infonns traders sufficiently to make the market move towards an efficient equilibrium
but insufficiently to pennit others to guess the infonnation, thereby nullifying the infonnation
creator's trading advantage. Imagine an insider under the old rules who invests time and money to
deduce that one of Polaroid's rivals has developed a newer and better instant camera. Such a person
could trade on the knowledge through production, or by selling Polaroid shares short. Because some
insider trading rules allow delay in reporting the trade or disclosing the infonnation, the trader could
benefit from the time lag-again, either in production or through trading. Now imagine the same
trader under the new rules. Kraakman and Gilson seem to argue that while the incentives offered by
trading have been changed, the returns offered by production have not. I am not sure why this is the
case. Under a regime of instant disclosure of identity and size of sale, many traders might draw
negative conclusions about Polaroid from short sales by industry insiders. There would certainly be
less incentive to invest in infonnation creation for trading. Why would investment in production be
any different? What difference would it make if the trader buys the Polaroid license cheaply and
floods the market with cut-price Polaroids before the new camera arrived on the scene, rather than,
say, selling Polaroid short? It seems dubious to assume that because this is classed as "production"
the returns would not be diminished-"production," too, is a datum, and other traders and
consumers might draw similarly negative inferences. There seems to be no reason to assume that, as
a general matter, production decisions can benefit more from precise knowledge (in other words, that
a new camera is coming out, rather than just that the stock price is going down). The important
distinction is not so much between production and trading as between the creation of infonnation
that is and that is not socially valuable. Actually, we might benefit from prohibiting traders from
investing in this kind of infonnation creation, although to say so for sure we would need to know
more about the frequency of serendipitous, socially valuable discoveries occurring in searches
originally desigued to yield a trading advantage.
Perhaps when Kraakman and Gilson talk about "production" they have in mind something like
the production of the Polaroid camera in the first place, and thus the incentives they are talking
about are incentives to engage in fundamental research and development, not distributionally
advantageous market research. In that case, the conclusion seems more intuitively convincing. Part
of the reason that it is convincing, however, might be that the creator of the infonnation would have
some kind of intellectual property right to exploit through production, rather than having a mere
privilege to trade. Yet, as I argued in the discussion of infonnation economics, to identify those
"creators" who should be the beneficiaries of property rights, we must first resolve exactly the
tension that Kraakman and Gilson are dealing with-the tension between incentive and efficiency.
See supra Part IV.
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supposed to get to the market in the first place. By itself, this kind of
theoretical conflict might not seem to be cause for alarm. After all, physicists can tell us a lot about refraction, reflection, and light-sails even if
they must use the contradictory metaphors of particle and wave to do so.
Yet as I tried to show earlier,199 when it comes to some practical questions of information regulation-such as fair use or insider trading-the
choice between which aspect of information is to be stressed seems to
create a corresponding uncertainty in the results of the analysis.
In the next Sections, I attempt to extend this analysis by focusing on
some of the most influential economic scholarship on the disclosure of
information and then on the first real scholarly challenge to insider trading. My claim is that a concentrated study of the economic literature on
disclosure shows the extent to which the indeterminacy of the underlying
analysis is concealed only by a number of conceptual baseline errors and
ad hoc assumptions. When I turn to Henry Manne's challenge to the
regulation of insider trading, I argue that it is reliance on a notion
remarkably similar to romantic authorship that gives his analysis its
apparent determinacy. In the conclusion I argue that this ensemble of
baseline error, non sequitur, and romance is worthy of study because it is
used to justify expansive intellectual property rights far beyond insider
trading.
A.

Economic Analysis of Information Disparities

The more expansive law-and-economics literature treats insider
trading as a case study in regulating the disclosure of valuable information. To the skeptical outsider, the outstanding features of this analysis-whether supporting or opposing the prohibition of insider tradingseem to be: (1) persistent baseline errors, (2) the use of ad hoc claims
about behavior in order to give the analysis a spurious determinacy, and
(3) the tendency to ignore contradictions or aporias in the theory at the
moment policymaking conclusions are to be drawn.
1.

Baseline Errors

The best examples of baseline errors in discussions of insider trading
probably come from the cases,2oo but the law-and-economics literature
199. See supra text accompanying notes 74-97.
200. For example, Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella said,
As a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transaction has an
obligation to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand in some confidential
or fiduciary relation. This rule permits a businessman to capitalize on his experience and
skill in securing and evaluating relevant information; it provides an incentive for hard
work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting. But the policies that underlie the rule also
should limit its scope. In particular, the rule should give way when an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some
unlawful means.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239-40 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
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runs a close second. Consider the following analysis of the economics of
disclosure requirements, drawn from Professor Levmore's Securities and
Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts,201 the article that
introduced the happy phrase "optimal dishonesty.,,202 Professor
Levmore's argument rests on an exploration of the intersections and
analogies between insider trading and the more general rules of disclosure in contract law. According to Professor Levmore, legal rules forcing a mining corporation to disclose discovery of a large ore deposit on a
farmer's land would "hurt both present and future shareholders and, in
some instances, society as a whole.,,203 But the shareholders are "hurt"
only if we assume that they are entitled to the amount of profit to be
made in nondisclosing situations. And that is the very thing we are trying to decide. Are the Chicago Bears' shareholders "hurt" by the criminal law rules which prohibit the employment of their linebackers as
muggers after the game is over? The assumptions about the regime of
rules dictate which advantages (in strength, knowledge, information)
may be exploited and which may not. Levmore's comment is either
redundant (any change of entitlements will hurt those who lose protection and help those who gain it) or circular. He assumes the current rule
is right, uses that as the baseline to measure losses-but not gains-and
then finds the choice of rule mysteriously confirmed. 204
Judge Easterbrook uses exactly the same example, and makes a similar baseline error, although in his case it leads him to overgeneralization
and non sequitur. "Is it unfair for a geologist, after studying the attributes of farmland, to buy the land without revealing that the land likely
covers rich mineral deposits? If the answer is yes, then fairness means
that no one may appropriate the value of the information he has created.,,205 But this simply is not true. Imagine an argument that if we
prohibit an athlete from using his strength to take my money by force,
fairness means that we must also prohibit him from using his strength to
get a job on a football team. Again, the assumptions about the regime of
rules dictate which advantages may be exploited and which may not. To
(citation omitted). Since the definition of insider trading identifies exactly what are "unlawful
means," the use of "unlawful means" to define insider trading is an underwhelming analytic
technique.
201. Levmore, supra note 55, at 133-44.
202. ld. at 140.
203. ld. at 133.
204. The same problem bedevils many other articles. For example, Carlton and Fischel argue
that if insider trading were harmful, companies would prohibit it themselves. See Carlton & Fischel,
supra note 66, at 862-66. This seems dramatically to underestimate the importance of the fact that
under the current rules insider trading is already illegal. Manne's argument that entrepreneurs will
seek employment inside firms so as to engage in insider trading is subject to the same difficulties.
MANNE, supra note 29, at 138-41.
205. Easterbrook, supra note I, at 324.
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say that a particular advantage may not be exploited in one area does not
commit us to the view that it may not be exploited in another.
We find a similar mistake in Easterbrook's argument that an attack
on insider trading is an attack on the division of labor itself.
People do not have or lack "access" in some absolute sense.
There are, instead, different costs of obtaining information. An
outsider's costs are high; he might have to purchase the information from the firm. Managers have lower costs (the amount of
salary foregone); brokers have relatively low costs (the value of
the time they spent investigating); Sherlock Holmes also may be
able to infer extraordinary facts from ordinary occurrences at low
cost. The different costs of access are simply a function of the
division oflabor. A manager (or a physician) always knows more
than a shareholder (or patient) in some respects, but unless there
is something unethical about the division of labor, the difference is
not unfair. 206
Again, the conclusion simply does not follow. Easterbrook seems to be
operating on two assumptions. The first is that anyone in a position of
power has some kind of natural right to the advantages they would be
able to wring from that position if unrestrained by rules. The football
player example sufficiently demonstrates the flaws in this argument.
Alternatively, perhaps the assumption is that a market comes with an
automatic set of default positions and one of them is "allow trading on
superior information." It would be hard to find any lawyer since the
legal realists who would defend this position. His second assumption
seems to be that if we prohibit any person from profiting from any position of inequality, we are logically committed to a root and branch attack
on all ineqUalities everywhere. But this would be obviously incoherent.
If the assumption is the narrower one-that forbidding citizens to profit
from a single one of the advantages conveyed by the division of labor
implies that we must forbid anyone to profit from any advantage from
the division of labor-then Judge Easterbrook is making a category mistake. Dogs have four legs and cats have four legs, but that does not
imply that cats are dogs or that rules affecting cats must be applied to
dogs-unless, of course, we have previously committed ourselves to
treating all four-legged animals alike.
The second typical baseline problem in discussion of trading on
superior information occurs at the moment when the analyst imagines a
change in the rules, but fails to modify the rest of the analysis. For
example, when Levmore does think of shifting the baseline to a different
pattern of entitlements, he assumes either irrational behavior or a failure
to adjust behavior to the new regime. In his argument about mineral
206. Id. at 330.
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exploration, for example, he claims that under a full disclosure regime
farmers would ask prices so high that they would hold up the sale or
even stop exploration altogether-his assumption being that no company
would prospect if it had to disclose the fruits of its efforts to sellers. 207
He offers no reasons why rational parties would suddenly begin to engage
in holdout behavior after the change in rules. He also seems to ignore
the fact that changes in rules produce changes in behavior. Under the
new regime, we would expect extensive use of pre-exploration option
contracts on promising pieces of land, for example. Such contracts
would allow companies to factor in estimates of exploration costs, potential profits discounted by the likelihood of a find, and so on. Farmers
would simply do the same type of calculation in reverse. By ignoring this
kind of possibility, Levmore can premise his examination of a new rule
on the continuation of the pattern of dealing that would have been produced by the old rule. Needless to say, the new rule looks irrational.
None of this should be taken to imply that it is wrong to worry
about the level of reward necessary to produce information. One could
imagine a situation, not constructed with baseline fallacies, circular definitions of "damage," and inconsistent assumptions of irrational behavior,
in which a society would be hurt by contracts made on the basis of fuller
disclosure. 2 0 8 But to have any impact on policy, the analysis would have
207. Levmore, supra note 55, at 133.
208. An unpublished essay by Steven Shavell from Harvard Law School's "Discussion Paper
Series" avoids most of these pitfalls. Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information
Prior to Economic Exchange, Discussion Paper No. 91 (Apr. 1991) (unpublished manuscript,
available from Harvard Law School). Limiting his conclusions to the world of his model, Professor
Shavell argues that sellers should be required to disclose so that they do not have unduly high
incentives to acquire information, but that buyers should sometimes be allowed to conceal their
information. Briefly stated, the argument is that we must distinguish between information that has
social value and that which has no social value. We only want to encourage production of the
former. Professor Shavell takes as a definition of "socially valuable information" "that which allows
an action to be taken that raises the value of the good to the party who possesses it." ld. at 4 n.6.
Professor Shavell wishes to avoid rules that would simply achieve a different distributive effect with
no impact on allocative efficiency. We do not wish to give incentives to acquire information that wiII
merely make one party or the other richer, but we do wish to give incentives to produce information
if it will help in moving resources to their use-value. Under a rule of compulsory disclosure for
sellers, sellers will only invest in information-gathering when the chances of the information
revealing something positive, multiplied by the amount of the increase in value the information
would allow the seller to recoup, would be greater than the chance of the information revealing
something that would decrease the value of the property multiplied by the amount of the decrease in
value.
Shavell is careful not to generalize his approach to other issues of information inequality.
Interested by the method, I have tried to imagine how one might do so. One difficulty would be that
once we go beyond the model, we can contemplate situations in which the seller can profit by
"seIling short" (such as in insider trading)-offsetting the losses involved in the sale of his current
portfolio by trading on the knowledge that the price of similar goods is likely to fall. This raises
some problems for the baseline measurement of socially valuable information. In certain kinds of
markets, the seller will be able to "raise the value" of his property whether the information is
positive or negative. But the increased value depends at least partly on the possibility of silence. A
basic problem appears to arise here. The decision whether or not we want individuals to invest in
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to show that the hypothetical situation was actually likely to be our situation. This is exactly what Levmore does not do.

2.

Ad Hoc Claims About Behavior

The same article offers a fine example of ad hoc claims about behavior by different parties under different sets of rules. Professor Levmore
sets himself the task of deciding whether disclosure rules are necessary
for (1) termite-infested-house sellers and (2) farmers and mineral companies. "Homeowners... need not be offered an incentive [by a rule
which allows sellers to withhold information] to inspect for termites. As
soon as there is a fleeting rumor of a termite infestation in the neighborhood, every sensible owner calls in the experts and prepares to take corrective measures."209 Thus Levmore argues that when society does not
compel disclosure, both buyers and sellers will inspect, leading to a waste
of resources.
This efficiency-based distinction is most compelling in the
case of the ore discovery. Unlike the owner of an infested house,
the farmer is not likely to drill in his fields for minerals. There
will be a net societal loss if we do not encourage exploration, and
there is no reason to think that the farmer will be inclined to
explore unless he is privy to the buyer's information. The buyer,

of course, will not explore if he must disclose the fruits of his
efforts. 210
Levmore fails to offer proof for any of these generalizations. The
first two seem to rest on stereotyped assumptions about the relative foresight and sophistication of home buyers and farmers. Similarly, they
assume an absence of a well-functioning secondary market in geology
experts or mining options. The last statement, that no mineral explorainformation depends on the effect of the research on the asset's price, but the asset "price" depends
on the postulated rules of disclosure. In the concrete example given, the rule of compulsory
disclosure would tend to undermine the possibility of selling short. Therefore, sellers would not
invest in acquiring information when they knew it was likely to be of this kind. (Since the "seller" is
also a "buyer" with respect to other units of the fungible good, the possibility of trading
advantageously would appear to depend on the relative inefficiency of informational market
mechanisms similar to those discussed in Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 83.)
Factoring in the empirical uncertainties of information costs, we might find that a compulsory
disclosure rule would produce underinvestment by sellers in information likely to be negative, or that
the absence of a compulsory disclosure rule would lead to inefficient investment in information
gathering merely to gain an advantage over other traders, thus causing distributional changes but no
increase in allocative efficiency. See Fama & Laffer, supra note 83, at 292. Once again, the efficiency
claims seem to be in tension with the incentive claims, see Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 69, while
the baseline price measure appears both to decide and to depend on the regime of information
disclosure. I am unsure whether a similar point could be made about the capital asset pricing model
used to determine the existence of efficient markets. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 83, at 561
n.41.
209. Levmore, supra note 55, at 135.
210. [d. (emphasis added).
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tion will ever take place if the explorer has to pay (postdisclosure) market
price for mineral-bearing land, is simply false. Gathering information
does have costs, but one cannot stipulate a priori that they must always
be so high that concealment is necessary to protect the information.211
The claim is also analytically incoherent for the reasons discussed in the
subsection concerning baseline errors.212
3.

Ignoring Contradictions in the Theory

The influential Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,
Economic Theory and Regulation of the Securities Industry,213 provides
an example of the ingenious use of contradictory economic analysis, and
baseline errors at the same time. The Note's author, Christopher Saari,
admits that unregulated markets "mayor may not" lead to optimal production of information and cites economists to prove it. The Note points
out that Kenneth Arrow argues that production of information will be
"less than optimal because producers of information will not be able to
capture its true value due to inability to acquire necessary property
rights" in the information they produce.214 The same footnote proceeds
to cite Jack Hirshleifer and Eugene Fama and Arthur Laffer, who argue
that "production of information will be greater than optimal because
some information will be produced solely for trading advantages that
produce wealth distribution rather than for allocational purposes.,,215
These two charmingly contradictory arguments do not lead the author to
question the determinacy of the analysis, but instead to cite yet another
economist for the proposition that "production of information in unregulated markets may not be strictly optimal, but will lead to better resource
211. Cf. Hirshleifer, supra note 69.
212. Supra Section VIII.A.1. And these failings are made even more disturbing by the fact that
many of these articles use a persistent rhetoric of scientific certainty to cover up their extreme
judgmental moralism. Here is Professor Levmore excoriating a farmer who is nasty enough to ask
the mineral company questions about what they are doing. He begins by comparing the farmer to a
house owner who holds out on (and holds up) a development.
The owner of the 3OO1st tract of land who demands a high price is really the despicable
character. Similarly, the seller who, to preserve a fraud claim, asks specific questions about
activities he would otherwise never engage in is really the contemptible party. Like eminent
domain, optimal dishonesty operates to deny a windfall to a passive party when to do
otherwise might lead to a net societal loss.
Levmore, supra note 55, at 142 (emphasis added). Of course, the question of whether the farmer
would engage in the activities himself is irrelevant. (Wasn't that Adam Smith's basic point?) And to
call the farmer "passive" strikes one as judgmental labeling rather than economic science. It also
seems to go against everything Coase ever taught us about joint activities. If, on the other hand,
these statements reflect the ideology of the romantic author, then we might expect that the parties
who get the rights are those who can most readily be portrayed as active romantic innovators, rather
than passive, unoriginal sources. That picture seems to fit fairly well.
213. Saari, supra note 66.
214. ld. at 1068 n.197 (emphasis added) (citing Arrow, supra note 94, at 617 n.190).
215. ld. (emphasis added) (citing Fama & Laffer, supra note 83; Hirshleifer, supra note 69).
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allocation than any other alternative."216 That is, we cannot agree what
happens in "unregulated" markets-but "regulated" ones are bound to
be worse.
This assessment is political dogma masquerading as analysis. In
fact, given economists' acknowledgement that "public goods" may
require regulation in order to avoid free rider problems and their frequent claim that information is a public good, this is the worst place to
make such a claim. It does not help to find that Arrow and Laffer agree
that "unregulated" markets will not produce the right amount of information, but can't agree whether they will over- or underproduce. Worse
still, later in his analysis of markets for the production of information,
Arrow states that-even allowing for commodification of information"unregulated" markets will underproduce and that some major form of
state intervention is probably necessary.217 This position is hardly consistent with the earlier proposition that "production of information in
unregulated markets ... will lead to better resource allocation than any
other alternative."
The claim is not only analytically unsupported, it is also conceptually incoherent, depending as it does on a completely untenable set of
assumptions about the ground rules in a "natural" market. Would those
rules require disclosure, or not? The question has no answer, in part
because there is no "natural," unregulated state of affairs. Without the
rules of contract, tort, and property there would not be a market. Barring a belief in classical legal thought, how could we claim that the particular set of (common law?) rules found in this country at this time is
any more natural, neutral, or nonregulatory than the rules imposed by
the SEC? As I pointed out before, reading much of the economic literature, one might imagine that the legal system came with preset, default
positions that sounded something like this: "Protect owners against
physical invasion of land, allow formation of contracts when information
is concealed, nullify contracts where lies are told.,,218 But this is silly.
The choice is not between "regulated" and "unregulated" but between
different kinds ofregulation.219 Judge Posner has claimed that economic
analysis is the true heir of legal realism. On the evidence of these arguments one is tempted to call this "the case of the murdering heir."

B.

Insider Trading Law as a Puzzle

For my purposes, the interesting thing about insider trading law is
that it represents a commitment to a far-reaching, publicly popular, egal216. Id. (citing Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
1 (1969».
217. Arrow, supra note 94, at 623.
218. See, e.g., Easterbrook's arguments discussed supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
219. See Hale, supra note 168, at 626-28.
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itarian program of regulation-a commitment that is valued despite the
fact that the program is expensive to administer and difficult to police.
What is more, the prohibition of insider trading is merely the capstone of
a larger structure that places affirmative obligations to reveal information
on companies involved in the securities market. This structure is
defended by far-reaching appeals to egalitarian norms.
The SEC puts relatively onerous reporting requirements on both
companies and individuals and even attempts to police the information
revealed to make sure that it is not misleading. Thus, for example,
income projections that might gull an unsuspecting investor are forbidden, and the form of disclosure required is designed explicitly to put the
novice, so far as is possible, on par with the experienced investor.22o
Courts, administrators, and scholars say things about the evils of disparate access to information that they would never say about disparate
access to wealth or to other forms of power or property. They even
worry about the evils of structural disparities in access, not merely about
cases where one individual has mistreated another. This concern is
hardly popular nowadays, even in a presumably hospitable field such as
civil rights. 221 Yet all tlris takes place in the securities market, in the very
heart of capitalism, and in the face of practical difficulties of administration and sustained academic criticism. Surely this is a puzzle.
In this Section, I examine the internal structure of this puzzle, tracing its competing, circular arguments and its self-swallowing definitions.
My claim is that the internal structure of the debate over insider trading
reproduces once again the matrix of ideological tensions in the liberal
theory of justice that I identified earlier-public versus private, free flow
of information versus property, the norm of equality versus the norm of
return to the status quo ante, and so on.
Using this framework I would argue that it is precisely the fact that
insider trading is trading on information that helps us to understand why
it is ideologically feasible to subject it to egalitarian regulation. Mter all,
this trading is a market transaction. In the repetitive and contradictory
division of the world into public and private, the market is supposed to
be exactly the place that stands outside the norm of equality. Rich and
poor both get one vote. Leaving the voting booth as formally equal citizens, they tum instantaneously into members of civil society. One
returns to the stock exchange, the other to the unemployment line. The
writ of equality does not run to the marketplace. Yet the nonrational
220. Professor Epstein would probably argue that it was an uncompensated taking of the latter's
hard-won expertise. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
221. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (evidence that skiIIed, highpaying jobs are filled predominantly by whites and unskiIIed, low-paying jobs are fiIIed
predominantly by minorities is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination).
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association of information with the public sphere, with the world of
debate and discussion, makes it easier to talk about insider trading using
the language of equality and fairness.
What is more, we are dealing with something commonly thought of
as "market information." As I pointed out earlier, the basic model of the
perfect market in microeconomics depends on the idea that all parties are
"informationally equal," in that they all possess perfect information. It
does not, needless to say, depend on all parties being equal in wealth or
possession of legally protected interests. Thus, at first blush it might
seem that one would be "arguing downhill" in claiming that a party
should not be able to trade on the basis of undisclosed nonpublic material
information. 222 At the very least, it would seem that micro economic discourse would be more hospitable to this precise form of egalitarian regulation. As we will see, things are actually much more complicated. Yet
the unreflective first plotting of information as a "public" matter and (to
a lesser extent) the apparent congeniality of economic theory to ideas of
informational egalitarianism remain vitally important to the political
acceptability of the insider trading laws. 223 One thesis of this Article is
that our intuitive ideological mapping matters, whatever the outcome of
more prolonged reflection.
If the analysis presented so far is correct, some idea akin to "authorship" ought to be offered as a device to mediate these tensions between
public and private, between the norm of equality and the norm of return
to the status quo, between imperfect information as property in a market
and perfect information as a property of a market. What would an
222. Although, of course, the transaction costs involved make this simplistic assumption
extremely problematic, and the section on law and economics shows some of the other possible
conclusions one could draw. In one sense, I see this issue as a playing out of the "paradox" proposed
earlier. See supra text accompanying note 70.
223. If this hypothesis were right, one would expect to see a diverging pattern of treatment of
informational ineqUalities and (other kinds ot) wealth inequalities-particularly after the
abandonment of the most Lochneresque visions of laissez [aire. In the late nineteenth century,
courts would seldom allow plaintiffs to get out of bargains by showing evidence of either wealth
inequalities or information inequalities. (Though there is certainly a convincing story in American
legal history that claims that classical legal thinkers had to work quite hard to ignore older doctrines
such as 'just price." These were the doctrines that allowed juries to inquire into the relative wealth
and power of the parties-whether this particular merchant was "grinding the faces of the poor."
As such, these doctrines were anathema to a legal consciousness built on the beliefs that Marx
described-the idea that the inequalities of civil society were taboo as far as the state was concerned.)
In any event, under the influence of a will theory of contract and a caveat emptor theory of
bargaining, it was hard even to explain why there should be contractual redress for disparities in
information or power.
But note the relative changes in these doctrines since the early part of the twentieth century.
Courts are still uneasy about striking down bargains merely because of disparities in wealth or power
between the parties. Yet they seem much more comfortable imposing disclosure requirements,
extensive and non-derogable "duties to warn," and even requirements that the particular class and
educational requirements of potential purchasers be taken into account in constructing warnings.
Informational egalitarianism is clearly not as threatening as economic egalitarianism-hardly an
unimportant fact to understand as we enter the "information age."
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author figure look like in insider trading, and what would be its most
important characteristic? From my perspective, the key feature of
authorship as a mediating device lies in its romance-by which I mean
both the homage to imagination, originality, and the unique spirit that is
typical of the Romantic movement in literature and the actual romanticization of the character of this original creator and destroyer-this
Faustian figure.
In the stereotyped story line that goes with this construct, the
romantic author spurns convention and loathes routine. He may even
violate social mores. Nevertheless, society gains so much from the original creations he throws off that these matters can be overlooked or perhaps even cherished. If the theme of originality supplies the conceptual
basis on which to rest the claim to property, the romanticization of the
author supplies both the emotional justification for the normative claim
and the device by which it can be limited where necessary. Who can
resist the argument, "Senator, you're no Van Gogh"? (Although, as
Bleistein shows, the same rhetoric allows even the humblest contributions to be conclusively presumed "unique.")
Insider trading scholarship is the last place one would expect to find
odes to romantic authorship. And yet my claim has been that the author
device is almost irresistible because of the conceptual neatness and emotional appeal of the way in which it mediates the contradictions in the
regulation of information. If we find the language of romantic authorship incongruously used to defend insider trading, I would claim that my
argument is strengthened.
The germinal defense of insider trading comes from Henry
Manne. 224 His supporters claim that all subsequent discussions of the
criminalization of insider trading "raise, without acknowledging it, the
questions first raised by Henry Manne.,,225 Manne's book begins with a
lengthy economic analysis of insider trading and with a consideration of
the effects of various insider trading rules. But after 110 pages of such
analysis, he has this to say:
This somewhat laborious discussion of what happens in the
stock market does not constitute a strong argument against a proposal to bar all insider trading. Indeed it is not intended for that
purpose at all, but merely to point out that no strong arguments
along these lines are available in defense of such a proposal. . . .
But the debate is far from over.... [T]he argument developed in the following three chapters is that a rule allowing insiders to trade freely may be fundamental to the survival of our
corporate system. People pressing for the rule barring insider
224. MANNE, supra note 29.
225. Carney, supra note 66, at 868.
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trading may inadvertently be tampering with one of the wellsprings of American prosperity.226
The wellspring to which he is referring is entrepreneurship. Manne
begins his normative argument with a reprise of Schumpeter's argument
on the role of entrepreneurship and its likely demise under the rigid and
routinized conditions of modem organizational life----conditions which
might seem inimical to the entrepreneurial spirit. 227
Schumpeter's basic argument was that without dynamic innovation
from inventors and entrepreneurs, competition would lead to diminishing returns on capital-as more capital goods were added to a market in
which the supply of labor was (at least relatively) fixed. 228 Eventually
such a process could lead to the point where no further capital accumulation took place. Inventions and recombinations of productive factors
make capital more productive, shifting the factor-price frontier to the
right. Yet as soon as a great innovator arises, competitors will imitate
the innovation, returns on capital will be driven down once again, and
the process will repeat itself. Thus, for both Manne and Schumpeter,
originality, iconoclasm, and innovation are simultaneously the keys to
economic development and the identifying characteristics of the entrepreneur. 229 Manne takes pains to point out that this innovation is crucial
226. MANNE, supra note 29, at 110.
227. ld. at 124-27. Manne has to tread carefully here. As Schumpeter describes him, the
entrepreneur is the enemy of tradition whose "conduct and ... motive are 'rational' in no other
sense. And in no sense is his characteristic motivation of the hedonist kind." SCHUMPETER, supra
note 14, at 92. This tends to fit the idea that routinization and bureaucracy will undermine the
opportunities for entrepreneurship. But when Manne goes on to argue that entrepreneurs need more
profits if they are to be motivated, the entrepreneur suddenly switches hats from the nonrational
creator and destroyer to the economically rational actor who, presumably, would find a modem
corporation entirely congenial.
228. SCHUMPETER, supra note 14; see PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
EcONOMICS 113, 188-89 (14th ed. 1992).
229. Schumpeter lists the entreprenuer's principal motivations as
the dream and the will to found a private kingdom ... the will to conquer: the impulse to
fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake ... of success itself•.•.
Finally there is the joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply of exercising one's
energy and ingenuity.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 14, at 93. Dream, will, success for the sake of success, nonrational
imperatives, and above all, the joy of creating and transforming-these descriptions paint a picture
of the genius romantic author, particularly when he claims that the entrepreneur comes from that
portion of society distinguished by "super-normal qualities of intellect and will." ld. at 82 n.2. His
analysis is certainly an interesting answer to a wider question: to whom do we attribute the growth
of civilization, of culture, of capital-to the individual who makes the change, or to the society,
culture, public domain, and workforce that make that change possible? Schumpeter's book is a
premier (and unusually convincing) example of the argument that attributes growth to the
iconoclastic individual. The argument takes the form of "but for" causation-"but for the
entrepreneur ... n Manne goes one step further, concluding from the "but for" argument an
entitlement to some share of the proceeds-both on grounds of just dessert and on utilitarian
grounds to encourage further production. This style of argument is of course exactly the style of
argument that justifies property rights for the (great) author and then, by analogy for all authorsprovided only they make something original. Originality and individuality become the central
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even though the entrepreneur seems (like the author) merely to be
recombining elements that already exist. Those elements are information
and productive factors in the former case, language, genre, and perhaps
even plot in the latter.
For Schumpeter the entrepreneur's function is to make new
combinations of productive factors, that is, to bring them together
in a new way. Routine business management is a critical function
in the successful operation of a corporation, but it will characterize the work of corporate executives only after productive factors
have been successfully combined for the first time. 230
Entrepreneurs have been identified as the agents of development,
and creative originality has been identified as the mark of the entrepreneur.231 Manne now turns to the question of incentives. Following Berle
and Means, he believes that ownership and control are separated in the
modem corporation. Diverging from them, he argues that entrepreneurs
will probably seek positions within firms and make their money from
stock trading rather than stock ownership. In making that argument he
also diverges from Schumpeter, who did not believe that large returns
were necessary to motivate the entrepreneur. Rather, Schumpeter
believed that the satisfaction of innovation or creation sufficed.232
At first, Schumpeter's point that large returns are not a necessary
incentive for entrepreneurial effort seems correct. The supply
would appear to be determined solely by personal, psychological
forces. Entrepreneurs do appear in government and in salaried
qualities we look for in conferring property rights. It should be noted, however, that Schumpeter
thinks that economic reward to the entrepreneur is not central to entrepreneurship-precisely
because the motivations of the iconoclast are not "rational" money-grubbing ones. This tension
between romaticizing the author and making utilitarian arguments about the need to encourage
authorship reappears throughout this study. In the English edition of the book, Schumpeter also
denied the charge that he was glorifying the entrepreneur.
[O]ur analysis of the the rOle of the entrepreneur does not involve any "glorification" of the
type, as some readers of the first edition of this book seemed to think. We do hold that
entrepreneurs have an economic function, as distinguished from, say, robbers. But we
neither style every entrepreneur a genius or a benefactor to humanity, nor do we wish to
express any opinion about the comparative merits of the social organisation in which he
plays his role, or about the question whether what he does could not be effected more
cheaply or efficiently in other ways.
Id. at 90 n.1.
230. MANNE, supra note 29, at 116. At another point Manne describes the entrepreneur in
decidedly Faustian terms, as "this upsetter of stable societies, this creator of disruptive forces." Id.
at 119.
231. "[T]he typical entrepreneur is more self-centred than other types, because he relies less
than they do on tradition and connection and because his characteristic task-theoretically as well as
historically-consists precisely in breaking up old, and creating new, tradition." SCHUMPETER,
supra note 14, at 91-92.
232. Schumpeter makes explicit the point that, although he views the entrepreneur as the engine
of capitalist development, economic gain is not a vital motivation for the entrepreneur. In his view,
two out of three of the goals of the entrepreneur "may in principle be taken care of by ... social
arrangements" other than the profit motive. Id. at 94.

1506

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1413

positions, and the temperament for innovation may turn up in
such nonentrepreneurial professions as the clergy or teaching.
But surely these are the exceptions, and, though data would be
difficult to obtain, the indications are that entrepreneurial talent
tends to concentrate in those industries, professions, and positions
providing the greatest potential for very substantial profits. 233
Thus, where Schumpeter saw the rigidity of modern bureaucratized
capitalism and the swings of the business cycle as the major enemy of
entrepreneurship, Manne sees an absence of reward to the entrepreneur
as the biggest problem. In one of his more lyrical and romantic
moments, he uses exactly the Faustian imagery we saw earlier to introduce his claim that we need to secure to entrepreneurs the fruits of their
labors: "What then is the nature of the return to this upsetter of stable
societies, this creator of disruptive forces?,,234 His answer? Profits from
insider trading. The argument here gets a little incoherent.
Certain events or developments lend themselves peculiarly to
exploitation by insiders. Not surprisingly, many of these are
items that corporate employees or others close to the corporation
will have produced. Higher earnings or the concommitant [sic]
dividend increase are clear examples. New products or inventions, new ore discoveries, oil finds, or successful marketing or
management techniques also will generally be known first to those
in the company responsible for the development. 235
The clear implication is that insider trading will be the result of beneficial changes produced by innovative "upsetters of societies and creators of disruptive forces." Society benefits by the improved allocation of
productive resources and thus should not begrudge the entrepreneur/
insider his or her cut. 236 This is nice rhetoric but bad analysis. The
insider makes money off information that will cause the future stock
price to diverge widely from the current price in either direction. Thus,
being a lousy manager and selling short before the impending bankruptcy
becomes public knowledge will net the same return as being a good manager and recouping part of the increase in stock price. Manne has based
his argument on originality and uniqueness, but something can be
uniquely bad as well as uniquely good.
The idea is confusing in other ways. The unsupported claims about
the placement of entrepreneurs and their stock trading habits, the cate233. MANNE, supra note 29, at 122-23. Given Manne's own thesis, this would imply that, at
present, either few entrepreneurs are in large companies or that they are there and are trading
illegally.
234. ld. at 119.
235. ld at 55.
236. Indeed, for the reasons given above, it is only through innovation that capital accumulation
will continue.
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gory errors inherent in certain of his generalizations, the difficulty in
delineating those insider trading opportunities that were the result of
entrepreneurial activity, all of these lead us to wonder if something else is
going on under the text. At one point, Manne asks himself who should
be allowed to trade. Suddenly, from the heady language of the creator
and destroyer of societies, the relentless romantic innovator, Manne
swoops down to the realities of corporate personnel. The conceptual
whiplash is rather like that produced in Bleistein when the rhetoric of a
Van Gogh or a Monet is used to justify intellectual property in an advertising poster.
The last form of the "person-is-not-entitled" objection to insider
trading is that individuals making insider profits are frequently far
removed from a time or place or job in which they could perform
any entrepreneurial service for the company. It is, however,
extremely difficult to identify individuals performing the
entrepreneurial function or to know the precise moment at which
an individual performs an entrepreneurial act. . . .
Directors, large shareholders, executives, lawyers, investment bankers, or many other individuals may, at one time or
another, perform an entrepreneurial function. Most of the time,
however, they will not be innovating. And for any particular
development, many individuals may have made contributions.
Who, among the lawyers, bankers, and executives involved, can
be given full credit or the correct portions of credit for conceiving
the desirability of a merger, searching out the most likely firm,
and effectuating the desired plan? An entrepreneurial function
has been performed, and the individuals involved will have some
claim against the subsequent flow of inside information. But any
attempt by an outsider to correlate the contribution and the
reward on a one-for-one basis will probably fail. The contribution
of an individual may be so subtle-so much a result simply of his
being there-and yet so critical that we must be very cautious in
concluding that no reward is deserved. 237
This magnanimity does not extend to mere menial workers whose
jobs are deemed incapable of giving rise to original contributions and
who thus deserve no share of the reward. Once again, "sources" get a
rough break if they do not come close enough to fit the image of the great
author. What is more, the dividing line seems a little arbitrary. Lawyers
are author/entrepreneurs, but secretaries are not. Then again, Manne's
intended audience is a legal one so we might understand a certain rosetinted view of the lawyer's role.
To review: after spending half of his book on economic analysis of
237.

MANNE,

supra note 29, at 156-57.
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the market in information, Manne concludes that his "somewhat laborious discussion ... does not constitute a strong argument against a proposal to bar all insider trading.,,238 Harking back to my discussion of
information economics, I would agree-at least so far as the skeptical
judgment about the determinacy of economic analysis is concerned. 239
Some moral or theoretical a priori is required in order to ground the
analysis. Ultimately, Manne pins his hopes on a Faustian vision of entrepreneurship, a vision which puts innovation (and not mere labor) at the
heart of the issue and which seeks to reconcile society to the granting of a
monopoly rent by promising the entrepreneur the spin-off profits from
her innovative actions. In all significant respects, this is the romantic
theory of authorship all over again.
Manne's theory fails because it cannot separate "bad" originality
from "good" originality. It fails because it can neither justify nor limit
the class of people entitled to cash in on insider information. It fails
because he has only the most tenuous argument to connect insiders and
entrepreneurs in the first place. For these reasons and others, Manne's
book has proved more influential in raising the topic of insider trading
regulation than in actually solving that problem. But though the opponents of insider trading regulation may claim that they have gone far
beyond his approach, they fail to grasp the crucial moment in Manne's
analysis-the moment when an indefinite body of economic ideas about
information is given normative content by romance. 240 In this case, the
romance is attached to the dynamic innovator, the person who is put at
the center of all economic development. Though Manne's theory fails to
convince, it nevertheless offers a revealing picture of the role of romantic
authorship in discussions of information regulation. In the next Part,
that same romance is used to endow the manipulators, rather than the
sources, of genetic information with the right to profit from its
development.
IX
SPLEENS

So far, I have argued that issues of information will tend to revolve
around a set of tensions-between public and private, between the norm
of equality and the norm of the return to the status quo, between the
public domain and the private right, between the idea of property as an
absolute shield against potentially oppressive others and the idea of prop238. ld. at 110.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 69-97.
240. Drawing on the ideas advanced in the discussion of information economics. see supra Part
IV. one might ask the other critics of insider trading regulation the extent to which their ideas
achieve apparent determinacy without recourse to such romantic notions only by underplaying the
kinds of paradoxes discussed in Grossman & Stiglitz. supra note 69.
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erty as a bundle of rights, utilitarian in both derivation and application.
Public discourse in general and legal discourse in particular must appear
to mediate these tensions. Otherwise, particular regimes of information
regulation will seem "ungrounded," "contrary to institutional logic,"
"dangerous in their precedential implications," or simply "wrong."
For example, we might have a normative theory that argued that
any individual who mixes her labor with information should thereby
acquire a legally protected interest in it. 241 Yet if we accept the labor
theory of property for information, why not for all property? Unless we
have some articulated limiting principle, our information property
regime will "subvert" our general property regime.
At the same time, any information property regime requires a moral
justification of the fact that the individual is being granted a private
monopoly rent for recombining language, genre, and ideas that were harvested free of charge from the public domain. Coupled to this moral
argument we would need a prudential argument that this particular level
of property rights would not lead to the privatization of the fertile fields
of the public domain--converting it into a patchwork of inaccessible, and
increasingly barren, private estates. 242 To give an extreme example,
think of granting Shakespeare's heirs a property right in perpetuity over
Romeo and Juliet's plot, or Turing's estate a property right in all computer technology. How likely would future Turings or Shakespeares be
under such a regime?
Finally, since information property is more obviously de-physicalized than other property rights, we would need some hook on which to
241. This is certainly a theory which reappears time and again in the regulation of information.

See International News Servo v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-42 (1918) (recognizing a
quasiproperty right in news); see also Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282,
1294-95 (1991) (rejecting the "sweat of the brow" theory, but holding that choices of selection and
arrangement may imbue a compilation with sufficient originality for copyright).
242. Wendy Gordon and William Fisher provide the two most impressive examples of such a
combined moral-utilitarian analysis in the field of copyright. See Fisher, supra note 22; Gordon,
Merits o/Copyright, supra note 74. Yet in their prudential analyses of the optimal level of property
rights, both articles concentrate more on the level of property rights necessary to encourage authors
to produce than on the countervailing need to keep a large amount of information free from property
rights so that authors and creators will have the necessary raw materials with which to work. Using
the language of this Article, the private property component of the prerequisites of information
production gets more attention than the public domain component. See Litman, supra note 2. This
problem occurs even in the best and most sophisticated copyright literature. One explanation of this
emphasis might be the power of the vision of authorship I have described in this Article. The
romantic vision of authorship emphasizes creativity and originality and de-emphasizes the
importance of sources, genre, and conventions of language and plot. Thus, when economists and
legal scholars come to do their analyses, most see the issue as determining the extent of property
necessary to motivate and reward the creative spirit, rather than the extent of the public domain
necessary to give the magpie genius the raw material she needs. (Emerson on Shakespeare.) Landes
and Posner's work on copyright offers a significant exception; however, they themselves point out
that this is a "neglected consideration." Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 332. In this Part, the
tendency of author-discourse to devalue "sources" will be an important element of my analysis of the
Moore case.
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hang the legally protected interest. In other words, we would need some
convincing and apparently firm set of attributes that we could identify as
the property that the author, inventor, or artist could own, even after the
particular book, machine, or print has been sold. If property is to fulfill
its ideological function of apparently securing the individual from the
dubious affections of the state and other parties, this set of attributes
would have to be something more reified than some general injunction to
protect whatever today's utilitarian calculation indicates we should.
In the Part on copyright law, I argued that the figure used to
"solve" these problems is the romantic author. The conceptual device of
the romantic author makes credible the division between idea and expression. The romantic author stands with one foot in civil society and the
other in the public domain of political, artistic, and scientific interchange.
The author takes facts, genre, and language from the public domain,
works on them, adds the originality of spirit presumptively conferred on
him by the themes of romanticism, and produces a finished work. The
ideas (and the facts on which they are based) return to the public
domain, thus enriching it for the future. But because his originality has
marked the form of the work as "unique," the form or expression
becomes his alone. Together, the figure of the romantic author, the
theme of originality, and the conceptual distinction between idea and
expression seem to offer one of the most convincing mediations of the
tensions described earlier. This assemblage of mediating devices is so
convincing, in fact, that I argued we should expect to find it well beyond
the familiar realm of copyright. Moore v. Regents of the University of
California 243 seems to support that thesis.
Earlier in this Article, I described some of the bizarre features of the
Moore opinion.244 At first sight, the case looks as though it has been
deliberately constructed to provide a foil for law professors' lectures on
bad legal reasoning. The court bumbles and pontificates, apparently at
random. The reader is left to make the transitions as best she can. What
connects this confused discussion of the difference between the right of
publicity and the right of property to the claim that limited property
rights are not really property rights at all? What, if any, relevance does
the question-begging discussion of whether or not Mr. Moore's cells were
unique have to the idyllic picture the court paints of research carried on
free from the dead hand of property rights? How is the idyllic picture
reconciled with the court's later claim that the researchers themselves
must be given property rights in order to provide the vital incentives
necessary for their work? My claim is that these otherwise inexplicable
features of the case support the theory developed in this Article. The
apparently random shifts of topics, inconsistent jurisprudences of prop243. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). eer!. denied, 111
244. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.

s. Ct.

1388 (1991).
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erty, and ostensibly conflicting claims about originality and incentives
are best explained as a manifestation of the structure I described when I
discussed copyright.245
A.

Worrying About Property

The court in Moore worries about the classification, limitation, and
relativization of property. It also worries about the utilitarian justification for property. One theme of this Article is to suggest that these
strands of the opinion express the same concerns in different words.
1.

Limitations on Property

The best place to begin the argument is at the moment that the court
confronts these issues head on, in its discussion of regulatory limitations
on property. In this case, the limitations that concern the court do not
come from the law of copyright, but instead from a statute that regulates
the use and disposal of human tissue. "By restricting how excised cells
may be used and requiring their eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to 'property' or 'ownership'
for purposes of conversion law.,,246
This limitation is not as extreme as the claim presented earlier by
Krause in his eighteenth-century attack on the very notion of intellectual
property: "No, no, it is too obvious that the concept of intellectual property is useless. My property must be exclusively mine; I must be able to
dispose of it and retrieve it unconditionally.,,247 Nevertheless, there is
something peculiar in seeing a late-twentieth-century California court
talk about the implications we can draw from elimination of the rights
ordinarily attached to property. From a practical point of view, such
comments invite counterexamples. Most countries put extensive restrictions on the use, reproduction, transfer, and disposal of banknotes with245. My analysis here focuses on the reasons that the court gives for its decision, the
assumptions on which that decision is based, and the structure of the rhetoric in which the decision
is justified. I am not implying that the court's decision is indefensible on other grounds. One
obvious concern in giving patients property rights over their own bodies is that it holds out the
possibility of a market in organs in which the poor and the needy sell everything from kidneys to
corneas. A court or legislature convinced of the evils of such a system might reject the
commodification of organs for entirely different reasons than the court in Moore-although the case
for prohibiting sale would be less compelling in situations where the organ must be removed for
other reasons. Concerns like these seem to have been at the root of the National Organ Transplant
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274f (1988). One of the interesting things about the Moore case is that it says
so little about these kinds of concerns and so much about the concerns that would dominate if one
was viewing the issue through the author paradigm. Since my concern is with the general effect of
author-thinking on the interests of sources and audience, it is that aspect of the case on which I
concentrate here.
246. Moore. 793 P.2d at 492.
247. Krause, supra note 118, at 415-17, quoted in Woodmansee, supra note 1, at 444.
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out prompting any soul-searching about property rights in money.248 To
a greater or lesser extent, similar types of restrictions could be found for
cars, plutonium, motor oil, beachfront houses, and air conditioners.
From a slightly more theoretical perspective, the court's comment is
even more puzzling. After all, in contemporary legal discourse the most
common conception of property is the bundle of legally protected interests, held together by competing and conflicting policy goals. The
removal of one or more sticks from the bundle should have no particular
implications for the legally protected interests that remain. This point
should be more rather than less obvious in questions of intellectual property. The author claims a right in the work that is severable from the
material object bought by the reader. An author cannot prohibit the
reader from burning the book, nor from telling acquaintances about it,
nor from stealing the ideas. Even the jokes may be fair game, if retold
under the right circumstances. The one prohibited act is the copying of
expression-and even in that case there are exceptions. Thus, to reason
from the "normal incidents of ownership" in a case like this is to adopt a
formalistic and absolutist vision of property like that of Krause, and to
do so in the area least suited to it.
2.

Utilitarian Justification of Property

The court does not see itself as formalist, of course. The majority
says explicitly that "when the proposed application of a very general theory of liability in a new context raises important policy concerns, it is
especially important to face those concerns and address them openly."249
Yet, when the court does address them, it does something very curious.
The majority opinion describes the existing state of affairs-a world in
which "sources" have no property rights over the products developed
from their body fluids, tissue, or genetic information. "At present,
human cell lines are routinely copied and distributed to other researchers
for experimental purposes, usually free of charge. This exchange of scientific materials, which still is relatively free and efficient, will surely be
compromised if each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of
a lawsuit.,,2so This assessment is a fine example of the rhetoric of the
public domain. Property rights of "sources" are portrayed as impediments to innovation, an unnecessary drag on research. This principle is
potentially an imperialistic one. One could imagine the same argument
being made against copyright, or in favor of the legalization of insider
248. Thanks to David Seipp for this example.
249. Moore, 793 P.2d at 488. It is interesting to contrast this view with their equally strong
opinion that the "important policy concerns" worrying the dissent should be handled elsewhere.
"Shedding no light on the Legislature's intent, philosophical issues about 'scientists bec[oming]
entrepreneurs' are best debated in another forum." ld. at 492 n.34 (quoting id. at 514 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting» (citation omitted).
250. ld. at 495 (footnote omitted).
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trading. As I pointed out at the beginning of this Article, commodification of information can always be portrayed as either a time-consuming
and unjust impediment to, or a necessary prerequisite for, the free circulation of information. 251
Indeed, this is exactly what happens. A moment later, information
property rights of scientists are portrayed as necessary incentives to innovation. This assertion is not supported by data or analysis. It simply
flows from the assumptions of romantic authorship. As my discussion of
information economics makes clear,252 it is possible that if we do not give
property rights to sources of genetic information, not enough will be
brought to researchers in the first place. It is also possible that researchers would be given adequate incentives by the quest for scientific preeminence and by the joy of research, and that the competitive advantage of
those who are first to bring a product to market would be a sufficient
incentive for research and development. The court does not consider
these alternative possibilities, not because they are weighed and rejected
or because the existence of the patent system precludes them altogether,
but because the ideology of romantic authorship makes them disappear.
3.

Characterization as Property

The court also worries about the characterization of certain legally
protected interests as "property" rights. The plaintiff and the court of
appeal had relied strongly on analogies from privacy right cases dealing
with the antinomially named "right of publicity." When the California
Supreme Court addressed the cases cited by the plaintiff,253 its main concern was whether or not the right of publicity is "really" a property
right.
These opinions hold that every person has a proprietary interest
in his own likeness and that unauthorized, business use of a likeness is redressible as a tort. But in neither opinion did the authoring court expressly base its holding on property law. Each court
stated, following Prosser, that it was "pointless" to debate the
proper characterization of the proprietary interest in alikeness. 254
From a legal realist perspective of legally protected interests, the
question is indeed pointless: classification of the legally protected interest is dependent on the purpose the interest has to serve. Thus, rather
than staring at the legally protected interest in an attempt to divine
251. Compare International News Servo v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) with Feist
Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
252. See supra Part IV.
253. Moore, 793 P.2d at 490 (citing Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979)).
254. [d. (citations omitted).
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whether it was "really" property,255 one would decide the goals of this
particular interest and would then discuss whether the remedies attached
to a "property" right would be sufficient to achieve them. The court,
however, having tipped its hat to Dean Prosser, is not willing to follow
him. "For purposes of determining whether the tort of conversion lies,
however, the characterization of the right in question is far from pointless. Only property can be converted."256 Nevertheless, having raised
the question of classification, the court declines to settle it. Instead, the
majority simply assumes that the "right of publicity" is not a property
right, in part because of its classification as a right that protects privacy.
This is a shame because, if seen a little less formalistically, the pUblicity
rights cases themselves present a fascinating example of the tensions discussed in this Article.
B.

Public and Private; Publicity and Privacy

The famous Warren and Brandeis article that formed the basis of
much of the law of privacy257 attempted to ground the right to exclude
others in a person's privacy interest-the legitimate desire to keep certain
information from the eyes of the public. Their article implies that the
interest is more than just a property right in information about oneself.
The vision they invoke is the cozy private sphere of the home, not the
bustling private sphere of the market. Indeed, to allow the market to
commodify one's privacy might be to accelerate exactly the trends that
Warren and Brandeis found so disturbing. If one understands the concern that animates this area of the law to be the protection of privacy,
rather than the protection of private property, Mr. Moore's analogy
might seem to be correspondingly weaker. To a judge, taking someone's
genetic information is unlikely to seem intuitively as much of a violation
of "privacy" as publishing facts from a diary without the consent of the
author.
Yet despite their classification under the law of privacy, the publicity rights cases on which the plaintiff relied pay great attention to the
importance of commodification, alienation, and transfer of the protected
255. See generally WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 174.
This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process.
Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.-And you really get such a
queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and
thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this"
innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And
here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism
of an object. And we can also say the word "this" to the object, as it were address the
object as "this"-a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing
philosophy.
Id. at 1ge.
256. Moore, 793 P.2d at 490.
257. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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interest, and little or no attention to the concerns that so worried Warren
and Brandeis. The Motschenbacher case2S8 turns on a racing driver's
ability to commodify the distinctive image of his car and use it to advertise cigarettes. The Carson case2S9 explains at length that Mr. Carson
already licenses the phrase "Here's Johnny" to a chain of clothing stores
in which he holds a twenty percent interest. The Hirsch case260 holds
that "Crazylegs" Hirsch should be able to sell the right to use his nickname, and thus that it cannot be used without his consent to promote the
sale of products that remove hair from women's legs. The Lugosi case261
allows Mr. Lugosi a partial monopoly over the commercial exploitation
of a particular image of Dracula.
It is also worth noting that in each case the plaintiffs did not expend
great labor, emotion, or even originality in creating the protectible
"mark." It was Ed McMahon's distinctive voice and phrasing that made
Mr. Carson's introduction more than a pleasantry. Mr. Motschenbacher
did not design the car that formed the tangible basis of the image he was
allowed to exploit. "Crazylegs" Hirsch was given his nickname by someone else. Mr. Lugosi's right of pUblicity protected a figure drawn from a
book Mr. Lugosi did not write, portrayed in films he did not write,
direct, or produce, and based on an historical figure262 who actually did
very different (though equally unpleasant) things.
To a greater or lesser extent, therefore, each case treats fame as a
partial public good-something unique and personal that can be gainfully exploited only if it can be commodified and others excluded from its
use except on pain of payment. This, of course, was exactly what Mr.
Moore wanted the court to say about his genetic information. Why did
they refuse? Neither formalism, nor the functional requisites of the biotechnology industry, nor the dictates of economic efficiency seems sufficient to explain the decision.
Perhaps the court is applying an authorship theory after all. Perhaps the deep assumption here is that a celebrity is the author of his or
her fame, and that the phrases, nicknames, and images that are associated with the fame are, as Judge Kennedy put it in his dissent in the
Carson case, actually expressions of the essential celebrity.263 To be
famous, after all, is to stand out from the crowd, to be thought unique.
There is also a strong popular belief that having labored to create this
unique mark, the celebrity is entitled to have it protected. Mr. Moore's
258. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
259. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
260. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
261. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
262. alk/a Vlad the Impaler.
263. By far the most sophisticated development of this idea is in Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/
izing the Celebrity: PubliCity Rights, Postmodern Politics and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365 (1992).

1516

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1413

genetic endowment could certainly be seen as something he got without
expending labor. 264
But what about uniqueness and originality, the other fundamental
prerequisites for an author to have exclusionary property rights in his
creation? In one of its most surprising passages, the court says that not
only was Mr. Moore's genetic information produced without the relevant
labor, it was insufficiently original to justify property rights.
Lymphokines, unlike a name or a face, have the same molecular
structure in every human being and the same, important functions
in every human being's immune system. Moreover, the particular
genetic material which is responsible for the natural production of
lymphokines, and which defendants use to manufacture
lymphokines in the laboratory, is also the same in every person; it
is no more unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the
spine or the chemical formula of hemoglobin. 265
This passage is remarkable partly because it is nonsensical. It was
precisely the unique properties of Mr. Moore's genetic "programs," the
fact that his virus-infected cells overproduced lymphokines, that made
his tissue and bodily fluids such an important part of Dr. Golde's
research. If the issue was one of unique value, or unusual ease of extraction, clearly Mr. Moore's cells are not like everyone else's. Both seawater and gold ore contain gold molecules. That does not stop a cubic foot
of gold ore from being more valuable than seawater containing the
equivalent amount of gold. If the issue is statistical uniqueness, again it
is exactly the unusual degree to which Mr. Moore's cells overproduced
lymphokines that made them worth fighting about. The court offers the
weak argument in support of its position that "[b]y definition, a gene
responsible for producing a protein found in more than one individual
will be the same in each.,,266 Both Steve Timmons and I can jump and
hit a volleyball. Only one of us, however, will be asked to endorse shoes,
or to play on the U.S. Olympic team. But by the court's logic, since both
Steve and I are "playing volleyball" we are both "volleyball players" and
are therefore "the same."
But the argument about uniqueness is not merely nonsensical. It is
also irrelevant to the question of whether or not Mr. Moore should be
able to sue in conversion-irrelevant that is, unless the issue is once again
being restated, whether consciously or unconsciously, in terms of the ideology of authorship.
264. Although most labor theories of property have as their most basic postulate the ownership
of one's own body. It is from this a priori naturalistic property right that labor theorists deduce the
case for one's ownership of the fruits of that body's work.
265. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 490 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1388 (1991).
266. Id. at 490 n.30.
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Thus there are two distinct reasons why Mr. Moore is arguing
against the grain of the implicit structure I have described. First, the
market has taken from him the most "private" information of all, information about his own genetic structure. Yet our intuitive notions of privacy are constructed around the notion of preventing disclosure of
intimate, embarrassing, or simply "personal" socially constructed facts
about ourselves to others like ourselves. I could stare at my own genetic
code all day and not even know it was mine. Even if I could "read"
DNA, it is hard to imagine that I would be upset by revelation of my
genetic code, or at least, that I would experience the particular complex
of anger, shame, and righteous indignation that we associate with "a violation of privacy." For example, I would be less upset if someone chose
to reveal that I carry the recessive gene for blue eyes than if they disclosed my preference in underwear-though neither is unusual or (to the
best of my knowledge) aesthetically or socially reprehensible. There is
something in the way that our culture has constructed the notion of privacy that makes it more hospitable to the protection of "social" facts
than "natural" facts.2 67 Even with the obvious borderline cases-hereditary diseases, for example-revelations are only thought to be violative of
a person's privacy when some particular social significance has been
given to the genetic coding.
The difficulty with Mr. Moore's case is that (1) no one would think
worse of him for having a genetic makeup that could be mined for a
socially valuable drug and (2) specialized knowledge would be necessary
to make the connection between the "facts revealed" by his genetic
makeup and his "inner life." One could draw the mild and reformist
conclusion that our notion of privacy, based as it is on the revelation of
intimate social facts comprehensible to a lay audience, does not adequately protect the interests of individuals in genetic information.
Second, if the thesis of this Article is correct, decisionmakers will
tend-consciously or unconsciously-to look at questions of information
through the lens of the romantic vision of authorship. The pUblicity
rights cases seem to view protected nicknames, catchphrases, fangs, and
cars as the expression of some underlying celebrity persona-the marks
of a fame that is definitionally original and presumptively the result of
267. Of course, this distinction breaks down fairly quickly. For one thing, there is no such thing
as a "theory free" description of facts, so that all "natural" facts can be seen as "social" facts if only
one picks the right definition of "society." Thus, more precisely, we could say that the ordinary
language notion of privacy protects an individual's subjectively defined "personal information" from
the gaze of the peer group that the individual has chosen to recognize.
The more the revealing party seems to profit by the information, the more we allow the
"victim" of the unwanted disclosure to define the sphere of privacy. Thus a butcher would probably
not be found to have violated George Bernard Shaw's privacy rights if he revealed in a letter to The
Times that Mr. Shaw secretly broke his vegetarian principles by eating pork pies. If, on the other
hand, the butcher demanded £100 on pain of disclosure, we call it "blackmail" and prohibit the
commodification of the information.
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hard work. These qualities sound suspiciously like the analytical structure of romantic authorship in copyright law. If Mr. Moore's claim is
not to the protection of his "privacy" tout court, but rather the protection of his ability to commodify the genetic information derived from his
cells, then the inquiry shifts from privacy to the "right of publicity,"
from the home and the secret to the market and the commodity. Once
that shift is made, we are led to ask, "Who is the real author of the
genetic information at issue here?" Reading this case, however, one gets
the sense that the court thinks that Mr. Moore has not exhibited that
mixture of arcane labor and dazzling originality that we associate with
the romantic author. This sense is deepened when the court moves on to
talk about the comparative rights of Mr. Moore and the doctors and
researchers.
C.

The Author and the Source

Having decided that Mr. Moore does not own the actual cells taken
from his own body, the court uses the University of California's patent to
trump his claim to the cell line developed by Dr. Golde and the other
researchers.
Finally, the subject matter of the Regent's patent-the patented cell line and the products derived from it-cannot be
Moore's property. This is because the patented cell line is both
factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore's
body. Federal law permits the patenting of organisms that represent the product of "human ingenuity," but not naturally occurring organisms. Human cell lines are patentable because "[l]ongterm adaptation and growth of human tissues and cells in culture
is difficult-often considered an art ... ," and the probability of
success is low. It is this inventive effort that patent law rewards,
not the discovery of naturally occurring raw materials. 268
The conceptual structure of patent law contains many of the same
oppositions as that of copyright, and in this excerpt the court deploys
them to great effect. There is something wonderful in the way that Mr.
Moore becomes a "naturally occurring raw material," whose "unoriginal" genetic material is rendered unique and valuable by the "inventive
effort," "ingenuity," and "artistry" of his doctors. If we look at this case
through the lens of the romantic author, then Mr. Moore's claim is as
ridiculous as if Huey Long had laid claim to ownership rights over All
the King's Men or the baker of madeleines to Remembrance of Things
268. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492-93 (first emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). It
should be noted that although the court can justifiably say that the themes of originality, inventive
effort, and functional use are appropriate to a discussion of patent law, these are in fact the themes
that organize the entire opinion, and not merely the section on patent law. The mention of artistrylargely irrelevant in the patent law context-further supports my thesis.
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Past. Authorship devalues sources. In its implicit application of authorship analysis to this case, the court similarly devalues sources. The fact
that this can be accomplished in the face of the strong naturalistic presumption that one owns one's own body, and in the face of the ethically
unattractive behavior of Mr. Moore's doctors, is a testament to the rhetorical power of the ideas involved.
Thus, to a greater extent than the other issues this Article discusses,
the Moore case may indicate both the contentious value judgments
loaded into the conceptual apparatus of authorship and the way that discussions of entitlement to control information are carried out through
the metaphor of "authorship," even in fields far from copyright. Seen
this way, Mr. Moore's case seems to have 'been designed to fail the
authorship test. The court thinks that his rights are already too limited
to be property, that his genetic information is too natural to be a creation, that it is neither private enough to be protected by the law of privacy nor original or creative enough to be protected by the rights of
pUblicity. Viewed through the lens of authorship, Mr. Moore's claim
appears to be a dangerous attempt to privatize the public domain and to
inhibit research.269 The scientists, however, with their transformative,
Faustian artistry, fit the model of original, creative labor. For them,
property rights are necessary to encourage research. What should we
think about this desire to cast around in every situation until we find the
people who most resemble authors, and then to confer property rights on
them?
There is one last irony in the Moore case. The California Supreme
Court does not leave Mr. Moore entirely without recourse. As I mentioned in the introduction to this Article, the court acknowledges that
doctors have a duty to disclose any financial interests they have in the
treatment of a patient. Thus, while discussing genetic information, the
court views Mr. Moore as a "naturally occurring raw material," a public
domain to be mined by inventive geniuses. Conversely, when discussing
his role as a consumer of medical services, Mr. Moore is transformed
into a sovereign individual with an unchallengeable entitlement to the
facts necessary to make informed decisions. 27o As far. as the majority is
269. There is a parallel here to Levmore's discussion of farmers who own land that,
unbeknownst to them, contains valuable mineral deposits. If a mineral company seeks to buy the
land, should it be able to respond dishonestly to the farmer's inquiry about possible mineral deposits?
Levmore is convinced the answer is yes: in fact he calls it "optimal dishonesty" and says that the
farmer's behavior in attempting to find out the full value of his land is "despicable" because he has
no intention of mining the land himself. Levmore, supra note 55, at 137-42.
270. This part of the decision spawns a whole new set of puzzles. What will be the measure of
damages for the violation of this legally protected interest? Are damages to be decided with no
reference to the value of the drugs or cell lines produced from the patient who has failed to give
consent? What if the doctor believes that the patient will not give his or her consent to such
research, but also believes that the patient's cells are likely to be invaluable in developing a hugely
profitable drug? In that situation, a rational doctor in a position like that of Doctor Golde will
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concerned, Mr. Moore is the author of his own destiny, but not of his
spleen.
X
CONCLUSION

A.

"Typing" Information Issues

There are a number of reasons that one might classify the kinds of
issues I have discussed here under the heading "information." One
might believe that one had a master theory-a single set of principles
capable of resolving all significant conflicts, or simply a single set of functional goals to be rescued from messy doctrinal particularity. For example, as discussed earlier, Judge Easterbrook was concerned that putting
information cases in traditional legal pigeonholes would cause the Court
to "overlook the need to consider the way in which the incentive to produce information and the demands of current use confliCt.,,271 My aim
here was rather different.
First of all, I had a descriptive and analytic goal. I wished to attack
from a different angle a series of problems that have puzzled scholars and
frustrated courts. The conventional way of addressing these issues is a
particularistic one. The legal system commodifies, refuses to commodify,
or makes illegal the commodification of certain kinds of information.
Scholars then take each issue on its own merits. They ask, "Why is
blackmail illegal?" or, "Why does the state forbid insider trading?" or
even, "Why does copyright doctrine extend protection to expression but
deny it to ideas?" Instead, I asked a series of questions about the roles
that information is expected to play in the institutions of a liberal statein the family, in the market, and in the world of politics and public
debate. My aim was to remain faithful to the subtlety and complexity of
the material by dealing with each issue in some detail. If I had to abandon that goal temporarily in order to summarize my conclusions here, I
would say that the ideology of a liberal society presents different reified
visions of information-as the lifeblood of the disinterested debate in the
public world, as the instantaneous omniscience of the actors in the perfect market, as that which must be commodified if we are to encourage
more information to be produced, as that potential public manifestation
of themselves that individuals must be able to control if we are to protect
the cozy world of the home, the family, and the persona. And so on, and
so on.
Most analysts start by assuming a certain level of deductive rationaldecide not to infonn, will pay the damages for breach of the duty to disclose or for battery and will
still come out ahead. The obvious way to avoid undennining the patient's sovereign power of
decision would be to base the damages in part on the patient's proportional contribution to the
profitable drug. But how different is that from a "property" right?
271. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 314.
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ity in the construction of our social institutions. 272 They assume that
there really is some logical reason that blackmail should be prohibited.
After all, most of us feel so strongly that blackmail is "wrong" that it is
easy to imagine that a little further reflection and a better set of analytical
tools will uncover the principle that distinguishes the blackmail demand
from the rent bill, or from the baseball stadium's negotiation with its host
city. Alternatively, analysts critique the current position-but again,
they assume the deductive rationality of the institutions they analyze.
Thus, the critics of insider trading regulation seem puzzled by the fact
that legislative history, scholarly analysis, and judicial exposition offer no
rationale for prohibiting a practice that, when described in abstract
terms, seems to them entirely compatible with the norms of a free market
society. In the place of this fuzzy thinking, they offer economic analyses
of secrecy, justifications of "optimal dishonesty," and models of the efficient capital market, confident that their prescriptions are not marred by
the flaws of the ideas they criticize.
In my view, blackmail is illegal because we have a vision of "privateness" that is constructed in part around the control of information 273_
as opposed to, say, wealth, health care, or housing. 274 We "romanti272. For a discussion of the relevance of the assumption that social institutions are subject to
critique by reason, and an analysis of the conservative objections to such an idea, see James Boyle, A
Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modem Conservatism. 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 263, 299-314
(1991).
273. See. e.g.• Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.s. 589, 599-600 (1977) (defining privacy in terms of "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and ... the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions") (footnotes omitted). This definition of privacy focuses
on retention and control of information to protect the person and the life plan. One interpretation of
this idea is that information is the only resource or form of wealth the need for which can be
convincingly derived from the liberal theory of personhood. This may be one reason that state laws
regulating abortion that incorporate theories of when life begins can be disturbing. See. e.g.•
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1989) (refusing to consider the
constitutionality of the preamble to Missouri's abortion law where the theory of life contained
therein was not used to justify regulation of abortion). For an interesting analysis of information
rights in light of current Supreme Court doctrine, see Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The
Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy. 71 B.U. L. REv. 133 (1991).
274. An inexact analogy may help to demonstrate the profoundly contingent, socially
constructed nature of our notion of "public sphere" and "privacy." Imagine a society In which
everyone lived in communal dormitories with socialized childrearing, limited taboos about public
displays of sexual behavior, and so on. Imagine also that universal access to excellent health care
was seen as a defining. essential quality of the society. Then imagine a person in that society who
offered permanently to give up her right to health care, in return for some release from communal
obligations. Such a transaction might well be seen as no more legitimate than an attempt by a citizen
in this society permanently to renounce her vote or her right to counsel, perhaps even to sell herself
into slavery. Such a transaction might seem to violate the "logic" of the public sphere. Conversely,
imagine the way that "privacy" would be seen in such a society. Certainly, an individual whose
neighbor in the dormitory threatened to reveal some unpleasant fact would be unhappy, but would
that society necessarily have thought "control of information about oneself" to be an important
principle of social organization, as opposed to, say, "policing those who shirk their social duties"?
My point is not that certain forms of social organization necessarily produce certain principled
normative concerns. Rather, a process by which we imagine changes in fundamental aspects of our
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cize"27S a notion of subjective control of private information, refusing to
allow the information to be commodified. The best analogy to blackmail,
then, is not monopoly or monopsony, but something like the "wrongful
birth" cases in which many courts refuse to recognize the costs of raising
a child as "damage" flowing from a negligently conducted sterilization
operation. In both cases, we make a pretheoretical judgment that an
activity is "private," and only then do we "deduce" that it must be kept
from the ruthless, instrumental logic of the market.
Insider trading is another situation in which someone trades from a
superior position in nonpublic information. This is not just any information, but information of great value. In blackmail, we pigeonholed the
issue into the "private" world of information about home and family. In
insider trading, on the other hand, we label the issue as "public," subject
to the norms of equality rather than the norms of the market, precisely
because it is material information and not some other form of wealth or
power. Hence, there is a strand in the cases and in the scholarly writings
that applies the norm of equality to all regular dealings in material nonpublic information. But there is also a strong vision that information
should be traded just like every other commodity-a vision that would
deny the special public status of information. Thus, there is an equally
strong-perhaps now, a stronger-tendency to see insider trading in
terms not of formal public equality, but rather in terms of private misappropriation and theft.
The disagreements in courtrooms and scholarly journals about the
proper characterization of insider trading help to point out the limits of
my argument. The typing I am describing is neither so deeply rooted in
the culture that it can never be criticized nor so determinate that it dictates only one solution. At most, I am trying to layout the structure
within which issues are now framed, possibilities foreclosed, and so on.
The structure matters, because it excludes some options from consideration (excludes them even from being seen, perhaps), or prompts a hasty
leap to judgment, or because it is one of the many forces shaping the
terrain of political struggle. But the process of typing is neither a giant
conspiracy nor a deterministic and inevitable deep structure of thought.
Finally, let me say that this process of typing information issues as
public or private276 is not "irrational," in the derogatory sense of that
social life reveals the contingency of our own beliefs. In fact, the relationship of social form to
normative structure is highly contingent-perhaps a dormitory-based social system would be more
concerned with privacy than we are-but this contingency is concealed precisely by the fact that
members of any given society share a basic normative structure.
275. I use the word to mean that as a society we project onto an institution or set of actions an
emotional and intellectual charge-in this case a positive one-and that we then perceive that charge
as already being contained within the romanticized object. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1980); Boyle, supra note 9.
276. And typing them into the conflicting ideas about what public and private mean.
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term. There are, to be sure, reasons why we think. the control of information about ourselves is fundamental to the preservation of the self. There
are reasons why a right to control private information will command
more support in this society than a right to control some other critical
resource-food, for example. There are reasons why the claim that "everyone should trade from a position of roughly equal information" seems
merely "fair," whereas "everyone should trade from a position of
roughly equal wealth" seems like socialism. Those reasons are a complex
of ideology, anthropology, history, New Deal institutions, class interest,
noble ideal, Enlightenment epistemology, and so on. It would take a better philosopher than I to lay them out fully, and one with more hubris to
believe that exactly the correct mix could be identified. But it is in the
process these "reasons" explain-the process of "typing" information
issues that I have described in this Article-more than in the language of
microeconomics or Rawlsian rights theory that we find answers to the
question, "Why are insider trading and blackmail illegal?"
I would also draw another, modestly realist, conclusion from this
process and the conflicting stereotypes about information on which it
relies. During the process of typing issues as public or private, analogies
and metaphors playa vital role. In some cases, however, we become the
prisoners of our metaphors. While this observation has a long and distinguished history in other areas of legal doctrine,277 the information field
has been curiously immune to it.
In the area of electronic information services, the Prodigy case is a
particularly good illustration. 278 Prodigy has been defending itself from
charges that its electronic bulletin boards censored notices critical of
Prodigy and did not censor anti-Semitic speech. The ACLU wanted
neither form of restriction; B'nai Brith wanted only the latter. An article
from Network World offers a series of classic "public and private" characterizations, shored up by metaphors that refer back to the information
technology of yesteryear.
Prodigy's bulletin board editing policies are, in essence, electronic
publications, the spokesman added. He said Prodigy has the right
to edit or delete material, just as newspapers have a right not to
print letters to the editor.
Jerry Berman, director of the American Civil Liberties
Union's Information Technology Project in Washington, D.C.,
said the ACLU agrees with Prodigy's assertion that it has the
277. Cohen, supra note 12.
278. See Barnaby J. Feder, Computer Concern Assailed on Anti-Semitic Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 1991, at A21; Barnaby J. Feder, Computer Speech-Also Free, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3D, 1991, at
A24; Barnaby J. Feder, Toward Defining Free Speech in the Computer Age, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1991, § 4, at 5; Michael W. Miller, Prodigy Computer Network Bans Bias Notes/rom Bulletin Board,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1991, at B1, B6.
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right to edit public bulletin board systems. But he said a Prodigy
policy limiting the types of private electronic messages users can
send is a gray area.
Some new Prodigy rules prohibit users from sending unsolicited messages protesting pricing policies to the Prodigy
advertisers. . . .
Berman said these restrictions may be justified because
Prodigy is a private service, but they could also be seen as an
unjustifiable restraint of free speech.279
The metaphors are contested, of course. Organizations such as
Electronic Frontier compare electronic bulletin boards to public parks. 280
In another article, Berman drew on the shopping mall cases to suggest
that "[t]he courts may some day hold that electronic shopping networks
like Prodigy are the public forums of the 21st century.,,281 The process
by which bulletin boards are analogized to shopping malls, which in the
past had been analogized to the Roman forum, is a fascinating one.
Berman then suggests that Congress should regulate electronic mail
under "common carrier principles.,,282
The tropes change as the context changes. In libel cases, for example, courts have analogized electronic information services to bookshops
or for-profit libraries,283 rather than to newspapers that publish libelous
information. The difficulty comes when the analogy alone seems to
decide the issue.
"There is some debate in legal circles on the extent to which
videotext service providers must screen publicly posted
messages," said Benjamin Wright, a lawyer in Dallas who specializes in electronic communications law. "If the law sees the provider as more like a newspaper, then the duty to screen is higher.
But if the law sees the provider as more like a telephone company,
a communications common carrier, then the duty is lower.,,284
Parks? The U.S. Mails? Federal Express? A telephone company?
Community newspaper? Regulated television station? Common carrier?
Who is to say? There are advantages-in familiarity, evocativeness and
tradition-to this particular kind of analogical reasoning. Nevertheless,
279. Barton Crockett, DA Probes BBS Practices at Prodigy. NETWORK WORLD, Apr. IS, 1991,
at 4.
280. See infra note 305.
281. Jerry Berman & Marc Rotenberg, Forum: Free Speech in an Electronic Age. N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1991, § 3, at 13.
282. Id.
283. "CompuServe's CIS product is in essence an electronic, for-profit library that carries a vast
number of publications and collects usage and membership fees from its subscribers in return for
access to the publications." Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
284. Peter H. Lewis, The Executive Computer: On Electronic Bulletin Boards. What Rights Are
at Stake? N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23. 1990. § 3, at 8.
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it is hard to repress an occasional wish to frame the issue as whether a
specific type of regulation will help or hinder the kind of society that we
wish to create,285 rather than filtering it through an additional layer of
simile and metaphor. The difference in the two methods is not the difference between rational analysis and figurative speech286--our vision of the
good society is, of necessity, an analogical one too. Still, it would be
unfortunate if we decided how to regulate the most important technologies of the next century based mainly on their formal resemblances to the
physical environs or commercial settings in which the public information
of the nineteenth century found its home.

B. The Search for an Author
The second goal of this Article was more complicated. Recognizing
the existence of contradictory pictures of information and. the role of the
public/private distinction in information issues is only the beginning of
the project. At the end of my description of the conceptual elements of
information issues-property, the public/private distinction, and information economics-I outlined the ideological and practical prerequisites
for the law of intellectual property. Our assumptions about state, market, family, and information present a task for the law of information.
Given these assumptions, intellectual property law, and the law of information in general, must appear to reconcile a series of apparently incompatible demands if it is to appear credible.
It must provide a conceptual apparatus that appears to mediate
the various tensions associated with the role of information in liberal society. Thus, for example, it must explain why a person who
recombines information from the public sphere is not merely
engaging in the private appropriation of public wealth. It must
explain how we can motivate individuals, who are sometimes postulated to be essentially self-serving and sometimes to be noble,
idealistic souls, to produce information. If the answer is "by giving them property rights," it must also explain why this will not
285. The best summation of the Prodigy debate itself may have come at the end of a Boston
G/obe article:
Industry analyst Gary Arlen has a different view. What may have happened, he says,
is that Prodigy unwittingly attracted people looking for a real communications network
instead of consumers eager to spend money in an electronic shopping maIl.
Citing a computer magazine editorial, he says, "Prodigy's message to its subscribers
seems to be 'Shut up and shop.' "
Chris Reidy, Computer Flap: Is Speech Free on Prodigy?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 1991, at 35.
286. This is one of my disagreements with the economic analysts of information issues.
Easterbrook, for example, believes that the problem with intellectual property issues is that abstract
(and I would say, metaphoric) terms conceal from the court the real functional requisites of the
information market. Yet to engage in economic analysis is (at least as Judge Easterbrook does it) to
abstract certain aspects of a complex social situation, whether of blackmailing, baby-seIling, bookwriting or boat-covering-and to declare that this is really a market. And that, of course, is a
metaphoric, analogical process.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1526

[Vol. 80:1413

diminish the common pool or public domain so greatly that a net
decrease in the production of information will result. (Think of
overfishing.) It must carve out a sphere of privacy and at the
same time ensure a vigorous sphere of public debate and ample
information about a potentially oppressive state. It must do all of
this within a vision of justice that expects formal equality within
the public sphere, but respects existing disparities in wealth, status, and power in the private. And all of these things must be
accomplished while using a conception of property that avoids the
theoretical impossibilities of the physicalist, absolutist conception,
but that at the same time is not too obviously relativistic, partial,
and utilitarian,287
The constellation of ideas that seems most successfully to reduce the
salience of these tensions in copyright law is the figure of the romantic
author, the associated theme of originality, and the conceptual distinction
between idea and expression. This triad manages to make it seem that
intellectual property rights are more than just a utilitarian grant by the
state; to limit the ambit of something that sounds very much like a labor
theory of property rights; and to divide the author's creation so that the
idea goes into the world of public exchange, while the expression remains
the author's. In explaining the history of this constellation of ideas, I
tried to show that the idea of authorship is socially constructed and histori~ally contingent. In particular, the romantic vision of authorship
plays down the importance of external sources by emphasizing the
unique genius of the author and the originality of the work. This
"author gambit" is so attractive that it is found far beyond conventional
intellectual property law, a fact of no small importance.
The current trend seems to be to assume that economics is the most
appropriate theoretical language in which to discuss questions about the
regulation of information. But the tum to microeconomics does not rob
the idea of romantic authorship of all significance. In my discussion of
information economics, I tried to show that economic analysis of information questions is paradoxical or at least aporetic. I suggested that
these problems could be traced to the fact that perfect information is a
defining conceptual element of the analytical structure used to analyze
markets driven by the absence of information, in which imperfect information itself is a commodity. The implication was that informationally
efficient markets are not merely difficult to achieve, but impossible.
The paradoxes of information in liberal state theory reappear in
microeconomics. Economists analyze some information from the "commodity" side and other information from the "perfect information" side,
but they can neither produce a theoretical metaprinciple that justifies
287.

Supra pp. 1460-61.
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their shifts nor completely purge the disfavored aspect from their analysis. It seems perfectly possible to invert the hierarchies, so that one could
analyze the free availability of futures market prices as a public goods
problem, or copyright as an intolerable transaction cost.
The most obvious manifestation of this basic indeterminacy is the
difficulty that economists have in theorizing about the amount of information that will be produced in an "unregulated" market. Will it be too
much or too little? Many economists say that information is a classic
public good, apparently taking as a theoretical a priori about public
goods problems the assumption that too little of the good will be produced. Yet some economists think that the absence of property rights
will lead to the production of too much information. Thus, the use of
some general body of "public goods theory" to analyze information
issues seems impossible.288 Each information issue needs to be examined
on its own, in a particularistic, highly empirical way-a style not often
found in the current literature. In the absence of such particular, empirical data, and some convincing theoretical grounding, economics offers
little more than a partial checklist of issues and tradeoffs. And that is
where the author comes in again. In a strange mixture of Wordsworth
and Coase, Byron and Stigler, the values of romantic authorship seem to
seep-consciously or unconsciously-into economic analysis. And
because in most conflicts the paradigm of authorship tends to fit one side
better than the other, this romantic grounding provides economic analysis with at least the illusion of certainty. Authors tend to win.
In Parts VIII and IX, I claimed that both scholars and courts have
288. Professor Steven Shavell suggests to me that when professional economists talk about
"public goods" they do not mean that there is a general category of goods that share the same
economic characteristics, manifest the same dysfunctions, and thus benefit from similar corrective
solutions. Most economists, he argues, would agree that there is no such thing as "public goods"merely an infinite series of particular problems (some of overproduction, some of underproduction,
and so on), each with a particular solution that cannot be deduced from the theory but that instead
would depend on local empirical factors. If this is what economists think, I would be happy to
agree. Certainly, lawyer-economists often seem to have more expansive ideas. See Landes & Posner,
supra note 22, at 326 ("A distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its 'public good'
aspect."); see also Demsetz, supra note 28; Easterbrook, supra note 1; Kitch, supra note 1.
Mainstream economics texts and articles also make more general claims. JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968); Paul A. Samuelson, Contrast Between
Welfare Conditions/or Joint Supply and/or Public Goods, 51 REv. EcON. & STAT. 26 (1969); Earl
A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production a/Collective Goods, 50 REV. EcON. & STAT. I
(1968). This seems to be true of economists of all political opinions and theoretical types. DAVID
HEMENWAY, PRICES AND CHOICES: MICROECONOMIC VIGNETTES (1977); Perelman, supra note
94. Finally, detailed articles by economists often make the same mistakes that one would expect of
someone working with a reified and overly general "public good" vision of information. Arrow,
supra note 94. Nevertheless, there are articles putting forward ideas consistent with Shavell's point
of view, e.g., Hirshleifer, supra note 69, although it is noticeable that these articles generally adopt
the tone of a protestant dissenter, rather than that of normal science. In the end, my conclusion has
to be that Professor Shavell is committing the entirely laudable error of being too kind to his
colleagues.
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wide recourse to the author gambit. In the Moore case, the court found,
like Krause,289 that Mr. Moore's claims raise concerns about the limitation and justification of property and the nature of privacy. Eventually,
it is the celebration of original, creative, artistic modification of naturally
existing raw material and the need to motivate society's creators that
justify giving property rights to the doctors but not to Mr. Moore. 29o
Even the right-of-publicity cases seem to reflect this body of ideas,
allowing the commodification of the "expressions" of a unique celebrity
persona. In both areas, those who do not look like authors find that their
property claims are rejected. Mr. Moore presents us with a powerful
picture of the unfortunate consequences that can ensue if the court
decides you are part of the public domain. Ed McMahon, the World's
Foremost Commodian, and the manufacturers of Crazylegs depilatory
cream may present less compelling claims to our sympathy, but they all
suffer some significant consequence in part because they do not fit the
author paradigm.
In Part VIII, the relevance of the romantic author to economic and
utilitarian analysis becomes clearer still. As an example I used the original defense of insider trading by Henry Manne. Manne admits that his
economic analysis of insider trading provides no strong reasons to legalize the practice. Again, it is a figure akin to the romantic author who
provides the outcome-determinacy the analysis otherwise lacks. Drawing on Schumpeter's theory of economic development, Manne conjures
up a romanticized vision of the entrepreneur/innovator as the creator
and destroyer of settled arrangements. Manne, with the aid of a few category errors, declares that profits from insider trading will function as
the entrepreneur's reward-temporary monopoly rents that lie at the
heart of capitalism. The parallel to copyright and patent is striking.
In the other writing on insider trading and on the right to withhold
valuable information, echoes of the author appear again and again.
Professor Levmore's article on insider trading and contract law styles as
"contemptible" the farmer who "to preserve a fraud claim, asks specific
questions about activities he would otherwise never engage in" and advocates his own proposed doctrine as a way "to deny a windfall to a passive
party when to do otherwise might lead to a net societalloss."291
289. See Krause, supra note 118.
290. In other words, the argument on behalf of the doctors that we must secure for producers
the fruits of their labors in order to encourage research has an equal and opposite counterpart. The
opposing argument identifies Mr. Moore as a co-producer in terms of dessert and argues that unless
individuals are rewarded for allowing their genetic material to be used for research, too little genetic
material will be made available to researchers. The California Supreme Court avoids, suppresses, or
counters this argument by appealing to its audience's reverence for the original, creative laborer who
transforms the environment, and whose property rights are appropriately limited by their very
function. The ideal of authorship first identifies the researchers as the relevant parties and then
justifies their property rights.
291. Levmore, supra note 55, at 142.
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The judgmental moralism and the preference for the active,
dynamic, exploring mineral company rather than for the "contemptible,"
"passive" farmer are not required by the economic analysis. Indeed, one
could paint a perfectly respectable series of economic vignettes in which
the absence of a right to expect disclosure held up transactions and
encouraged strategic behavior on the part of farmers who could never
rely on the representations of buyers of their land. Instead, the choice to
start the analysis from a preference for the "active," inventive party
seems to represent the same romanticization of the innovating, transforming author figure. If one starts from this perspective, then the
farmer, like the baker of Proust's madeleines or Mr. Moore, has no
moral right to the profits the innovator makes from the new object--even
though that object was created from raw material supplied by the hapless
source. Whatever coating of economics is subsequently put over this
pretheoretical orientation, the outcome derives from the initially hidden,
and probably unconscious, moment of romance. Judge Easterbrook's
arguments about the division of labor seem to be marked by a similar
pretheoretical preference for Faust and the individual creator, rather
than for Job and the public domain.
I am certainly not saying that authors are bad, or claiming that we
never need to give property rights to the creators of information in order
to encourage further production. The protection and exaltation of
authorship is a compelling and attractive idea. The need to reward producers in order to encourage continued production is a real concern,
although, of course, the question of just who is a "producer" continues to
be a problem. Just as the typing of information issues into public and
private may produce felicitous and attractive results, the concern with
the motivation of authors may, in any individual case, be exactly what is
needed. But I stress the "may." Of the examples I gave above, Proust's
baker may have no claim to our heartstrings or our utilitarian goals,
while the farmer and Mr. Moore may have considerably more. Yet to
the extent that we decide information issues by forcing them into a
Procrustean concept of authorship, we risk a tendency to ignore the
countervailing moral and utilitarian concerns. This risk arises not
because we reject these concerns, but because the veil of authorship
obscures them. Consider the following.
Centuries of cultivation by third world farmers produce wheat and
rice strains with valuable qualities-in the resistance to disease, or in the
ability to give good yields at high altitudes. The biologists, agronomists,
and genetic engineers of a western chemical company take samples of
these strains, engineer them a little to add a greater resistance to fungus
or a thinner husk. The chemical company's scientists fit the paradigm of
authorship. The farmers are everything that authors should not be: their
contribution comes from a community rather than an individual, tradi-
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tion rather than an innovation, evolution rather than transformation.
Guess who gets the intellectual property right? Next year, the farmers
may need a license to resow the grain from their crops. Calling this practice "the great seed ripoff," Representative John Porter actually introduced a resolution into Congress that would have called for the United
States not to proceed with intellectual property negotiations under the
GATT until there has been a study on "protecting the rights of those in
the Third World."292 A news article on the resolution immediately follows this observation by offering a view of this issue from the other side,
that is to say, from within the author-centered view of intellectual property: "The 'industrial world' view on the issue is that poor countries
pirate drug recipes or high-yield seeds, violating the patent laws of industrial countries to avoid paying royalties on the order of $3 billion a year
to U.S., Japanese and European firmS.,,293
Other examples abound. Shamans from the Amazon basin often
have generations of lore about the properties of herbs and flowers. Some
of the these plants are placebos; others are extremely valuable. 294 Drug
companies have found that if they test the plants from the shamans'
"black bag," they yield a high percentage of valuable drugs.
While skeptics may argue that the lore of native healers is
mere superstition, the ethnobotanists see shamanic knowledge as
the result of a trial-and-error process refined over thousands of
years. Ethnobotanists hope to take a scientific short cut to discovering new uses for the tens of thousands of plants with which
native peoples are intimately familiar. 295
One of the most fascinating experiments reported by the New York Times
involved the AIDS virus. In test tube trials, "[o]fthe 20 plants collected
on the shaman's advice, five killed the AIDS virus but spared the T cells.
But of 18 plant species gathered randomly, just one did SO.,,296 There is,
of course, no guarantee that any of these plants would be suitable for
human consumption, but they are now being tested.
A more widely publicized example concerns vinca alkaloids from
the rosy periwinkle-a plant that is native to Madagascar. The plant was
used indigenously to treat diabetes. It was investigated by the Lilly company and forms the basis of a compound now used in chemotherapy
treatment. 297 According to the British newspaper The Independent, the
292. David Judson, Lawmaker Urges u.s. to Come Clean on "Seed Ripoffs. " GANNElT NEWS
SERVICE, July 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
293. ld.
294. Daniel Goleman, Shamans and Their Lore May Vanish with Forests. N.Y. TIMES, June II,
1991, at CI.
295. ld.
296. ld.
297. The example is actually a more complex one. When tested as a drug to ameliorate the
symptoms of diabetes, the alkaloids derived from the periwinkle did not perform well. Subsequent
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plant "has yielded a drug to cure Hodgkin's disease and a trade in the
drug worth $100m a year.,,298 The article goes on to quote the World
Wide Fund for Nature to the effect that "[i]f Madagascar had received a
significant part of this income, it would have been one of the country's
largest (if not the largest) single sources of income.,,299 In the days of
recombinant DNA techniques, genetic information may be one of the
largest resources of the developing countries. "Madagascar is the unique
home of perhaps 5 per cent of the world's species. It is the biological
equivalent of an Arab oil sheikhdom. Yet, without an income from its
huge biological wealth, it has chopped down most of its forests to feed its
people.,,3°O Now there's a place to deploy our economic analyses of public goods, free riders, and the tragedy of the commons. Precisely because
they can find no place in a legal regime constructed around a vision of
individual, transformative, original genius, the indigenous peoples are
driven to deforestation, or slash-and-burn farming. Who knows what
other unique and potentially valuable plants disappear with the forest,
what generations of pharmacological experience disappear as the indigenous culture is destroyed. In both cases, a large part of the problem is
that indigenous peoples share in none of the profits of development.
While it is always possible that huge profits could destroy the culture just
as effectively as penury, the decision to impose the author vision without
acknowledging, or even understanding, its implications is also the decision to ignore these problems.
These facts have not gone completely unnoticed. Environmental
groups and groups devoted to the preservation of indigenous peoples
have criticized the way that tribal lore and biological largesse find no
place in the language of intellectual property. Dr. Jason Gray, Director
of Cultural Survival, put the position simply:
"It's a question of intellectual property rights. People whose
medical lore leads to a useful product should have a stake in the
. profits. Unless we return some profits to them, it's a kind of theft.
We have to figure out ways to make the rain forests pay for themselves, so these peoples can continue to exist."301
This "colonial" form of intellectual property has been around for
hundreds of years. In 1800 the Makushi Indians showed explorers the
plant from which they extracted curare for their arrowheads. Western
chemists found that curare was an excellent muscle relaxant. It is still
testing showed that the drug had other, equally valuable uses. How, then, should we value the
contribution of Madagascar's flora and indigenous medical lore? At zero? If we do, how are we to
avoid the public goods problems, or tragedy of the commons problems that I discuss below?
298. Fred Pearce, Science and Technology: Bargaining/or the Life o/the Forest, INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 17, 1991, at 37.
299. ld.
300. ld.
301. Goleman, supra note 294, at C6.
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being used to this day. According to Dr. Mark Plotkin of Conservation
International, "The Makushis never received any compensation for the
discovery of a product worth millions."302
In the future, plans to set up data banks on the genetic resources of
tropical rain forests raise concerns that companies will no longer have
any incentive either to preserve the forest or to reward its inhabitants for
the use of their lore. Precisely because of our increasing ability to record
genetic information as information, the connection of that information to
its natural habitat will become less necessary. Conrad Gorinsky, a
Guyanan biologist working in Britain,
calls the current plans "bunker biology," because they ignore the
traditional tribal knowledge that is the fount of our wisdom. He
fears that the [proposed treaty on genetic sovereignty] could act
as an incentive for companies to loot the biological riches of the
rain forests over a few years, secreting the results in their laboratories and gene banks. A gene in the lab, they will argue, is worth
two in the bush. But once the riches are taken, who will save the
rain forest then?303
A patent lawyer or an economist could argue that we cannot criticize intellectual property regimes for failing to maintain the genetic
diversity of the biomass (or whatever). Perhaps that is true, although it
seems highly problematic to me. But even if we close our eyes to the
distributional, environmental, and other "subsidiary" effects of our intellectual property regimes, even if we analyze those regimes solely on their
ability to maintain and increase the production of information, we find
that, for the reasons developed in this Article, they are unlikely to
achieve that very restricted goal. An author-focused regime that makes
the contributions of sources "invisible" is unlikely to reward those contributions-even when an economic analysis might show this to be desirable. Sources may become a "commons" whose exploitation is justified
or obscured by an author theory, leading to predictably tragic resultscutting down the genetic miracle of a rain forest to grow subsistence
crops, for example. The result may be a reduced flow of genetic material
to laboratories and a consequent reduction in research and innovation.
The same general analysis can be applied to restrictive decisions about
the fair use exception in copyright,304 to the application of patent law to
computer programming tricks worked out long ago by hackers,305 and
302. [d.
303. Pearce, supra note 298.
304. The Kinko's decision, for example. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.• 758 F.
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The restriction of the doctrine of fair use may seem initially to go the
other way. In one sense. a restricted fair use exception will guarantee a higher level of payment to
"sources." The difference, of course, is that you only benefit from the restriction of fair use if the
legal system already classifies you as an author.
305. Some computer scientists and software developers have been resolutely opposed to the
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even to the willing participation of subjects in genetic research programs.
It is not only "sources" that tend to suffer from the blindnesses of
the authorial vision. Audiences suffer too-even as they sometimes benefit from the incentive mandated by the authorial vision. As I pointed out
in the discussion of the conflicting roles of information, copyright scholars have recently begun to comment critically about the tensions between
their discipline and the ideals of the First Amendment. They are right to
do so. Whether the issue is access to electronic information, the photocopying of materials for classroom use, the quoting and paraphrasing of
passages from an ex-president's biography, or the general issue of the
privatization of the public domain, author-talk often presumes the very
relationship between the incentives of property rights and the availability
of information that it must prove. The opposing positions of the United
States and the Third World on the intellectual property provisions
debated during the Uruguay Round of negotiation on the GATT show
the implications that these presumptions have for international development as well as for domestic debate. 306 Less obvious, but no less important, are the effects that the regime of intellectual property will have on
the international audience for literary work, political debate, or scientific
exchange.
My point here is a simple one. Much of the current case law and
scholarly literature gives the impression that if we wished to consider
issues of distributive justice, international development, or citizen interest in a thriving public domain, we would have to give up a rigorous
analytical system that carefully balances incentives for production
against the needs of current use. From my perspective, nothing could be
further from the truth. The current analysis is massively indeterminate
at every stage. It is based on claims for which there is inadequate empirical evidence. It relies on an aporetic set of economic ideas in which most
issues could convincingly be portrayed either as a public goods problem
requiring commodification or as a monopolyItransaction cost problem
requiring competition and the free flow of ideas. As a system, it is held
application of intellectual property to information technology. One of the developers of the Lotus
program, Mitch Kapor, has been a powerful critic of the effects of intellectual property on the
"electronic frontier," founding a group by that name to counter the orthodox wisdom about the
necessity of property rights to encourage development. Richard Stallman, an MIT computer
scientist, has founded a group called the "League for Programming Freedom" specifically to
challenge what he sees as the inhibiting effects of commodification on both the development of new
technology and the dispersal of market power over information technology. Finally, an
underground group called "Nu Prometheus" has dedicated itself to stealing and revealing the
"source codes" for single supplier CPU's such as the MacIntosh as a way to encourage other
suppliers to compete with Apple. The idea of theft in the service of competition is a perfect example
of the contlicts I describe in this Article.
306. See, e.g., Clyde H. Farnsworth, u.s. Warns on Global Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1988, at DI ("Brazil opposes stronger protection for intellectual property and freer trade in
services-two major American objectives."). See generally Eric Wolfhard, International Trade in
Intellectual Property: The Emerging GATT Regime, 49 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 106 (1991).
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together by definitional fiat, despite the fact that the definitions of "idea,"
"expression," "parody," "originality," "fact work," "fair use," "nonobviousness," and "natural law" merely reproduce the very tensions they
were designed to resolve. Finally, the system is both grounded on and
imbued with an ahistorical and romanticized vision of authorial creation:
it takes as universal premise that which should be its occasional
conclusion.
Admittedly, there are a number of things the authorship vision does
well. It conceals the indeterminacy of much of the utilitarian analysis.
More positively, the concerns it stresses are real ones. Authors and
inventors often do need to be encouraged, protected, lauded, and
rewarded. The romantic vision of authorship offers an attractive idea of
creative labor-transcending market norms, incorporating both work
and play, and entailing a world in which workers have a real connection
to and control over the fruits of their labors. This is a vision that we
might want to expand far beyond the limited realm of property in information. As currently constructed however, intellectual property in particular and information issues in general seem to be in the thrall of an
idea that is taken as truth where it should be questioned as dogma.
C.

The Future

In this Article, I have assumed that we are moving towards a society
more centrally concerned with the production, manipulation, and use of
information. As assumptions go, this seems to be a reasonable one.
Obviously, any judgment about the best way to analyze information
issues will depend in part on the fears (and hopes) we have about this
process. Classical liberalism lays great stress on the dangers posed by a
runaway state, and so liberalism as a political doctrine has much to say
about the best means for the restraint of state power. What fears do we
have about information and the much heralded information age? From
here it is hard to tell what the future holds, or what kind of ideas and
cultural traditions will be of use. Inevitably we rely on historical analogies to grasp the situation, and just as inevitably, the analogies mislead as
well as enlighten. In an information world, what would be the equivalent
of Hegel's and Weber's analyses of the pUblic/private split, Marx's labor
theory of value, or Pigou's analysis of externalities? Here are three possibilities that draw on the ideas developed in this Article.
1.

Information Class

My concern in this Article has been with ideas and lines of thought
that tend to be suppressed by the current way of thinking about information and society. This is a familiar intellectual exercise. Writing about
the industrial revolution and the transformation of capitalism, Marx
turned the rhetoric of private property and entrepreneurialism on its
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head, arguing that wealth was socially produced but privately appropriated. According to Marx, law, ideology, religion, and philosophy all
operated to obscure this "skimming off" of surplus value. In place of a
market theory of value and the confused positivist/natural right theory
of property of his time, he offered a labor theory of value, transforming
workers from "another factor of production" into "the real producers of
value."307
One danger that might be dimly prefigured in this Article is that we
are moving towards a new, highly stratified class system-a world
broadly divided between manipulators of information and "sources." In
a society where one group compiles, modifies, redesigns, and commodifies information gleaned in part from the genes, consumption patterns,
and culture of the rest of the population, the rhetoric of justification and
entitlement bids fair to be based on author-talk. Just as the market/natural right vision of property could be used to claim that workers were
receiving exactly the proportion of social wealth to which they were entitled, so the authorship vision can be used-both rhetorically and theoretically-to obscure, undervalue, or simply ignore the contributions of
"sources." Precisely because author-talk is genuinely attractive, because
it does express desirable moral and utilitarian ideas, its power is likely to
be all the greater. How does one break the grip of a rhetoric of entitlement that systematically obscures and undervalues the contributions of
one part of the popUlation and magnifies those of another part of the
population? One method is to propose an alternative rhetoric of entitlement. For Marx, the labor theory of value was the true theory, rather
than a way of thinking that helped to expose the partiality and contentious quality of the settled arrangements of his society. By contrast, the
argument in this Article merely aspires to show the suppressed side of
information and intellectual property, not to dethrone the author and
crown the source instead.
The examples here ranged from the Moore case to insider trading,
from copyright doctrine to indigenous medical lore in the Amazon and
the tragedy of the commons in the forests of Madagascar. Using them, I
argued that for complex reasons relating to the ideology of public and
private spheres in a liberal society, the regime of intellectual property is
built around a particular romanticized conception of authorship. I
argued that this regime often has the effect of devaluing sources and that,
even within the conventional language of policy analysis, such a devaluation seems sometimes to have very bad consequences. (Sometimes it has
very good ones-but more by accident than by design.) This, surely, is
307. This is not to say that I am arguing in favor of the labor theory of value. One of the
achievements of marginalism in economics and legal realism in property law was to point out the
flaws of both the Marxist labor theory of value and the conventional vision of property which it
opposed.
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something we want to know. Apart from this pragmatic concern, I have
a more intangible one-Ideologiekritik rather than policy analysis.
Marx's errors notwithstanding, it is important to see the lacunae and
contentious assumptions involved in a particular society's discourse of
entitlement-the language in which entitlement to that particular society's primary resources is both described and justified. 308 To have a critical understanding of the rhetoric of entitlement in an information
society, one would need an analysis of conventional discourse about
information as well as of the more complicated, more sophisticated, and
more highly formalized version of that discourse provided by the language of microeconomics. I have tried to provide both here.

2.

Information Overload
My second alternative future is strongly counterintuitive, for it discards not only the basic assumption of post-Enlightenment thought that
more information is always a good,309 but also the assumption that the
rate of progress of science and society will vary directly with the rate of
accumulation of information. I offer the idea anyway, not because I
believe it will necessarily happen, but because the very possibility of this
set of events tends to be suppressed by the uncritical acceptance of an
Enlightenment view of information. 3to
It could be that we are headed for an information overload-a
brownout caused by overproduction and consumption of information.
This is an idea that ought to be familiar to the legal profession. During
the '80s, bright young lawyers worked hundreds of thousands of hours
on contested tender offers and leveraged buyouts. They pored through
corporate documents, built up electronic databases to keep track of their
research, searched for any case, treatise, or law review article that could
308. I think that Foucault would have agreed with this point, even as he would have insisted
(again rightly in my view) that grand theory offers exactly the wrong method tofind and criticize
this "discourse."
309. See DREzE, supra note 73.
310. I say this in part because what little writing there is on the impact of "the information
society" on law has been profoundly meliorist and optimistic. See. e.g.• M. ETHAN KATSCH, THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989). Professor Katsch believes that
greater access to information may undermine "abstractions of the law," "such as rights." ld. at 26265. He seems to believe that this process will make the law more "humane," a word that appears
here-as it does in some early critica1legal theory, see Boyle, supra note 272-to be an antonym of
"abstract." Yet his other positions seem marked by a mainstream liberalism that prods me into
wondering whether he wants "abstractions" like "the right of free speech" to be undermined. When
he says that the information age will make law more like a conversation, I find myself wondering
who will get to talk and who will have to listen. Finally, when he says that privacy will "change,"
id. at 168-97, I find myself beset by dystopian images entirely unlike the ones that appear, from his
tone, to be intended by that phrase. All of Professor Katsch's assessments may be right-a
transformation devoutly to be wished, no doubt-but it is hard to escape the conclusion that he is
able to be so vague and yet so optimistic precisely because he is talking about information-the
lifeblood of the Enlightenment. It is from that feeling of unexamined possibilities, contrariness, and
general "humbuggery" that this dystopia arises.
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give their side an edge, and checked every possible line of authority on
computerized legal research services. They even rechecked the final
product an hour before filing just to make sure that no more recent decision had been added. On the other side, opposing attorneys did exactly
the same thing. Even if one believes that all those takeovers actually led
to a more efficient allocation of resources, it is hard to believe that the
legal process would not have been just as efficient and just as equitable if
both sides had commanded a slightly lower level of effort.
We could describe this legal equivalent of the nuclear arms race in
terms of market failure, inefficient discovery rules, prisoners' dilemmas,
or hyperlexis. But any thorough analysis would have to concede that one
of the problems was not just hyperlexis, but Hyper-LEXIS-an explosion
of the availability of information that, under a particular set of societal
assumptions and background rules, sometimes leads to a socially irrational investment of resources. There is no a priori reason that the idea
must be confined to the adversary system. We might imagine a world in
which inventors were overwhelmed by the difficulty of searching patent
banks, where specialists found it impossible to keep up in their fields,
where researchers worked in increasing isolation-an isolation produced
by the sheer quantity of available information. Increasing specialization,
balkanization of the disciplines, an irrational fixation on "authority" and
cross reference, and a scholarly habit of conspicuous citation,311 even an
erosion of public debate by information overload-these signs are not so
very alien to the world we live in that we can afford to dismiss them
completely. Nor are they so different from the results one would expect
in a world that romanticizes authorship and focuses overwhelmingly on
incentives to the immediate producer. That might be food for thought.
In the 1930s, welfare economists used the example of the factory
that pours pollution into the air but pays nothing for its use. In that
case, they declared, a failure to internalize all externalities causes overproduction. If the full social costs of production were taken into
account, the current high levels of production might prove uneconomical. Maybe a future Pigou will write an analysis of the blindness of information economics at the close of the twentieth century3I2 and will point
311. I have to say that I like the irony of saying this at the end of a huge Article whose myriad
footnotes are the fruit of every electronic research service the world has to offer.
312. Cf. D.M. Lamberton, The Emergence of Information Economics, in COMMUNICATION
AND INFORMATION EcONOMICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES 7, 7-22 (Meheroo Jussawalla & Helene
Ebenfield eds., 1984).
The emergence of information economics can be seen as a response to the deficiencies of
economic theory based on perfect knowledge, the failures of policy, or the spectacular
advent of intelligent electronics with greatly enhanced capacity for communication,
computation, and control. Whichever is the preferred interpretation, it remains a personal
judgment whether the battle for recognition and respectability has only just been joined, is
well advanced, has been won or perhaps been lost.
Id. at 7.
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out that we were oblivious to the "information pollution" we were creating, that our economics did not force us to internalize the consequences
of our overproduction, leaving us free to continue to "pollute.,,313 Like
the welfare economics of the thirties, the economics of information might
well lay part of the blame on an ideological insistence on the image of the
isolated economic actor. For us, that actor is the author. Our romance
is almost as great as the romance with which the classical economists
endowed the self-reliant economic atoms of the Lochner era.

3.

Information Politics
What of the realms in which the author-figure apparently does not
play so great a role? What of public debate, privacy, or requirements for
disclosure of information advantage in market transactions?314 Here I
am most optimistic. My own views are loosely egalitarian and I favor an
expanded and decentralized view of democracy.3lS But egalitarianism
and democracy are norms that liberalism confines to a comparatively
narrow sphere-as evidenced by everything from the state action requirement to the notion of formal equality in the public sphere. One way to
express my conclusions is that, on information issues, liberal political
theory is less restrictive. Consequently, from my perspective many of the
criticisms aimed at liberalism are less powerful. Precisely because information is conceived of as being different from other forms of wealth and
power, precisely because it seems like an "infinite" resource, it does not
get exiled to the world of civil society. Information disparities are not
simply taken as "given," as a postulate that must be accepted before we
begin. Thus, to me it seems that judges are more willing to strike down
bargains on the basis of information disparities than other forms of (nonphysical) power disparities, that legislatures are willing to criminalize
313. Because of the "infinite" vision of information I discussed earlier, we do not view
information as a good, the maximization of which is sometimes harmful. But a moment's reflection
should reveal occasions when the unbridled growth of information may actually be hurtful. Some
decisions become harder with more information. See DREZE, supra note 73. When we think of
information not as a good, but as the lifeblood of the public sphere of debate, or the perfect
information of a market model, we ignore the constraints produced by overproduction. For
example, given a retrieval system of a limited capacity, I will prefer to have a smaller database that
will give me answers 50% of the time than to add the information necessary to give answers 100% of
the time but which so overwhelms my abilities to retrieve and process data that I can only find the
answer 40% of the time. In neoclassical price theory, these kinds of trade-offs are exactly the ones
that market decisions make so well. Yet the point of this paper has been to show that the double
quality of information-both part of the model and a good to be traded under the model-may
prevent the operation of economic feedback mechanisms on the level of market behavior, and may
make questions of microeconomic analysis undecidable on the level of scholarship. As the case of
the polluting factory shows, the parallel to welfare economics operates at both levels, the practical
and the theoretical.
314. Of course, as I tried to show earlier, the author ideal often does appear in that particular
issue, especially when analyzed by Professor Manne.
315. While admitting that these are abstractions that do not resolve concrete cases, that they
frequently contradict each other, and so on, and so on.
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insider trading but not other forms of market advantage, that people who
see nothing wrong in the state refusing to fund abortion clinics find Rust
v. Sullivan troubling. When we are analyzing disclosure requirements or
the extent of a duty to warn, we are more willing to look at outcomes and
results, rather than uniformly equal access-to take into account the
actual educational level, social class, and native language of those who
are the targets of the warnings, rather than conclusively assuming a formal equality.
Whatever the practical limits of these "exceptions"-and at the
moment I would accept them to be enormous-it seems that we apply
egalitarian norms more broadly when we are dealing with information
rather than with some other form of wealth or power. If we are indeed
moving towards an "information-based society"-whatever that
means-then we are doing so with a reservoir of egalitarian cultural
understandings and political ideals. This fact, in and of itself, guarantees
nothing at all. But it is not unimportant, and from my perspective, it is a
very good thing.
What about privacy? Egalitarian and redistributive political solutions can be supported by arguments keyed to the requirements of the
individual ("to flourish, every human being needs ...") or supposedly
deduced from abstract distributional principles. The interesting thing
about privacy is that it follows the former strategy and thus offers up a
view of human personality that has normative implications about the
control of resources. To be fully a person, one must have control over
(fill in the blank). The resource named is information. Again, a society
that often has a hard time imagining that persons need control over food,
shelter, medical care, and so on, can find room for the idea that the most
intimate sphere of personhood must be defined in part by a right to control information-the right of privacy.
When Warren and Brandeis wrote their article, this may not have
seemed like much of a challenge to the distribution of power in society.
In a society based on the transmission, accumulation, and manipulation
of information, it might seem rather more of one. Of course, it could
tum out that the ideal of privacy was precisely the basis needed for a
discourse of entitlement in an information society. It could be manipulated to allow an electronic society to justify the appropriation of intimate details, just as the labor theory of property was used by Locke to
"boot himself up" into market society. Again, one must resist the temptation to reason from rhetoric to reality. Nevertheless, it seems to me
that the gradient of argument runs the other way. Using the concept of
privacy, one is arguing downhill when challenging the imperial tendencies of a data-based society and arguing uphill when supporting them.
The question that remains to be answered is whether the social harm
we should be most concerned about is underproduction, overproduction,
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the tragedy of the commons, the commercialization of an electronic public sphere, the corrosive effect of information technology on privacy, or
merely straightforward distributional inequity. This Article cannot
answer that question. Indeed, I have tried to show that there are conceptual reasons why the question is unanswerable in the abstract. But my
argument does show that the way that we currently think about information may actually blind us to important aspects of each one of those
problems, making us that little bit more helpless in the face of them. On
the other hand, some of our current ideas about information offer reservoirs of strategy, tactics, and social belief that-when viewed in the
abstract-seem egalitarian in the extreme. To someone like me, who
believes a lot of our social ills come from the restriction of egalitarian
norms, that fact has an optimistic ring.
We should be careful in drawing too strong a conclusion from this
analysis. I have tried to offer a theory of information, but the theory is
more like a road map or a tool kit than a blueprint or an algorithm. One
cannot deduce social consequences from the existence of an authorship
theory of intellectual property or an information-centered vision of privacy. This Article can point out tendencies and gradients of argument.
It can describe the process of typing information as public or private,
finite or infinite. It can work out some of the reasons that the romantic
vision of authorship spreads far beyond copyright. It can show the
aporias at the heart of information economics. It can prognosticate
about the way that the rhetoric and ideology of the past will interact with
the social arrangements of the future. It can suggest that the information
age may be constructed in part around the conflicting valences of a
romantic, individualistic notion of information production, an egalitarian
notion of public information, and a theory of privacy based on a notion
of positive liberty. Ultimately, however, it must end on a note of uncertainty. And that, it strikes me, is entirely appropriate to both its subject
and its theme.

